v. Curtis

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY
August 5, 2021
2021COA103
No. 18CA0480, People v. Curtis — Election Law — Offenses
Related to Mail Ballots; Crimes — Forgery
A division of the court of appeals considers whether, under
People v. Bagby, 734 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Colo. 1987), the legislature
intended to limit prosecution for conduct related to mail ballots to
the mail ballot offense statute, section 1-13-112, C.R.S. 2020. The
division concludes it did not, and, therefore, the prosecution had
discretion to charge the defendant with a mail ballot offense as well
as felony forgery under section 18-5-102(1)(d), C.R.S. 2020.
The division also concludes that (1) the defendant’s
convictions for forgery and a mail ballot offense do not violate his
right to equal protection; (2) felony forgery is not a lesser included
offense of misdemeanor mail ballot offense; and (3) the prosecutor
did not commit reversible misconduct.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2021COA103
Court of Appeals No. 18CA0480
Weld County District Court No. 17CR245
Honorable Julie C. Hoskins, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Steven Curtis,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE DUNN
Fox and Pawar, JJ., concur
Announced August 5, 2021
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, John T. Lee, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Kevin E. McReynolds, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver,
Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Kamela Maktabi, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant Steven Curtis tried to vote twice in the November
2016 general election. In addition to his mail ballot, Curtis also
filled out his ex-wife’s mail ballot, forged her signature on the ballot
envelope, and mailed it to the Weld County Clerk and Recorder. For
this, a jury convicted Curtis of felony forgery, section
18-5-102(1)(d), C.R.S. 2020, and a misdemeanor mail ballot offense,
section 1-13-112, C.R.S. 2020.
¶2 Curtis appeals his forgery conviction, contending that the
prosecution lacked the discretion to charge him under the general
forgery statute and, instead, could charge him only under “the more
specific” mail ballot offense statute. Because we disagree, we reject
Curtis’s contention that we must vacate his forgery conviction. And
because we are unpersuaded by Curtis’s other challenges, we
affirm.
I. Background
¶3 Curtis and his wife Kelly ended their marriage in May 2016.
Kelly later moved to South Carolina. Before the November 2016
general election, the Weld County Clerk and Recorder’s office sent
Kelly’s mail ballot to the home she once shared with Curtis. Soon
1
after, Curtis filled out, signed, and mailed both his and Kelly’s
ballots to the Weld County Clerk.1
¶4 Meanwhile, Kelly contacted the Weld County Clerk’s office to
obtain an absentee ballot but was told that she “had already voted”
and that her ballot “was sitting right there.” Kelly explained that
she hadn’t filled out a ballot or given anyone permission to do so on
her behalf. She later confirmed that the signature on the ballot
envelope wasn’t hers.
¶5 When asked, Curtis denied signing Kelly’s ballot.
Unconvinced, the prosecution obtained a court order requiring
Curtis to provide DNA and handwriting samples. DNA testing
showed that Curtis had sealed Kelly’s ballot return envelope, and a
handwriting expert concluded that Curtis had filled out the return
address on the envelope and signed Kelly’s name.
¶6 The prosecution charged Curtis with forgery and a mail ballot
offense. At trial, Curtis implicitly acknowledged that he filled out
1 Curtis signed Kelly’s name on the “Voter’s Signature” line on her
ballot return envelope. See § 1-7.5-103(7), C.R.S. 2020 (defining
“[r]eturn envelope” as “an envelope that is printed with spaces for
the name and address of, and a self-affirmation to be signed by, an
eligible elector voting in a mail ballot election . . . .”).
2
and signed Kelly’s ballot but asserted an involuntary intoxication
affirmative defense. He argued that his chronic diabetes resulted in
blood sugar “blackouts” that made him confused and unable to
remember most of October 2016. As a result, he argued that he
“did not possess the mental state [necessary] to commit or
complete” the charged offenses.
¶7 The jury rejected the involuntary intoxication defense and
convicted Curtis as charged. The trial court sentenced Curtis to
probation and community service.
II. The Bagby Challenge
¶8 Relying on People v. Bagby, 734 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Colo. 1987),
Curtis first contends that the prosecution lacked authority to
charge him under the general forgery statute because the
legislature intended to limit prosecution for conduct related to mail
ballots to the more specific mail ballot offense statute. We disagree.
A. Waiver and Preservation
¶9 We first reject the People’s contention that Curtis waived his
Bagby challenge because it is a challenge to the information that
must be raised before trial under Crim. P. 12(b)(2).
3
¶ 10 An information may be defective in either form or substance.
See People v. Williams, 984 P.2d 56, 63 (Colo. 1999). Objections
based on defects to the form of the information must be made
before trial or they are waived. Crim. P. 12(b)(2). But a defect in
substance is jurisdictional and may be raised at any time. See
Williams, 984 P.2d at 63-64. A substantive defect requires
“dismissal of the charge” or renders “void any conviction entered on
such charge.” Id.
¶ 11 Although the People contend that Curtis’s claim “raise[s] an
alleged defect in the charging information,” they don’t point to any
specific form defect in the information. See People v. Davis, 2017
COA 40M, ¶ 9 (concluding Crim. P. 12(b) doesn’t apply where the
defendant’s claim didn’t involve a defect in the charging document).
¶ 12 Nor is any form defect self-evident. The information charged
Curtis with two crimes based on the same set of facts. That’s
entirely proper. See § 18-1-408(7), C.R.S. 2020. So we see
“[n]othing on the face of the charging document” that “revealed a
defect to which [Curtis] could have properly objected.” People v.
Wester-Gravelle, 2020 CO 64, ¶ 23; see also People v. Zadra, 2013
COA 140, ¶¶ 65-66 (recognizing that federal appellate courts
4
uniformly apply Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2) “where the defect is
apparent from the face of the charges”) (citations omitted), aff’d on
other grounds, 2017 CO 18, ¶ 18.
¶ 13 To the extent Curtis’s claim can be characterized as an
objection to the information at all, it appears to be a substantive
one. Indeed, if Curtis is correct that the mail ballot offense statute
abrogates the general forgery statute, then the prosecution “lacked
authority” to charge him with forgery. Thus, should he prevail, we’d
have to vacate the forgery conviction. See Williams, 984 P.2d at 64
(substantive defect renders void any conviction entered on such
charge); People v. Moore, 200 Colo. 481, 485, 615 P.2d 726, 729
(1980) (“[W]hen an information fails to charge a crime, the court
acquires no jurisdiction.”). Such an objection doesn’t need to be
brought before trial. See Williams, 984 P.2d at 63-64.
¶ 14 Even if we assume Curtis’s objection could be classified as a
form objection, we see nothing in the record — and the People point
to nothing — suggesting Curtis’s failure to raise the challenge under
Crim. P. 12(b) was intentional, rather than an oversight. See People
v. Rediger, 2018 CO 32, ¶ 39 (waiver is the intentional
relinquishment of a known right). Because our supreme court
5
construes waivers under Crim. P. 12(b) as it does other waivers, see
Wester-Gravelle, ¶ 26, and “indulge[s] every reasonable presumption
against waiver,” Rediger, ¶ 39 (citation omitted), absent any
“evidence that [Curtis] intended to relinquish the right in question,”
Phillips v. People, 2019 CO 72, ¶ 33, we can’t conclude that Curtis
waived his claim that the prosecution lacked authority to charge
him with forgery. See Wester-Gravelle, ¶ 26 (concluding the
defendant’s failure to demand a prosecutorial election or request a
modified unanimity instruction under Crim. P. 12(b) constituted a
forfeiture); see also Zadra, ¶¶ 68, 70 (reviewing multiplicity
challenge for plain error where the failure to bring the motion under
Crim. P. 12(b) “was a result of oversight”).
¶ 15 All this said, we agree with the People that Curtis didn’t
preserve his Bagby challenge. Thus, if we agree error occurred, we
won’t reverse unless the error is plain. See Rediger, ¶ 47.
B. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
¶ 16 When a defendant’s actions violate more than one criminal
statute, the prosecution ordinarily may charge the defendant under
each statute. See § 18-1-408(7); see also People v. Clanton, 2015
COA 8, ¶ 10. In that scenario, it’s for the prosecution “to determine
6
what charges to file.” People v. Stewart, 55 P.3d 107, 118 (Colo.
2002); see also People v. Smith, 938 P.2d 111, 115 (Colo. 1997)
(“Ordinarily, a prosecutor has discretion to charge any applicable
offense.”).
¶ 17 But in rare circumstances the prosecution may be barred from
charging a defendant under a general criminal statute when the
legislature evinces a “clear” intent to limit prosecution to a more
specific statute. Smith, 938 P.2d at 115-16; accord Bagby, 734 P.2d
at 1061; Clanton, ¶ 11.
¶ 18 To determine whether the legislature clearly intended to limit
prosecution to a more specific statute, courts consider whether (1)
the specific statute invokes the full extent of the state’s police
powers; (2) the specific statute is part of an act creating a
comprehensive and thorough regulatory scheme to control all
aspects of a substantive area; and (3) that act carefully defines
different types of offenses in detail. See Bagby, 734 P.2d at 1062;
Smith, 938 P.2d at 116; People v. Warner, 930 P.2d 564, 568 (Colo.
1996).
¶ 19 Applying the Bagby factors, our supreme court has found only
two instances where the legislature “intended the specific
7
provisions” of a statute “to supplant the more general provisions” of
the criminal code. Warner, 930 P.2d at 568. First, in Bagby, the
supreme court concluded that the legislature intended to require
the offense of falsely completing a liquor license application to be
prosecuted under the Liquor Code and not the general criminal
code. Bagby, 734 P.2d at 1062. And later, in Warner, the court
reached a similar conclusion regarding the Limited Gaming Act of
1991, holding that the legislature intended that the use of a device
to remove tokens from a slot machine be prosecuted exclusively
under the Limited Gaming Act. See Warner, 930 P.2d at 568.
¶ 20 Bagby and Warner reached their conclusions, in part, by
finding that the Liquor Code and the Limited Gaming Act were
comprehensive regulatory schemes. Beyond that, however, the
supreme court relied significantly on the legislative declarations in
the Liquor Code and the Limited Gaming Act. Those respective
declarations each invoked the “full extent” of the state’s police
powers. See Bagby, 734 P.2d at 1062 (holding the Liquor Code’s
legislative declaration expressly invoked the full extent of the police
powers); Warner, 930 P.2d at 568 (concluding that the Limited
8
Gaming Act’s legislative declaration invoked the full extent of the
state’s police powers).
¶ 21 We review de novo to determine whether the legislature
intended a specific statute to abrogate the general criminal code.
See Clanton, ¶ 13.
C. The Mail Ballot Offense Statute Doesn’t Supplant the General
Forgery Statute
¶ 22 As relevant here, a person commits forgery
if, with intent to defraud, such person falsely
makes, completes, alters, or utters a written
instrument which is or purports to be, or
which is calculated to become or to represent if
completed:
....
A public record or an instrument filed or
required by law to be filed or legally fileable in
or with a public office or public servant.
§ 18-5-102(1)(d).
¶ 23 By contrast, a person commits a mail ballot offense if, among
other conduct, he “falsely makes, alters, forges, or counterfeits any
mail ballot before or after it has been cast.” § 1-13-112.
¶ 24 Curtis contends he could only be charged with the latter
offense because the legislature intended that the more specific mail
ballot offense statute supplant the general criminal code. To get
9
there, he asserts that the mail ballot offense statute is part of a
broader, comprehensive act that he calls the “Elections Offense
Act.” (Curtis identifies this “Act” as all of title 1, article 13 of the
Colorado Revised Statutes.) He then asserts that, in enacting that
“Act,” the legislature clearly intended to “invoke the State’s police
powers.” But unlike the Liquor Code and the Limited Gaming Act,
we don’t see a legislative declaration in article 13 evincing such an
intent and Curtis doesn’t point us to one. See People v. Stansberry,
83 P.3d 1188, 1190 (Colo. App. 2003) (holding that the prosecution
could bring charges under the general forgery statute where the
legislative declaration in the motor vehicle tax statute contained no
“broad invocation of police powers”); see also Clanton, ¶ 24
(rejecting Bagby challenge that argued the Colorado Employment
Security Act supplanted the general forgery statute).
¶ 25 Recognizing this gap, Curtis urges us to discern a clear
legislative intent to supplant the general criminal code from the
“statutory provisions” in that “Act.” But even assuming this
suggested approach is consistent with Bagby and Warner, Curtis
doesn’t direct us to any “statutory provision” in article 13 that
invokes the state’s police powers, expressly or otherwise. Nor does
10
he direct us to any particular provision from which we could infer a
clear legislative intent to limit the prosecution’s discretion to bring
forgery charges.
¶ 26 Looking past article 13, of more interest to us is the Mail
Ballot Election Act and its legislative declaration. See Ch. 43, sec.
2, § 1-13-112, 1990 Colo. Sess. Laws 318; see also § 1-7.5-101,
C.R.S. 2020 (identifying short title of the act). Though Curtis
doesn’t mention it, the mail ballot offense statute was enacted
through this Act. The Act’s legislative declaration, however, doesn’t
invoke the state’s police powers or otherwise help Curtis. See
§ 1-7.5-102, C.R.S. 2020. Rather, it declares simply that “mail
ballot elections are cost-efficient and have not resulted in increased
fraud,” Ch. 43, sec. 1, § 1-7.5-102, 1990 Colo. Sess. Laws 314, and
that, “by enacting this article, the general assembly hereby
concludes that it is appropriate to provide for mail ballot elections
under specified circumstances,” § 1-7.5-102(1). Such a narrow
declaration is nowhere close to the broad legislative declarations
that Bagby and Warner concluded showed a clear legislative intent
to invoke the full extent of the state’s police powers and supplant
11
the general criminal code. See Bagby, 734 P.2d at 1062; Warner,
930 P.2d 568.
¶ 27 Because the Mail Ballot Election Act doesn’t satisfy the first
Bagby factor — invocation of the full extent of the state’s police
powers — we needn’t consider the remaining two factors.
¶ 28 All told, we conclude the prosecution had discretion to charge
Curtis under the forgery statute.
III. Equal Protection
¶ 29 Curtis next contends that the forgery conviction violates his
right to equal protection under the law. This is so, he argues,
because the forgery statute fails to provide an intelligible standard
by which to differentiate the conduct it proscribes from the conduct
proscribed by the mail ballot offense statute. We disagree.
A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
¶ 30 The Colorado Constitution implicitly guarantees a defendant
equal protection under the law. Stewart, 55 P.3d at 114; see also
Colo. Const. art. II, § 25. “If a criminal statute proscribes different
penalties for identical conduct, and a defendant is convicted under
the statute imposing the harsher penalty, then the defendant’s right
to equal protection is violated unless there are reasonable
12
differences or distinctions between the statutes at issue.” People v.
Blue, 253 P.3d 1273, 1279 (Colo. App. 2011); see also Stewart, 55
P.3d at 114.
¶ 31 To determine whether two statutes prohibit identical conduct,
we compare the statutory elements. See Campbell v. People, 73
P.3d 11, 14 (Colo. 2003); Blue, 253 P.3d at 1279. “If the elements
differ qualitatively (and not merely semantically), such that one
statute requires proof of an element that the other does not, there is
no equal protection violation.” Clanton, ¶ 27; see also Blue, 253
P.3d at 1279.
¶ 32 We review de novo whether two statutes prohibit the same or
different conduct. See People v. Lee, 2020 CO 81, ¶ 11; accord
Clanton, ¶ 28.
B. The Forgery and Mail Ballot Offense Statutes Require Different
Mens Reas
¶ 33 To review, as relevant here, forgery requires proof that (1) a
person; (2) with intent to defraud; (3) falsely makes, completes,
alters, or utters a written instrument; (4) which was or was
purported to be, or which was calculated to become or to represent
if completed; (5) a “public record or an instrument filed . . . or
13
legally fileable in or with a public office or public servant . . . .”
§ 18-5-102(1)(d).2
¶ 34 By comparison, a mail ballot offense requires proof that a
person (1) falsely made, altered, forged, or counterfeited; (2) any
mail ballot; (3) “before or after it ha[d] been cast . . . .” § 1-13-112.
¶ 35 Curtis’s equal protection argument is premised on the
assumption that “both statutes provide for the same mens rea.”
But they don’t. Forgery requires “intent to defraud” while a mail
ballot offense doesn’t. See People v. Billington, 191 Colo. 323, 327,
552 P.2d 500, 503 (1976) (“An essential element of the crime of
second-degree forgery is intent to defraud . . . .”). This difference
between the statutes is “real in fact.” Stewart, 55 P.3d at 114. It
makes forgery a specific intent crime, see § 18-1-501(5) C.R.S.
2020, and requires the prosecution to present evidence that a
defendant has an “intent to defraud” someone or something. See
also Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining “defraud” as
“[t]o cause injury or loss to (a person or organization) by deceit”);
see also Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 593 (2002)
2 The legislature expressly defined “falsely complete.” See
§ 18-5-101(3), C.R.S. 2020.
14
(Defraud means “to take or withhold from (one) some possession,
right, or interest by calculated misstatement or perversion of truth,
trickery, or other deception.”). Because “a different mens rea is
required, different conduct is being punished[] and there is no equal
protection violation.” People v. Reynolds, 194 Colo. 543, 547, 575
P.2d 1286, 1290 (1978).
¶ 36 To the extent Curtis asks us to import an “intent to defraud”
element into the mail ballot offense statute, we decline to do that.
Had the legislature intended to make a mail ballot offense a specific
intent crime, it would have done so. E.g., People v. Moseley, 193
Colo. 256, 262, 566 P.2d 331, 335 (1977) (holding that “where a
particular specific intent is included as an element of an offense,
the legislature has done so expressly” and concluding, based on the
legislature’s silence, that robbery “requires no specific intent”); see
also Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29 (1997) (declining to
read an “intent to defraud” element into a criminal statute and
15
explaining that courts “ordinarily resist reading words or elements
into a statute that do not appear on its face”).3
¶ 37 That’s not to say the mail ballot offense statute has no mens
rea (an issue neither party asks us to resolve and on which we
express no opinion); rather, we simply conclude it doesn’t include
an intent to defraud.
¶ 38 We also reject Curtis’s assertion that the statutes prohibit the
same actus reus. Without relying on principles of statutory
construction, Curtis asserts that “falsely . . . forges” (as used in the
mail offense ballot statute) means the same thing as “falsely
complete” (as used in the forgery statute). But the legislature
specifically defined “falsely complete.” See § 18-5-101(3)(a), C.R.S.
2020. By contrast, the mail ballot offense statute doesn’t define
3 In a footnote, Curtis observes that the prosecutor argued at trial
that it “could be inferred” that the mail ballot offense statute shared
the same mens rea as forgery by considering section 1-13-106,
C.R.S. 2020 — a different provision in the same article that
cross-references the felony forgery statute. Curtis doesn’t further
develop this observation or explain how it informs his equal
protection argument. See People v. Durapau, 280 P.3d 42, 49 (Colo.
App. 2011) (declining to address undeveloped arguments). To the
extent the supreme court’s recent decision in People v. Rojas, 2019
CO 86M, ¶ 14, which construes a different statute with language
similar to section 1-13-106, bears on this observation, Curtis
doesn’t make that argument and it’s not before us.
16
“forges.” Rather, it includes the term “forges” alongside “makes,
alters, . . . or counterfeits.” See § 1-12-113. We therefore interpret
“forges” for purposes of the mail ballot offense statute consistently
with its plain meaning as informed by its companion terms. See
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation
of Legal Texts 195 (2012) (“When several nouns or verbs or
adjectives or adverbs — any words — are associated in a context
suggesting that the words have something in common, they should
be assigned a permissible meaning that makes them similar.”).
Doing that leads us to conclude that in this statutory context,
“forges” simply means “to make or imitate falsely.” See Webster’s
Third New International Dictionary at 891.4
¶ 39 For these reasons, we conclude Curtis’s convictions for forgery
and a mail ballot offense don’t violate his right to equal protection.
4 Curtis switches gears in his reply brief and argues not that “forge”
equates to “falsely complete” but, rather, that by using the term
“forge” the legislature intended to import the criminal elements of
felony forgery, including an “intent to defraud,” into the mail ballot
offense statute. We will not consider arguments first raised in a
reply brief. See People v. Hall, 59 P.3d 298, 301 (Colo. App. 2002).
17
IV. Merger
¶ 40 Curtis next contends that felony forgery is a lesser included
offense of a misdemeanor mail ballot offense and that the district
court erred by failing to merge the convictions and vacate the
forgery conviction. We disagree.
A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
¶ 41 The United States and Colorado Constitutions prohibit
multiple punishments for the same offense. See Page v. People,
2017 CO 88, ¶ 8. Thus, a defendant may not be convicted of two
offenses for the same conduct if “[o]ne offense is included in the
other.” § 18-1-408(1)(a).
¶ 42 To determine whether “an offense is a lesser included offense
of another offense,” we consider whether “the elements of the lesser
offense are a subset” of those of the greater, “such that the lesser
offense contains only elements that are also included in the
elements of the greater offense.” Reyna-Abarca v. People, 2017 CO
15, ¶ 64.
¶ 43 We review de novo whether an offense is a lesser included
offense of another. People v. Thomas, 2020 COA 19M, ¶ 30 (cert.
granted Sept. 28, 2020).
18
B. Forgery is not a Lesser Included Offense of a Mail Ballot
Offense
¶ 44 For the same reason Curtis’s equal protection argument is
unavailing, so too is his merger argument. That’s because Curtis’s
merger argument again hinges on his assertion that the mail ballot
offense statute requires “the same mens rea — intent by the
defendant to defraud” as the forgery statute. As already explained,
however, the mail ballot offense statute doesn’t require an “intent to
defraud.” Thus, the prosecution may prove a mail ballot offense
without also proving forgery. Which is to say forgery is not a lesser
included offense of a mail ballot offense. See Reyna-Abarca, ¶ 64.
¶ 45 While perhaps more expected, Curtis doesn’t argue that his
mail ballot offense conviction merges into his forgery conviction.
We therefore don’t consider whether it does. See, e.g., Galvan v.
People, 2020 CO 82, ¶ 45 (The party presentation principle “relies
on the parties to frame the issues to be decided and assigns to
courts the role of neutral arbiters of the matters raised.”); accord
United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. ___, ___, 140 S. Ct. 1575,
1579 (2020).
19
¶ 46 We conclude the district court properly declined to merge
Curtis’s forgery conviction into his mail ballot offense conviction.
V. Prosecutorial Misconduct
¶ 47 Curtis last contends that the prosecutor committed reversible
misconduct during closing and rebuttal closing argument. We
disagree.
A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
¶ 48 A prosecutor has wide latitude to argue based on facts in
evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts, as well
as to respond to the defendant’s arguments. People v. Maloy, 2020
COA 71, ¶ 61. But a prosecutor may not “make remarks for the
purpose of denigrating the defense.” People v. Collins, 250 P.3d
668, 678 (Colo. 2010); see also People v. Welsh, 176 P.3d 781, 788
(Colo. App. 2007). We evaluate improper argument claims in the
context of the argument as a whole and in light of the evidence
presented. People v. Munsey, 232 P.3d 113, 123 (Colo. App. 2009).
¶ 49 We engage in a two-step analysis to review prosecutorial
misconduct claims. Wend v. People, 235 P.3d 1089, 1096 (Colo.
2010). First, we evaluate whether the prosecutor’s conduct was
improper based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. Second, if
20
it was, we determine whether the conduct warrants reversal under
the applicable standard. Id.; People v. Robinson, 2019 CO 102,
¶ 18.
¶ 50 Because Curtis didn’t object to the prosecutor’s arguments, we
review for plain error. See Robinson, ¶ 19.
B. The Prosecutor Didn’t Denigrate Curtis’s Defense Theory
¶ 51 Curtis defended on the theory that, due to his diabetes and
related health issues, he was “impaired” and therefore “did not
possess the mental state to commit” the charged crimes. In support
of this defense, Curtis presented medical experts to discuss diabetic
episodes and the impact of uncontrolled blood sugar, as well as
family members that testified to their observations of Curtis’s
diabetic episodes.
¶ 52 And the jury heard directly from Curtis who detailed his
long-standing diabetic condition, prior hypoglycemic episodes, and
specific health challenges during October 2016. Curtis also
explained that after he learned about the DNA and handwriting
analysis, he had a “vague” memory of injecting insulin late one
evening and seeing a ballot in the trash when he went to dispose of
21
his needle. But he testified he had no memory of signing or mailing
his ex-wife’s ballot.
¶ 53 In closing argument, the prosecutor argued Curtis “knew
exactly what he was doing” and that “when he realized how
provable the crimes were, he grabbed on to the only thing that he
could[,] and he has been trying to sell that story ever since.” The
prosecutor later used the term “story” roughly a half dozen times in
closing and rebuttal closing when discussing Curtis’s version of
events.
¶ 54 Curtis didn’t object at trial, yet he now argues that the
prosecutor improperly denigrated his defense theory by using the
word “story” when discussing his account of what happened. But
Curtis testified and put his credibility at issue. It’s proper for a
prosecutor to argue — based on reasonable evidentiary inferences
— why the jury should or shouldn’t believe a witness. Domingo-
Gomez v. People, 125 P.3d 1043, 1050 (Colo. 2005); see also
Martinez v. People, 244 P.3d 135, 141 (Colo. 2010).
¶ 55 The prosecutor did that here. Read in context, the references
to Curtis’s “story” were tied directly to the evidence. They were not
personal attacks on Curtis or his counsel. They didn’t imply Curtis
22
or his counsel acted in bad faith. They weren’t dressed up with any
inflammatory adjectives or adverbs. Rather, the comments were
part of the argument explaining why — based on the evidence —
the jury shouldn’t believe Curtis’s account of what happened. See
Collins, 250 P.3d at 678 (The prosecutor’s comment that the
defense counsel’s theory of reasonable doubt was “absurd” was not
improper but “merely a response to defense counsel’s assertions
that the jury could not find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.”); cf. People v. Serra, 2015 COA 130, ¶ 88 (The prosecutor’s
“statements . . . that [the defendant] was making up a story to suit
his ‘selfish, narcissistic needs’ were . . . improper” because they
“impl[ied] the defendant ha[d] a bad character” and thus distracted
the jury’s attention away from the evidence.).
¶ 56 Thus, in this closing argument, the prosecutor’s comments on
Curtis’s version of events were proper.
C. The Prosecutor’s Comments Weren’t Otherwise Improper
¶ 57 We are equally unpersuaded with Curtis’s contention that the
prosecutor’s closing argument “improperly transformed” his
constitutional rights into a “burden on his credibility.”
23
¶ 58 Though he doesn’t say so directly, Curtis appears to contend
the prosecutor made an improper generic tailoring argument. A
generic tailoring argument “occur[s] when the prosecution attacks
the defendant’s credibility by . . . drawing the jury’s attention to the
defendant’s presence at trial and his resultant opportunity to tailor
his testimony” absent support in the record. See Martinez, 244
P.3d at 141. Curtis, however, doesn’t direct us to any portions of
the closing argument where the prosecutor did that. Nor do we see
a generic tailoring argument.
¶ 59 To the extent Curtis is upset that the prosecutor made a
specific tailoring argument when commenting that Curtis only
“remembered” seeing his ex-wife’s ballot after learning about the
DNA and handwriting analysis, that argument is directly tethered to
Curtis’s testimony and is proper. See id. (noting prosecutors may
“make specific tailoring arguments when they are tied to the
evidence in the record”).
¶ 60 Curtis also argues that this same statement — that he
“remembered” seeing his ex-wife’s ballot after he was presented with
the evidence against him — was an improper comment on his “right
to the disclosure of evidence material to his defense” and to
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“confront the prosecution’s evidence.” As we understand it, Curtis
suggests that, because it’s improper for a prosecutor to comment on
a defendant’s right to remain silent, it’s likewise improper for a
prosecutor to comment on a defendant’s other constitutional rights.
¶ 61 Curtis, of course, didn’t remain silent, and he doesn’t explain
how the prosecutor improperly commented on any particular
constitutional rights. Instead, he appears to simply take issue with
the prosecutor’s argument that cast doubt on his version of events.
Commenting on witness credibility, however, is fair. See Domingo-
Gomez, 125 P.3d at 1050.
¶ 62 We conclude the prosecutor’s comments were proper.
VI. Conclusion
¶ 63 We affirm the judgment of conviction.
JUDGE FOX and JUDGE PAWAR concur.
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