People v. Bruce E. Bagwell

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY
April 21, 2022
2022COA44
No. 19CA2398, People v. Bagwell — Crimes — Murder in the
First Degree; Criminal Law — Affirmative Defenses — Consent;
Public Health and Environment — End-of-life Options —
Colorado End-of-life Options Act
A division of the court of appeals considers whether a
defendant who intentionally kills a consenting, terminally ill victim
may assert a defense of consent under section 18-1-505, C.R.S.
2021. This statute creates an affirmative defense under certain
circumstances in which the victim consents to the defendant’s
conduct or to the injury the defendant causes. Section 18-1-505(2),
however, states: “When conduct is charged to constitute an offense
because it causes or threatens bodily injury, consent to that
conduct or to the infliction of that injury is a defense only if the
bodily injury consented to or threatened by the conduct consented
to is not serious . . . .”
The division concludes that death is necessarily a bodily injury
that is serious. The division therefore holds that the defense of
consent is not available to a defendant who intentionally kills a
terminally ill victim who consents to her own death.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2022COA44
Court of Appeals No. 19CA2398
Jefferson County District Court No. 19CR490
Honorable Lily W. Oeffler, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Bruce E. Bagwell,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division II
Opinion by JUDGE KUHN
Pawar and Rothenberg*, JJ., concur
Announced April 21, 2022
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Elizabeth Rohrbough, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Katherine Brien, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2021.
¶1 Defendant, Bruce E. Bagwell, appeals his conviction of
intentional first degree murder. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Bagwell was convicted for killing his terminally ill wife of
thirty-six years. Shortly after Bagwell’s wife was diagnosed with
metastatic lung cancer, her health and quality of life began to
deteriorate. Weeks before Bagwell fatally shot her, his wife
experienced declining cognitive function, lapses in consciousness,
and difficulty walking because the cancer had spread to her brain.
She lost approximately forty pounds and needed a walker or
wheelchair to move around their apartment. Her doctor estimated
she had mere months or weeks to live.
¶3 Hospice care was ordered; a hospice nurse began weekly visits
to the Bagwells’ apartment to attend to Bagwell’s wife and bring her
medication for pain management. Bagwell’s wife, though, elected
not to take these medications or undergo the painful cancer
treatments that might have prolonged her life.
¶4 After she allegedly asked Bagwell to end her life each day for
five days straight, he shot her in the apartment they shared — twice
in her head and once in her chest.
1
¶5 Shortly before Bagwell fatally shot his wife, he told her sister
he believed his wife would be dead in approximately two weeks. In
the hour after the shooting, Bagwell admitted to his wife’s father,
his wife’s sister, and the arresting officers that he shot his wife
because she asked him to do so to end her suffering. He told law
enforcement that his wife had begged him to shoot her each of the
preceding five days, and he explained that it was a “mercy killing.”
In a videotaped interrogation, Bagwell again admitted to two
detectives that he had killed his wife.
¶6 Bagwell was charged with first degree murder, a class 1 felony
under section 18-3-102(1)(a), (3), C.R.S. 2021. Before trial, he
moved to suppress his statements to the detectives and endorsed
an affirmative defense of consent under section 18-1-505, C.R.S.
2021. The trial court denied Bagwell’s motion to suppress and
precluded him from asserting his wife’s alleged consent to be killed
as a defense. The trial court reasoned that when the General
Assembly intended to create an affirmative defense to homicide, it
did so explicitly.
¶7 Bagwell was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. He
challenges both the consent and suppression rulings on appeal.
2
II. Affirmative Defense of Consent
¶8 Section 18-1-505 creates an affirmative defense for criminal
defendants under certain circumstances in which the victim
consents to the defendant inflicting the victim’s injury. Bagwell
contends the trial court erred by denying him this defense to the
first degree murder charge. We conclude that section 18-1-505
does not permit this defense when the victim consents to the
defendant causing the victim’s death.
A. The Affirmative Defense of Consent, First Degree Murder,
and Standard of Review
¶9 Section 18-1-505 provides that consent of the victim is an
affirmative defense when, as relevant here, two criteria are met.
§ 18-1-505(1), (2), (4). Subsection (1) makes the defense available if
“the consent negatives an element of the offense or precludes the
infliction of the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law
defining the offense.” § 18-1-505(1); see Hotsenpiller v. Morris, 2017
COA 95, ¶ 24. But even if subsection (1) is satisfied, subsection
(2) may still preclude the defense. It provides that
[w]hen conduct is charged to constitute an
offense because it causes or threatens bodily
injury, consent to that conduct or to the
infliction of that injury is a defense only if the
3
bodily injury consented to or threatened by the
conduct consented to is not serious . . . .
§ 18-1-505(2).
¶ 10 We analyze whether consent can constitute a defense to a
crime in the context of the particular offense and the defendant’s
particular conduct. See Hotsenpiller, ¶ 22 (citing Model Penal Code
§ 2.11 note 1 on General Principles (Am. L. Inst., Official Draft and
Revised Comments 1985)). Bagwell committed first degree murder
if, “[a]fter deliberation and with the intent to cause the death of a
person other than himself, he cause[d] the death of that person.”
§ 18-3-102(1)(a).
¶ 11 Whether section 18-1-505 permits a defense of consent to first
degree murder is a question of statutory interpretation that we
review de novo. See People v. Jones, 2020 CO 45, ¶ 54. If the
defense is available, we also review de novo whether Bagwell
presented sufficient evidence to be entitled to the jury’s
consideration of it. People v. DeGreat, 2018 CO 83, ¶ 16.
¶ 12 “It is the General Assembly’s prerogative to define crimes and
prescribe punishments . . . .” People v. Trujillo, 631 P.2d 146, 148
(Colo. 1981). Our primary goal in statutory interpretation is to
4
discern the legislature’s intent and to “effectuate the purpose of the
legislative scheme[,] . . . read[ing] that scheme as a whole [and]
giving consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its
parts.” McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, ¶¶ 37-38.
¶ 13 We first look to the language of the statute, reading it as a
whole and giving its words and phrases their common meanings.
Jones, ¶ 54. If the plain meaning of the statute is clear, we apply it
as written. Id. “If, however, the language is ambiguous, meaning it
is silent or susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation,
we may use extrinsic aids of construction, ‘such as the
consequences of a given construction, the end to be achieved by the
statute, and the statute’s legislative history.’” Id. at ¶ 55 (quoting
McCoy, ¶ 38).
B. Bagwell Was Not Entitled to
An Affirmative Defense of Consent
¶ 14 Bagwell contends that section 18-1-505 permits the defense of
consent to first degree murder when a terminally ill victim urges a
loved one to put an end to her painful, inevitable decline. We
disagree.
5
¶ 15 Bagwell urges that, in this situation, section 18-1-505(1)
makes the defense available because the terminally ill victim’s
consent to dying — and the loved one’s desire to fulfill that wish —
“precludes the infliction of the harm or evil sought to be prevented
by” the prohibition of murder. This prohibition, according to
Bagwell, seeks to prevent malicious killings, not mercy killings such
as the one that allegedly occurred here. In other words, Bagwell
argues that the prohibition of murder seeks to prevent unwanted as
opposed to wanted deaths.
¶ 16 Even if we assume, however, that subsection (1) makes the
defense available to Bagwell,1 we conclude that subsection
(2) precludes it. Under any reasonable interpretation of subsection
1Historically, a victim’s consent to homicide has not precluded the
harm inflicted or evil sought to be prevented by its criminal
prohibition, as this prohibition also serves wider societal interests
beyond those asserted by the victim. Model Penal Code § 2.11 note
1 on General Principles (Am. L. Inst., Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985); see also State v. Brown, 364 A.2d 27, 28 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976) (discussing how some criminal
prohibitions are designed to protect the interests of society as a
whole and why the victim’s consent is not considered in that
context because there is more at stake than the victim’s rights),
aff’d, 381 A.2d 1231 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977).
6
(2), the injuries causing his wife’s death are “bodily injur[ies] . . .
[that are] . . . serious.”
1. The Plain Meaning of Section 18-1-505(2)
¶ 17 “When conduct is charged to constitute an offense because it
causes or threatens bodily injury, consent to that conduct or to the
infliction of that injury is a defense only if the bodily injury
consented to or threatened by the conduct consented to is not
serious . . . .” § 18-1-505(2). Whether the injuries to which
Bagwell’s wife consented fall under this provision turns on the
General Assembly’s intent in using the phrase “bodily injury . . .
[that] is not serious.”
¶ 18 The criminal code defines “bodily injury” as “physical pain,
illness, or any impairment of physical or mental condition.”
§ 18-1-901(1), (3)(c), C.R.S. 2021. It does not, however, define
“serious” by itself or the phrase “bodily injury . . . [that] is not
serious.”2
2 The General Assembly has also defined the phrase “serious bodily
injury” to mean “bodily injury which, . . . involves a substantial risk
of death, a substantial risk of serious permanent disfigurement, a
substantial risk of protracted loss or impairment of the function of
7
¶ 19 Colorado’s consent defense is largely based on the Model Penal
Code (MPC), Hotsenpiller, ¶ 22 n.5, and subsection (2) enacted
section 2.11 of the MPC verbatim. Because no Colorado appellate
cases have interpreted subsection (2), we refer to the MPC and its
commentary for guidance on the meaning of this portion of the
consent statute. See Hotsenpiller, ¶ 22 n.5.
¶ 20 The MPC explains that, for offenses that cause or threaten
bodily injury, consent will have defensive significance only if, as
relevant here, “the injury is not serious.” Model Penal Code § 2.11
Explanatory Note (Am. L. Inst., Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985) (emphasis added). Indeed, the commentary
observes that consent is generally accepted as a defense only when
“no injury is caused or the injury is slight.” Id. at note 2 on Bodily
Injury. Notably, the drafters of the MPC explained that homicide
has universally been thought to be an offense “as to which consent
any part or organ of the body, or breaks, fractures, or burns of the
second or third degree.” § 18-1-901(1), (3)(p), C.R.S. 2021. The
parties do not argue on appeal that the phrase “bodily injury that is
serious” means the same thing as the statutorily defined term
“serious bodily injury.”
8
does not operate to prevent consummation of the crime.” Id. at note
1 on General Principles.
¶ 21 Neither the consent statute nor the MPC defines when an
injury is “serious,” so we may refer to dictionary definitions to
determine the plain and ordinary meaning of this term. See People
v. Serra, 2015 COA 130, ¶ 52. The dictionary defines “serious” to
include “having important or dangerous consequences.”
Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://perma.cc/SXQ4-ASMV.
¶ 22 We conclude the plain meaning of section 18-1-505 reveals the
General Assembly’s intent to adopt the consent defense as it was
described by the MPC commentary. In other words, the defense is
available under subsection (2) only when the victim consents to a
minor injury. An injury that causes a victim’s death is necessarily
“serious” — and thus not minor — because it involves a permanent
and dangerous impairment of the victim’s physical condition. The
consent defense is not available, then, when a defendant
intentionally kills a victim who consents to her own death.
¶ 23 Bagwell nevertheless asserts that a victim’s injury is not
“serious” when the victim is suffering from an agonizing, life-ending
illness and urges the defendant to cause the victim’s death as an
9
act of mercy. But the plain meaning of the phrase “bodily injury
that is not serious” focuses on the degree of injury inflicted, not on
the intent of the defendant, and section 18-1-505 does not suggest
that a victim’s injury is any less “serious” merely because the
victim’s pre-existing condition is dire.
¶ 24 Here, it is undisputed that Bagwell inflicted fatal gunshot
wounds on his wife. Under section 18-1-505(2), such wounds are
“bodily injur[ies] . . . [that are] . . . serious.” Thus, even if she
consented to those injuries, as Bagwell claims, the plain meaning of
the statute precludes him from asserting the affirmative defense of
consent to his first degree murder charge.
2. The General Assembly’s Intent is Clear
¶ 25 Alternatively, Bagwell argues that section 18-1-505 is
ambiguous and that we should apply the rule of lenity to interpret it
in his favor. We are not persuaded.
¶ 26 The rule of lenity provides that, “when we cannot discern the
legislature’s intent, ‘ambiguity in the meaning of a criminal statute
must be interpreted in favor of the defendant.’” Jones, ¶ 70
(quoting People v. Summers, 208 P.3d 251, 258 (Colo. 2009)).
However, we only apply this rule as a last resort — only “if after
10
utilizing the various aids of statutory construction, the General
Assembly’s intent remains obscured.” Summers, 208 P.3d at 258
(quoting People v. Thoro Prods. Co., 70 P.3d 1188, 1198 (Colo.
2003)); Jones, ¶¶ 56-71 (invoking lenity after applying multiple
other tools of statutory construction). We also use the general rules
of statutory construction where, as here, the statutes we interpret
include citizen-initiated measures. Huber v. Colo. Mining Ass’n, 264
P.3d 884, 889 (Colo. 2011).
¶ 27 Even if we were to assume that the meaning of the consent
statute is ambiguous, though, we would still conclude that the
overall statutory scheme demonstrates that consent is not a defense
to first degree murder.
¶ 28 Colorado law provides a means for terminally ill individuals
like Bagwell’s wife to seek the end of their own lives — the Colorado
End-of-Life Options Act.3 This Act provides a path for certain
terminally ill patients to receive aid-in-dying medication from their
physicians. §§ 25-48-101 to -123, C.R.S. 2021. It carefully
3Bagwell told law enforcement that he and his wife were familiar
with her options under the Act but she didn’t want to go to a
hospital or wait to use them.
11
delineates which terminally ill patients are eligible for this
medication, §§ 25-48-102(16), -103(1)(a), C.R.S. 2021, and the
procedures necessary to receive it.4
¶ 29 Critically, the Act expressly states that it does not authorize
any person — physician or not — to directly end an individual’s life
by “lethal injection, mercy killing, or euthanasia.” § 25-48-121,
C.R.S. 2021. To the contrary, the Act specifically notes that it does
not preclude criminal penalties for conduct inconsistent with the
Act. §§ 25-48-119(4), -121, C.R.S. 2021. These provisions
demonstrate the Act’s intent to create a narrow exception to the
4 The Act requires terminally ill patients not merely to consent to
receiving assistance in ending their lives, but rather to affirmatively
request such assistance. § 25-48-103(1)(c), C.R.S. 2021. Even
further, the patients must make the request to their attending
physician specifically, § 25-48-104(1), C.R.S. 2021, and their
request must be implemented via a host of statutorily prescribed
procedures, see id. (patient must make two oral requests, separated
by at least fifteen days, as well as a written request); § 25-48-103(1)
(attending physician must have diagnosed patient with terminal
illness and determine patient has mental capacity to request
assisted suicide); § 25-48-110, C.R.S. 2021 (attending physician
must verify that patient is making an informed decision);
§ 25-48-107, C.R.S. 2021 (consulting physician must confirm
attending physician’s findings); § 25-48-111, C.R.S. 2021 (attending
physician must document the patient’s requests and the physician’s
findings in patient’s medical record).
12
prohibition of homicide by allowing individuals a path to receive
assistance in ending their own lives under specific circumstances.
The Act explicitly forecloses Bagwell’s interpretation that the
consent statute creates, in effect, its own “mercy killing” exception.
Bagwell’s actions directly ending another’s life were not authorized
by the Act or the consent statute, even under circumstances that
might constitute a mercy killing.
¶ 30 The Act also left in place the offense of intentionally aiding
another in committing suicide as a form of manslaughter.
§ 18-3-104(1)(b), C.R.S. 2021. In People v. Gordon, 32 P.3d 575(Colo. App. 2001), a defendant charged with first degree murder
testified that he shot and killed his suicidal girlfriend to put her out
of her misery, as she had allegedly already shot herself once in the
head and survived. Id. at 577. A division of this court concluded
he was not entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser offense of
manslaughter (aiding suicide). The division reasoned that the
defendant did not “aid” the victim’s suicide because he did not
“merely furnish[] the victim the means to kill herself . . . [but rather]
actively engaged those means to kill her himself.” Id. at 578-79(“This particular phraseology [of ‘aids another to commit suicide’]
13
evidences a clear and unambiguous intent to penalize only persons
who provide indirect types of aid or assistance to others who then
go forward and kill themselves.”).
¶ 31 Likewise here, Bagwell actively engaged the means leading to
his wife’s death rather than indirectly aiding her passing.5 We
conclude that if Bagwell would not even be entitled to a jury
instruction on manslaughter, a lesser offense than murder, then
the statutory scheme would also not entitle him to an affirmative
defense completely exonerating his conduct. See People v. Nelson,
2014 COA 165, ¶ 48 (“An affirmative defense admits ‘the
defendant’s commission of the elements of the charged act, but
seek[s] to justify, excuse, or mitigate the commission of the act.’”
(quoting People v. Pickering, 276 P.3d 553, 555 (Colo. 2011))).
¶ 32 Finally, like in Gordon, our interpretation of the consent
defense serves similar, important ends. It guards against murders
being disguised as mercy killings and gives effect to the Act’s
5During his interrogation, Bagwell admitted that he and his wife
had discussed helping her to commit suicide by overdose on her
prescribed medications, but he alleged that they decided not to do
so.
14
statutory safeguards surrounding a terminally ill individual’s
decision to seek assistance in dying. See Gordon, 32 P.3d at 579;
§ 25-48-110, C.R.S. 2021; see also, e.g., § 25-48-103(1)(c) (requiring
terminally ill patient to voluntarily express the wish to receive aid-
in-dying medication); § 25-48-104(2)(a), C.R.S. 2021 (patient’s
signed, written request must be witnessed by at least two
individuals); § 25-48-108, C.R.S. 2021 (requiring a physician to
verify the patient is mentally capable and making an informed
decision before prescribing aid-in-dying medication); § 18-1-505(3)
(consent is not available as a defense if the consent is induced by
force, duress, or deception, and the consenting individual must be
legally competent and not unable to consent due to a behavioral or
mental health disorder).
¶ 33 These considerations are particularly apt where, as here, the
only evidence of Bagwell’s wife’s consent was from Bagwell, his wife
was suffering cognitive decline, and her ability to freely and capably
consent was not evaluated before her death.
¶ 34 Given this statutory context, we conclude that the General
Assembly did not intend for section 18-1-505(2) to allow the defense
15
of consent to murder, and therefore, there is no basis for applying
the rule of lenity.
¶ 35 In summary, we hold that a defendant is precluded from
raising a consent defense under section 18-1-505 where, as here,
he intentionally kills a victim who consents to her own death. The
trial court did not err by denying Bagwell’s request to assert it.
III. Suppression of Bagwell’s Statements
¶ 36 Bagwell also contends that the trial court violated his
constitutional rights by denying his motion to suppress his
statements to the detectives because (1) the detectives failed to
obtain a valid waiver of his constitutional rights under Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); and (2) his statements were given
involuntarily. We see no error in the trial court’s suppression
ruling.
A. Additional Facts
¶ 37 One of the detectives who interrogated Bagwell testified at the
suppression hearing. A transcript and video recording capturing
the entirety of the interrogation were also admitted. The
interrogation took place at the police station in a ten-by-ten-foot
room and lasted approximately an hour and forty minutes. Before
16
the detectives entered, Bagwell spoke spontaneously to a
supervising officer for twenty minutes and admitted that he shot his
wife.
¶ 38 Upon entering, the detectives read Bagwell his Miranda rights
and asked Bagwell if he understood those rights. Bagwell
responded, “Absolutely.” He asked for no clarification, said no
lawyer needed to be present, and then signed a written Miranda
advisement. At no point during the rest of the interrogation did
Bagwell request an attorney, ask to stop answering questions, or
seek any clarification of his rights. The detectives made no
promises or threats to Bagwell to get him to speak with them, and it
appeared to the testifying detective that Bagwell spoke freely and
voluntarily. Bagwell did most of the talking, speaking
spontaneously at times and giving lengthy answers to the
detectives’ open-ended questions.
¶ 39 Bagwell repeatedly told the detectives that he killed his wife to
end her suffering. He expressed that he was upset because he had
just shot his best friend, that he hadn’t wanted to kill her, and that
his decision tormented him.
17
¶ 40 The tone of the interview was conversational. Bagwell
cooperated with the detectives’ questioning and appeared to be
tracking what they were saying and responding appropriately.
Bagwell appeared to speak rapidly at times but said on multiple
occasions that he understood he was going to be arrested for
homicide, and, on one occasion, he said that he was thinking
rationally.
¶ 41 The testifying detective noted that Bagwell had an odor of
alcohol on his breath, but that he didn’t slur his words, sway, or
nod off during the interrogation.
¶ 42 Near the end of the interrogation, the detectives ordered a
blood draw to test Bagwell’s blood alcohol content (BAC), but
neither party sought admission of the results at the hearing.
Bagwell said that he believed his BAC was not high at that moment,
but that he was “not completely sober” when he shot his wife. At
the end of the interrogation, Bagwell lay on the floor of the
interrogation room and said he believed he was on the verge of
having a partially alcohol-induced seizure.
¶ 43 In denying Bagwell’s motion, the trial court found that
(1) Bagwell was oriented as to time and place and that any self-
18
induced intoxication did not prevent him from understanding his
waiver or the circumstances of the interrogation; (2) Bagwell’s
answers — though lengthy and spoken rapidly — were coherent
and responsive to questioning, and evidenced Bagwell’s
understanding of his circumstances; and (3) though Bagwell
appeared upset and agitated, this did not negate his ability to waive
his Miranda rights.
B. Standard of Review
¶ 44 We review suppression rulings as mixed questions of fact and
law. People v. Ferguson, 227 P.3d 510, 512 (Colo. 2010) (Miranda
waiver); Effland v. People, 240 P.3d 868, 878 (Colo. 2010)
(voluntariness of statements). We defer to the trial court’s factual
findings unless they are clearly erroneous but review the court’s
application of the relevant constitutional law to the facts of the case
de novo. Ferguson, 227 P.3d at 512-13.
¶ 45 In reviewing a trial court’s suppression order, we look solely to
the record created at the suppression hearing. People v. Thompson,
2021 CO 15, ¶ 16. Because we also have a video recording of
Bagwell’s interrogation and Miranda waiver, we can undertake this
review independently and not just from the cold record. See
19
Ferguson, 227 P.3d at 514 n.3; see also People v. Taylor, 2018 CO
35, ¶ 7 (“Where, as here, a portion of the challenged incident is
recorded, and there are no disputed facts outside of that recording
pertinent to the issue of suppression, we . . . may undertake an
independent review of the recording to determine whether the
evidence was properly suppressed in light of the controlling law.”).
¶ 46 The prosecution bears the burden of proving both the validity
of a defendant’s Miranda waiver and the voluntariness of his
statements by a preponderance of the evidence. People v. Thames,
2015 CO 18, ¶ 12; Effland, 240 P.3d at 878. We consider the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.
Thames, ¶ 13; Effland, 240 P.3d at 877.
¶ 47 If we conclude that the trial court erred in failing to suppress
Bagwell’s statements in violation of his constitutional rights, we
must reverse the judgment of conviction unless the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Hagos v. People, 2012 CO
63, ¶ 11.
C. Bagwell’s Miranda Waiver Was Valid
¶ 48 Bagwell contends that the detectives failed to obtain a valid
waiver of his Miranda rights. We disagree.
20
¶ 49 The United States and Colorado Constitutions guarantee
individuals the right against self-incrimination. U.S. Const.
amends. V, XIV; Colo. Const. art. II, § 18. To protect this right,
Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, holds that the prosecution may not
introduce in its case-in-chief any of a suspect’s custodial
statements resulting from interrogation unless the police preceded
their interrogation with certain advisements of the suspect’s
constitutional rights. People v. Davis, 2019 CO 84, ¶ 16; Thames,
¶ 11 (“A Miranda advisement is adequate as long as it conveys to
the suspect a clear and understandable warning that he has a right
to remain silent, anything he says can be used against him in
court, he has a right to the presence of an attorney, and, if he
cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires.”).
¶ 50 Suspects can choose to waive their rights, but this waiver is
only valid if given voluntarily,6 knowingly, and intelligently.
6 Bagwell’s only challenge to the voluntariness of his waiver is his
contention that he was intoxicated during the interrogation. But
intoxication only renders a suspect’s waiver involuntary when
governmental conduct causes the intoxication, People v. Platt, 81
21
Thames, ¶¶ 12, 14 (listing factors for evaluating the validity of a
waiver). A suspect’s waiver is knowing and intelligent “when made
with awareness of the nature of the right being abandoned and the
consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Id. at ¶ 12. This
awareness can be diminished by a suspect’s intoxication, but
intoxication does not automatically invalidate a waiver. People v.
Knedler, 2014 CO 28, ¶ 15; People v. Platt, 81 P.3d 1060, 1066
(Colo. 2004). We use a set of factors to determine whether a
suspect’s intoxication prevented him from understanding the
nature of those rights and the ramifications of waiving them:
(1) whether the defendant was oriented to his
or her surroundings and situation; (2) whether
the defendant’s answers were the responsive
product of a rational thought process;
(3) whether the defendant was able to
appreciate the seriousness of his or her
situation and the possibility of incarceration;
(4) whether the defendant had the foresight to
attempt to deceive the police to avoid
prosecution; (5) whether the defendant
expressed remorse for his or her actions; and
(6) whether the defendant expressly stated that
he or she understood his or her rights.
P.3d 1060, 1066 (Colo. 2004), and the record here contains no
evidence that Bagwell’s intoxication was anything but self-induced.
22
Knedler, ¶ 14 (citing Platt, 81 P.3d at 1066).
¶ 51 Bagwell argues that his waiver was not knowing and
intelligent because he was intoxicated, sick, and visibly upset
during the interrogation, and because he had no criminal history.
However, the record reveals that Bagwell waived his Miranda rights
out of a desire to justify shooting his wife — to explain she was
suffering and repeatedly asked him to do it. He was read a Miranda
advisement, right by right, immediately before the interrogation;
responded clearly that he had no questions; signed the written
advisement; and said on multiple occasions that he knew he would
be charged with homicide. These circumstances establish Bagwell’s
awareness of his rights and the consequences of abandoning them.
¶ 52 Bagwell’s self-induced intoxication did not sufficiently
undermine this awareness to render his waiver invalid. Bagwell’s
responses during questioning, though lengthy and at times
rambling, evidence the rational thought process of an individual
oriented to the circumstances of the situation. He repeatedly said
he understood the consequences of his actions, expressed remorse
over them, and chose to speak with the detectives anyway. Indeed,
Bagwell waived his Miranda rights approximately two hours after
23
his last drink, and he told the detectives that he did not believe he
was intoxicated during the interrogation.
¶ 53 Although Bagwell did exhibit some signs of disorientation,
these signs do not demonstrate that his waiver was unknowing and
unintelligent. At most, they demonstrate Bagwell’s understandable
shock and torment over just having shot his terminally ill wife.
¶ 54 We therefore conclude the trial court did not err in ruling that
Bagwell validly waived his Miranda rights.
D. Bagwell’s Statements Were Made Voluntarily
¶ 55 Bagwell further contends that, even if he waived his Miranda
rights, the trial court erred in ruling that he gave his statements
voluntarily. We again disagree.
¶ 56 The Due Process Clauses of the United States and Colorado
Constitutions protect defendants from the admission of statements
they made involuntarily. Effland, 240 P.3d at 877. A statement is
given voluntarily if it is “the product of an essentially free and
unconstrained choice by its maker.” Id. (quoting People v. Raffaelli,
647 P.2d 230, 234 (Colo. 1982)). But a statement is given
involuntarily if “coercive governmental conduct played a significant
role in inducing the statement.” Id. The focus of the voluntariness
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analysis is thus “whether the behavior of the [government] official
was such as to overbear the defendant’s will to resist and bring
about an admission or inculpatory statement not freely self-
determined.” People v. Ramadon, 2013 CO 68, ¶ 20.
¶ 57 This coercive governmental conduct can “include[] not only
physical abuse or threats directed against a person, but also subtle
forms of psychological coercion” like the deliberate exploitation of
the suspect’s weaknesses. Effland, 240 P.3d at 877. In assessing
the coerciveness of the governmental conduct, we look at both the
defendant’s ability to resist coercive pressures and the nature of the
police conduct, using a nonexclusive list of factors:
(1) whether the defendant was in custody;
(2) whether the defendant was free to leave;
(3) whether the defendant was aware of the
situation;
(4) whether the police read Miranda rights to
the defendant;
(5) whether the defendant understood and
waived Miranda rights;
(6) whether the defendant had an opportunity
to confer with counsel or anyone else prior to
or during the interrogation;
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(7) whether the statement was made during
the interrogation or volunteered later;
(8) whether the police threatened [the]
defendant or promised anything directly or
impliedly;
(9) the method or style of the interrogation;
(10) the defendant’s mental and physical
condition just prior to the interrogation;
(11) the length of the interrogation;
(12) the location of the interrogation; and
(13) the physical conditions of the location
where the interrogation occurred.
Ramadon, ¶ 20.
¶ 58 Bagwell points to no behavior by the detectives that amounted
to coercive police conduct. Indeed, he admitted his crime even
before the detectives asked any questions, and throughout the
interrogation he gave lengthy and revealing answers to the
detectives’ open-ended questions. The detectives made no threats
or promises to induce Bagwell’s statements. We do not see how
Bagwell’s will was overborne by the detectives’ conduct.
¶ 59 We therefore conclude the trial court did not err in finding
Bagwell’s interrogation statements voluntary or in denying his
motion to suppress.
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IV. Conclusion
¶ 60 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE ROTHENBERG concur.
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