v. Luna

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY
August 20, 2020
2020COA123
No. 16CA1993, People v. Luna — Children’s Code — Direct
Filing; Criminal Law — Jury Instructions — Self-Defense
In this appeal of a juvenile’s conviction under the direct-file
statute, § 19-2-517, C.R.S. 2019, a division of the court of appeals
concludes that the district court improperly instructed the jury
regarding the applicability of self-defense to alleged reckless
conduct. The division also concludes that, as a juvenile, the
defendant was not entitled to have the jury instructed with a
“reasonable child” instruction for his claim of self-defense.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2020COA123
Court of Appeals No. 16CA1993
Adams County District Court No. 15CR2757
Honorable Thomas R. Ensor, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Jorge Alejandro Luna,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE TERRY
Freyre and Lipinsky, JJ., concur
Announced August 20, 2020
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Gabriel P. Olivares, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Casey M. Klekas, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 In this appeal of a juvenile’s conviction under the direct-file
statute, § 19-2-517, C.R.S. 2019, we address a problem originally
discussed in People v. McClelland, 2015 COA 1. As in that case, we
conclude that the district court’s instruction to the jury improperly
described self-defense in the context of alleged reckless conduct.
We also consider and reject the argument that, as a juvenile,
defendant, Jorge Alejandro Luna, was entitled to have the jury
instructed with a “reasonable child” instruction.
¶2 Luna appeals the judgment of conviction entered on jury
verdicts finding him guilty of attempted reckless manslaughter and
second degree assault (heat of passion), and also appeals the
restitution order. We reverse the conviction and remand for a new
trial.
I. Background
¶3 Luna, a juvenile at the time, was living with T.M. Luna was at
home when T.M. and her boyfriend, J.P. (the victim), arrived
intoxicated. After T.M. went upstairs, J.P. approached Luna to
speak to him about picking up after himself.
¶4 J.P. testified that he had no memory of the events that took
place after he spoke with Luna, and that he woke up with nine stab
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wounds. Luna fled the scene but turned himself in to authorities
weeks later.
¶5 The prosecution charged Luna with one count of attempted
first degree murder, one count of first degree assault, and two crime
of violence counts. Luna was just under age eighteen at the time of
the charged incident, and the prosecution successfully moved to
have the case direct-filed against him in district court under section
19-2-517, allowing him to be tried as an adult.
¶6 Luna testified at trial that he stabbed J.P. in self-defense after
J.P. physically assaulted him multiple times. The jury acquitted
him of attempted first degree murder and first degree assault but
found him guilty of the lesser charges of attempted reckless
manslaughter and second degree assault (heat of passion).
II. The Court’s Self-Defense Instruction
¶7 The trial court crafted its own self-defense instruction, which
it gave at trial. Luna argues that the court’s self-defense
instruction was contradictory and misstated the law of self-defense
as it applies to crimes requiring recklessness, extreme indifference,
or criminal negligence. We agree.
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A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶8 We review jury instructions de novo to determine whether the
instructions as a whole accurately informed the jury of the
governing law. People v. Sandoval, 2018 COA 156, ¶ 11.
¶9 Because Luna did not object to the court’s self-defense
instruction, we will reverse only if any error was plain. Hoggard v.
People, 2020 CO 54, ¶ 13. For an error to be deemed plain, it must
be both obvious and substantial. To be substantial, the error must
so undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial itself as to cast
serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction. Id.
¶ 10 Generally speaking, there are two types of defenses to a
criminal charge: (1) affirmative defenses, which seek to justify,
excuse, or mitigate the commission of the act; and (2) traverses,
which effectively refute the possibility that the defendant committed
the charged act by negating an element of the offense. People v.
Pickering, 276 P.3d 553, 555 (Colo. 2011).
¶ 11 Self-defense is an affirmative defense to crimes requiring proof
of intent, knowledge, or willfulness. If a defendant charged with
such a crime raises credible evidence that he acted in self-defense,
the trial court must instruct the jury that the prosecution has the
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burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
did not act in self-defense. Id. at 556. However, “[w]ith respect to
crimes requiring recklessness, criminal negligence, or extreme
indifference, . . . self-defense is not an affirmative defense, but
rather an element-negating traverse.” Id. In such cases, the
defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction on self-defense as an
affirmative defense. Id. at 555-56. This is because it is impossible
for a person to act both recklessly and in self-defense. Id. at 556.
Self-defense requires one to act justifiably, see § 18-1-704(1), C.R.S.
2019, while recklessness requires one to act with conscious
disregard of an unjustifiable risk, see § 18-1-501(8), C.R.S. 2019.
¶ 12 Section 18-1-704(4) applies when a defendant who is charged
with a crime involving recklessness, criminal negligence, or extreme
indifference presents evidence of self-defense. It provides:
In a case in which the defendant is not entitled
to a jury instruction regarding self-defense as
an affirmative defense, the court shall allow
the defendant to present evidence, when
relevant, that he or she was acting in
self-defense. If the defendant presents
evidence of self-defense, the court shall
instruct the jury with a self-defense law
instruction. The court shall instruct the jury
that it may consider the evidence of
self-defense in determining whether the
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defendant acted recklessly, with extreme
indifference, or in a criminally negligent
manner. However, the self-defense law
instruction shall not be an affirmative defense
instruction and the prosecuting attorney shall
not have the burden of disproving self-defense.
§ 18-1-704(4).
¶ 13 Our supreme court has concluded that an instruction
informing the jury that the prosecution bears no burden of
disproving self-defense with respect to crimes involving
recklessness, extreme indifference, or criminal negligence is an
accurate statement of the law and does not improperly shift the
burden to a criminal defendant to prove one of those mental states.
Pickering, 276 P.3d at 557.
B. Analysis
¶ 14 The court’s self-defense instruction was almost two pages
long. It informed the jury that the evidence in the case had raised
the affirmative defense of self-defense and it outlined the elements
of self-defense. As pertinent here, the instruction also said the
following:
These affirmative defenses do not apply to the
crimes of Attempted reckless Manslaughter,
Second Degree Assault done Recklessly or
Third Degree Assault done with Criminal
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Negligence. You may, however, consider the
evidence presented in determining whether the
prosecution has proven, beyond a reasonable
doubt, the culpable mental states of
“Recklessly” or “Criminally Negligen[t]” which
are required for the commission of those
offenses. If the defendant acted in self-defense,
then he cannot be found guilty of “Reckless”
conduct or “Criminally Negligent” conduct.
The prosecution has the burden to prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
Defendant’s conduct was not legally authorized
by these defenses. In order to meet this
burden of proof, the prosecution must
disprove, beyond a reasonable doubt, at least
one of the above numbered conditions.
After considering all the evidence, if you
decide the prosecution has failed to meet this
burden of proof, then the prosecution has
failed to prove the Defendant’s conduct was
not legally authorized by these defenses, which
is an essential element of Attempted First
Degree Murder, Attempted Second Degree
Murder, and First Degree Assault. In that
event, you must find that the defendant did
not commit the crimes of Attempted First
Degree Murder, Attempted Second Degree
Murder, and First Degree Assault.
After considering all the evidence, if you
decide the prosecution has met this burden of
proof, then the prosecution has proved that
the Defendant’s conduct was not legally
authorized by this defense. In that event, your
verdicts concerning the charges of Attempted
First Degree Murder, Attempted Second Degree
Murder, Attempted Manslaughter, First Degree
Assault, Second Degree Assault done
Recklessly and Third Degree Assault done with
Criminal Negligence, must depend on your
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determination whether the prosecution has
met its burden of proof with respect to the
remaining elements of those offenses.
(Emphasis added.) Neither Luna’s counsel nor the prosecutor
objected to the court’s instruction.
¶ 15 We conclude that the court’s self-defense instruction
constituted plain error in light of McClelland, ¶ 24 (because the
reckless manslaughter instruction directed the jury not to apply the
instruction that explained the legal meaning of self-defense, the jury
received no guidance as to the meaning of self-defense with respect
to the offense of reckless manslaughter).
¶ 16 The court’s instruction was self-contradictory. On the one
hand, it correctly instructed that, if Luna acted in self-defense, then
he could not be found guilty of “reckless” or “criminally negligent”
conduct. But on the other hand, it told jurors that the affirmative
defense of self-defense does not apply to attempted reckless
manslaughter or to second degree assault “done recklessly.” And
while it is technically correct that the affirmative defense of
self-defense does not apply to those charges, no attempt was made
to explain the fine, but significant, distinction between an
“affirmative defense” and a traverse.
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¶ 17 This is similar to the error that resulted in reversal in
McClelland. See id. (reversal was required where instruction
“informed the jury that, when considering the charge of reckless
manslaughter, it could consider ‘evidence of self-defense,’ while
simultaneously advising it that . . . the only jury instruction
describing the law of self-defense in Colorado . . . did not apply”).
McClelland held that by instructing the jury that the affirmative
defense of self-defense “did not apply” to crimes of recklessness, the
instruction conflicted with section 18-1-704(4)’s requirement that
the trial court give the jury a self-defense instruction that outlines
the elements of self-defense law. Id. It held this way because such
an instruction could have deterred the jury from considering the
elements of self-defense when deciding whether the defendant acted
recklessly. See id. at ¶ 32 (instructing the jury that the self-defense
instruction did not apply could have led the jurors to erroneously
conclude that the defendant had a duty to retreat).
¶ 18 The same problem is presented by the court’s instructions
here. Logically, jurors would have been unable to reconcile the
conflicting instructions they were given. It is quite possible that
jurors simply concluded they did not need to consider all the
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elements of self-defense when determining whether Luna committed
the charged crimes recklessly or criminally negligently.
¶ 19 Because the instructional error contravened Colorado case
law, we conclude that it was obvious. See Scott v. People, 2017 CO
16, ¶ 16; see also People v. Bachofer, 192 P.3d 454, 463 (Colo. App.
2008) (contradictory self-defense instructions are “plainly wrong”).
¶ 20 We also conclude that the instructional error contributed to
Luna’s convictions. Luna admitted to stabbing J.P. but claimed
that he did so in self-defense because he was being assaulted by
J.P., who was a larger, very intoxicated adult. The issue of self-
defense was therefore central to the case and a thorough
understanding of self-defense law was required.
¶ 21 Moreover, the jury acquitted Luna of the knowing and
intentional crimes of attempted first degree murder, attempted
second degree murder, and first degree assault — all the counts for
which the jury was properly instructed on the law of self-defense.
In contrast, the jury convicted Luna of attempted reckless
manslaughter and second degree assault (heat of passion) — counts
for which the jury was not properly instructed on the law of
self-defense.
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¶ 22 This disparity replicates the circumstances in McClelland, ¶ 28
(instruction contributed to the defendant’s conviction where the
jury acquitted him of first and second degree murder — counts on
which the trial court properly instructed the jury on self-defense —
but found him guilty of reckless manslaughter, as to which the
court failed to properly instruct on self-defense).
¶ 23 Because the instructional error seriously prejudiced Luna and
was therefore substantial, we conclude that the error requires
reversal.
III. The “Reasonable Child” Instruction
¶ 24 Luna next argues that the trial court erred by denying his
tendered “reasonable child” instruction. Because this issue is likely
to arise on remand, we consider and reject his assertion.
A. Applicable Law
¶ 25 In evaluating the reasonableness of a defendant’s belief in the
need to take defensive action, a jury must consider the totality of
the circumstances, including the perceptions of the defendant.
Kaufman v. People, 202 P.3d 542, 551 (Colo. 2009).
¶ 26 Self-defense under section 18-1-704 takes into account both
the reasonable belief and the actual belief of the defendant. People
10
v. Willner, 879 P.2d 19, 22 (Colo. 1994). Although the affirmative
defense of self-defense takes into account the actual belief or state
of mind of a defendant, it ultimately requires that a reasonable
person would have believed and acted as the defendant did. People
v. Vasquez, 148 P.3d 326, 330 (Colo. App. 2006). In this context, a
“reasonable person” means an objectively reasonable individual.
Id.; see also People v. Toler, 981 P.2d 1096, 1099 (Colo. App. 1998)
(court may properly refuse to give an instruction that calls only for
a subjective test), aff’d, 9 P.3d 341 (Colo. 2000).
B. Analysis
¶ 27 Luna’s attorney tendered the following “reasonable child”
instruction:
In determining whether Jorge Luna acted
reasonably, you are instructed that a
reasonable child is defined as a reasonable
child in Mr. Luna’s situation and
circumstances.
Furthermore, in determining whether Mr.
Luna reasonably believed that [the victim’s]
use of unlawful force was imminent, you must
consider the circumstances surrounding Mr.
Luna’s actions as they appeared to him at the
time and not with the benefit of hindsight.
When assessing the reasonableness of
Mr. Luna’s beliefs, you should consider that
children are generally less mature and
responsible than adults, and often lack the
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experience, intelligence, perspective, and
judgment necessary to evaluate consequences
and risks. These attributes/qualities of youth
often result in impetuous and ill-considered
actions and decisions.
¶ 28 Luna’s attorney argued that the instruction was proper under
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (2011), which held that the
lower court erred by applying the same standard of reasonableness
to juveniles as for an adult in the context of the advisement
required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The court
denied Luna’s attorney’s tendered instruction, concluding, without
explanation, that J.D.B. was “not binding on this court” and that it
did not deal specifically with this issue. The court noted that
Luna’s counsel could still argue the differences between adult and
child culpability, but that the court would not give an instruction
about those differences.
¶ 29 Luna contends that Supreme Court precedents that have
distinguished the culpability of a juvenile from that of an adult
require a jury to apply a reasonable child standard in evaluating a
juvenile’s actions when claiming self-defense. Luna, however, does
not cite any authority to support his assertion that the reasonable
child standard applies to self-defense claims asserted by juveniles.
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¶ 30 J.D.B. does not discuss, let alone mandate, a reasonable child
instruction — or any jury instruction, for that matter. The case
merely holds that, so long as a child’s age is known or objectively
apparent to a reasonable interrogating officer, the child’s age should
be considered as part of the analysis of whether the child was in
custody for purposes of Miranda. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 277.
¶ 31 Colorado’s self-defense statute allows for consideration of the
defendant’s age and circumstances. The statute requires the jury
to consider whether the defendant reasonably believed and did in
fact believe that he was in imminent danger. § 18-1-704(2)(a). It
therefore allows a juvenile defendant to argue his subjective belief
and the circumstances that formed that belief, including his age.
Because there is no basis under J.D.B. to create a “reasonable
child” jury instruction, and because “it is the constitutional
prerogative of the legislature to define crimes and to establish
affirmative defenses for acts that might otherwise be criminal,”
People v. Gilliland, 769 P.2d 477, 480 (Colo. 1989), we decline to
create such a standard out of whole cloth.
¶ 32 But we are not adopting any sort of rule that would prohibit a
juvenile defendant from arguing that his age was a factor in
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determining whether he reasonably believed he was entitled to act
in self-defense. In our view, such a rule would be inconsistent with
J.D.B. See J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 277 (a child’s age is a factor that
courts cannot simply ignore).
¶ 33 We conclude that the trial court did not err by denying Luna’s
“reasonable child” instruction.
¶ 34 The self-defense instruction that was given properly instructed
the jury to consider Luna’s subjective state of mind and the totality
of the circumstances. The instruction informed the jury that
self-defense is proper when a person “has reasonable grounds for
believing, and does in fact actually believe that there is imminent
danger of injury,” and that the jury was to “consider all of the
circumstances surrounding the defendant’s conduct which existed
at the time of the act.” This instruction sufficiently apprised the
jury of the law of self-defense as it applied to Luna. Cf. Beckett v.
People, 800 P.2d 74, 78-79 (Colo. 1990) (separate instruction on
“apparent necessity” was not necessary, and court’s instruction was
sufficient where it allowed for use of self-defense based on what the
defendant “reasonably believed”).
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IV. Other Issues
¶ 35 Luna also argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct
and that the trial court erred by ordering restitution. Because we
do not anticipate these issues to arise again on retrial, we decline to
address them.
V. Conclusion
¶ 36 The judgment of conviction is reversed, and the case is
remanded for a new trial.
JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE LIPINSKY concur.
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