Peo v. Taylor

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY
May 14, 2020
2020COA79
No. 17CA2273, Peo v Taylor — Criminal Law — Rights of
Defendant — Speedy Trial
A division of the court of appeals considers whether a district
court may extend a defendant’s speedy trial deadline under section
18‑1‑405(3.5), C.R.S. 2019, which refers to failure to appear on the
“trial date,” when the defendant fails to appear at a pretrial
readiness conference conducted on the day before trial. The
division concludes it may not because the date of a pretrial hearing
is not the “trial date.”
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2020COA79
Court of Appeals No. 17CA2273
El Paso County District Court No. 16CR1475
Honorable Larry E. Schwartz, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Paul Anthony Taylor,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT VACATED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY
Fox and Berger, JJ., concur
Announced May 14, 2020
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brittany L. Limes, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Tanja Heggins, Alternate Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-
Appellant
¶1 The Colorado speedy trial statute, section 18-1-405(1), C.R.S.
2019, requires that a person accused of a crime be “brought to
trial” within six months of his or her not guilty plea. Section
18-1-405(3.5) provides that the six-month period is extended if the
defendant fails to appear on the “trial date.”
¶2 In this case, the district court held that the failure of
defendant, Paul Anthony Taylor, to appear for a pretrial hearing
extended the six-month speedy trial period. But the date of a
pretrial hearing is not the “trial date.” As a consequence of this
misreading of the speedy trial statute, the district court set Taylor’s
trial for a date more than six months after his not guilty plea.
¶3 Because the district court violated Taylor’s statutory right to a
speedy trial, we grant Taylor the only remedy the law permits for a
speedy trial violation. We vacate the judgment of conviction and
remand to the district court with instructions to dismiss the
charges filed against Taylor with prejudice.
I. Background
¶4 A Colorado Springs police officer pulled Taylor over for turning
into a parking lot without signaling. Through a check on the
vehicle’s license plate number, the officer discovered that the car
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had been stolen. A second officer placed Taylor in handcuffs, while
the first officer inventoried Taylor’s car. During the inventory, the
officer found marijuana, an open container of alcohol, a
methamphetamine pipe, and a baggie containing
methamphetamine.
¶5 Taylor was charged with aggravated motor vehicle theft,
possession of a controlled substance, possession with intent to
manufacture or distribute marijuana or marijuana concentrate,
driving under restraint, failure to signal for a turn, and illegal
possession or consumption of alcohol in a motor vehicle. Taylor
pleaded not guilty to the charges on August 29, 2016.
¶6 The district court set a pretrial readiness conference for 9:00
a.m. on January 23, 2017, and set his jury trial for the same time
on January 24, 2017.
¶7 Although Taylor failed to appear for the pretrial readiness
conference at 9 a.m. on January 23, 2017, his defense counsel was
present. The district court agreed to recall the case at 1:30 p.m. so
that defense counsel could attempt to contact Taylor. When the
case was recalled, Taylor was not present, and his counsel informed
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the court that he had been unable to reach Taylor. The court
issued a warrant for Taylor’s arrest.
¶8 The clerk then asked the court, “Waiver of speedy trial as of
today?” and the court answered, “Yes.” Defense counsel inquired, “I
assume vacate tomorrow’s trial date?” and the court responded,
“Yes.”
¶9 At 4:45 p.m. that same day, Taylor arrived at the court
without counsel. The court again recalled the case. Taylor asked if
he could explain “what happened.” The court replied, “I don’t want
you to make any statements that might come back to haunt you”
and refused to let Taylor make a statement outside the presence of
his attorney.
¶ 10 Taylor and his attorney did not appear in court for a trial on
January 24 because the court had vacated the trial date the
previous day.
¶ 11 On February 6, 2017, Taylor appeared before the court with
counsel, who requested that Taylor’s trial be set within the speedy
trial period. The court asked, “[W]hen was the last waiver of speedy
trial?” and defense counsel responded that there “[s]hould have
been no previous waivers.” He explained that he and Taylor had
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appeared at a pretrial readiness conference on December 19, 2016,
at which the prosecution had moved to continue the trial. The
court had granted the continuance over the defense’s objection.
Counsel continued,
As we stated Mr. Taylor appeared six hours
tardy for readiness on [January] 23. He was
taken into custody. So obviously [he] would
have been available for trial on [January] 24.
I note that there was no finding of speedy —
waiver of speedy made at any time when Mr.
Taylor was represented by counsel.
¶ 12 The clerk clarified that Taylor’s failure to appear was “deemed
waiver of speedy trial on January 23.” The court stated:
He was not here on the date that I made the
trial call. Then the question is whether or not
that constitutes a waiver as opposed to the
next day. When we are normally set.
I conclude there was a waiver of speedy trial.
That is our trial call time. The fact that we
could not have a jury present does not change
my opinion on that. Nor the fact that he was
in custody the next day.
So we will reset it within six months of the
date he failed to appear.
¶ 13 The following day, the court issued supplemental findings to
support its finding of a waiver of speedy trial. In the supplemental
findings, the court stated that on “January 24, the date set to begin
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jury selection, neither the defendant nor his attorney was present.”
The court concluded that “by failing to appear at trial call on
January 23 and failing to be present to demand trial on January
24, the defendant waived his right to a speedy trial.”
¶ 14 During a subsequent pretrial hearing, Taylor moved to dismiss
the charges against him on speedy trial grounds. The court denied
his motion. After the prosecution was granted a second
continuance over Taylor’s objections, Taylor’s trial was eventually
held on June 20-21, 2017, nearly ten months after Taylor entered
his not guilty plea. A jury found Taylor guilty of aggravated motor
vehicle theft, possession of a controlled substance, possession of
marijuana, failure to signal for a turn, and illegal possession or
consumption of alcohol in a motor vehicle.
¶ 15 On appeal, Taylor argues that (1) the district court violated his
statutory right to a speedy trial; (2) the district court violated his
constitutional rights when it prevented his counsel from raising an
affirmative defense of recreational marijuana; (3) there was
insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions for aggravated motor
vehicle theft and possession of a controlled substance; (4) the
district court erred by admitting hearsay testimony that the vehicle
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he was driving had been reported as stolen; (5) the district court
erred by denying his request to appoint substitute counsel; and (6)
the cumulative effect of the district court’s errors requires reversal.
II. The Statutory Right to a Speedy Trial
A. Standard of Review
¶ 16 When a district court denies “a defendant’s motion to dismiss
based on its application of a speedy trial statute to undisputed
facts, our review is de novo.” People v. Desantiago, 2014 COA 66M,
¶ 12, 409 P.3d 389, 391. “We also review de novo an issue of
statutory interpretation.” Id.
B. Applicable Law
¶ 17 Section 18-1-405(1) is clear: a person accused of a crime must
be “brought to trial” within six months of the date on which he or
she pleaded not guilty. See also Crim. P. 48(b)(1). However, “[i]f a
trial date has been fixed by the court and the defendant fails to
make an appearance in person on the trial date, the period within
which the trial shall be had is extended for an additional six-month
period from the date of the defendant’s next appearance.”
§ 18-1-405(3.5) (emphasis added).
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¶ 18 The duty to pursue trial within the speedy trial deadline rests
with the People and the district court. People v. DeGreat, 2020 CO
25, ¶ 11, ___ P.3d ___, ___. The remedy for a speedy trial violation
is dismissal of charges with prejudice. Id.
III. The District Court Violated Taylor’s Statutory Right to a
Speedy Trial
¶ 19 Taylor contends that his judgment of conviction must be
vacated because the district court violated his right to a speedy
trial. He argues that he did not waive his right to a speedy trial
under section 18-1-405(3.5) when he appeared six hours late to the
pretrial readiness conference on January 23, 2017. We agree.
¶ 20 The People first argue that the district court did not err by
denying Taylor’s motion to dismiss because, under People v. Peltz,
697 P.2d 766 (Colo. App. 1984), aff’d, 728 P.2d 1271 (Colo. 1986),
the pretrial readiness conference on January 23, 2017, fits within
the meaning of “brought to trial,” and that Taylor’s failure to appear
at the conference was adequate grounds to restart the speedy trial
period. But this argument misreads the statute.
¶ 21 Section 18-1-405(3.5) does not extend the speedy trial period if
the defendant fails to appear in person on the date he or she is
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“brought to trial.” It states that the speedy trial period is extended
for an additional six months if “the defendant fails to make an
appearance in person on the trial date.” § 18-1-405(3.5) (emphasis
added). (The language “brought to trial” appears in the definition of
the conclusion of the speedy trial period. See § 18-1-405(1)
(requiring that a defendant’s charges be dismissed with prejudice if
the defendant is “not brought to trial on the issues raised by the
complaint, information, or indictment within six months from the
date of the entry of a plea of not guilty”) (emphasis added). Thus,
the question before us is not whether a pretrial readiness
conference falls within the meaning of “brought to trial.”)
¶ 22 The meaning of “trial date” is clear in the context of section
18-1-405(3.5) and is distinct from the meaning of “pretrial
readiness conference.” See Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four
Venture, L.L.C., 3 P.3d 30, 35 (Colo. 2000) (“When construing the
meaning of a statute, reviewing courts should first consider the
statutory language and give the words their plain and ordinary
meaning.”); see also Desantiago, ¶ 13, 409 P.3d at 391 (“As long as
the meaning of such words is unambiguous, we need not rely on
interpretive rules of statutory construction.”). Logically, a trial
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judge would not order parties to appear for a “pretrial readiness
conference” by directing them to show up on the “trial date”
because a pretrial conference is not a trial. Thus, we cannot
support the People’s overbroad reading of “trial date.”
¶ 23 Taylor failed to appear for a pretrial readiness conference.
Because it is clear that the pretrial readiness conference was not
Taylor’s trial date, his failure to appear in court at 9:00 a.m. and
again at 1:30 p.m. on January 23, 2017, did not authorize the
district court to rely on section 18-1-405(3.5) to extend his speedy
trial period an additional six months. See People ex rel. Gallagher v.
Dist. Court, 933 P.2d 583, 589-90 (Colo. 1997) (holding that a delay
caused by a defendant’s failure to appear at a pretrial hearing “does
not constitute a waiver of speedy trial under section 18-1-405(3)
such that a new six month period begins to run”).
¶ 24 The speedy trial statute provides a remedy for a delay caused
by the defendant’s voluntary absence from a pretrial hearing. See
People ex rel. Gallagher, 933 P.2d 583 at 589-90; see also
§ 18-1-405(6)(d). The trial court may add a period of time that is
reasonably attributable to the “delay resulting from the voluntary
absence or unavailability of the defendant” to the end of defendant’s
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original six-month speedy trial period. § 18-1-405(6)(d); see People
ex rel. Gallagher, 933 P.2d at 588 (“[T]he time period ‘resulting from’
a defendant’s unavailability or absence includes a reasonable period
in which to reschedule and prepare for trial a case that has been
postponed.”). However, the district court did not find, and the
People do not argue, that the delay caused by Taylor’s failure to
appear reasonably warranted the addition of four months at the end
of Taylor’s speedy trial period under 18-1-405(6)(d). For this
reason, we do not consider this argument.
¶ 25 The People further argue that, even if Taylor’s trial date was
January 24, 2017, the district court properly restarted his speedy
trial period under section 18-1-405(3.5) because he failed to appear
on that date. This argument is unpersuasive because the district
court struck the January 24 trial date on January 23. Defendants
are not required to appear in court on vacated trial dates.
¶ 26 Section 18-1-405(3.5) resets the speedy trial period “[i]f a trial
date has been fixed by the court and the defendant fails to make an
appearance in person on the trial date.” Although the court fixed
Taylor’s trial date when it set the case for trial on January 24,
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2017, the district court “unfixed” the trial date by vacating Taylor’s
trial on the afternoon of January 23, 2017.
¶ 27 As a result, when Taylor failed to appear in court on January
24, 2017, he was not in violation of section 18-1-405(3.5) because
the trial date was no longer “fixed by the court.” He did not have a
trial date. For this reason, Taylor’s speedy trial period was not reset
when he failed to appear in court on January 24, 2017. (Taylor also
argues that he did not fail to appear on January 24, 2017, because
he was in custody on that date — as a result of failing to appear the
previous day — and was, therefore, available to be transported to
court. We do not consider whether the fact that a defendant was in
custody and available to be transported to court is sufficient to
establish that he appeared in court on his trial date because we
conclude that Taylor no longer had a trial date.)
¶ 28 Nearly ten months elapsed between August 29, 2016, when
Taylor entered his not guilty plea, and June 20, 2017, when his
trial began, because the court misconstrued section 18-1-405(3.5).
This time period exceeded the six-month statutory speedy trial
period. Thus, we conclude that Taylor’s statutory right to a speedy
trial was violated.
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IV. Remaining Contentions on Appeal
¶ 29 Because we conclude that the district court violated Taylor’s
statutory right to speedy trial, we do not consider Taylor’s other
arguments.
V. Conclusion
¶ 30 Taylor’s judgment of conviction is vacated. The case is
remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss the
charges against Taylor with prejudice.
JUDGE FOX and JUDGE BERGER concur.
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