19CA2007 Peo v Meleski 12-16-2021
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 19CA2007
Mesa County District Court No. 18CR462
Honorable Matthew D. Barrett, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
James Alan Meleski,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR
Navarro and Grove, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced December 16, 2021
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jacob R. Lofgren, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
The Law Firm of Tanja Heggins, Tanja Heggins, Denver, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellant
1
¶ 1 Defendant, James Alan Meleski, appeals the judgment of
conviction in his criminal case. He contends that the prosecution
presented insufficient evidence to support the sole count of
tampering with a witness or victim. We disagree and therefore
affirm.
I. Background
¶ 2 Meleski pleaded guilty to assault charges in case number
17CR384 based on allegations that he strangled his ex-wife. He
was sentenced to probation and the court issued a protection order
restraining him from, among other things, going to his ex-wife’s
home.
¶ 3 A few months later, Meleski went to his ex-wife’s home where
they had a verbal altercation, he suffered a self-inflicted stab
wound, and he left. Two days later, he returned. His ex-wife called
the police who responded and arrested Meleski for violating the
protection order.
¶ 4 After his arrest, a probation revocation complaint was filed in
case number 17CR384. Meleski appeared in court and requested
that his probation violation hearing be set in fourteen days. While
2
in custody awaiting that hearing, Meleski called his ex-wife and had
the following conversation:
[Meleski]: Hey I’m sorry. I going to tell, I’ve
been trying to tell them that I lied. I wasn’t
there. It never happened. It happen[ed] in my
truck at City Market that’s what I’m trying to
do. Go along with it. Just go along with it. I
was there on Sunday breaking the restraining
order there was no violent acts so that we can
get back on track. . . . I’m very sorry. I’m —
[Ex-wife]: You’re asking me to do what?
[Meleski]: Just tell them I wasn’t there. I
wasn’t there Saturday. I wasn’t there
Saturday. Hello?
[Ex-wife]: I’m not going to lie. Why would I lie?
Why — why are you asking me to lie?
[Meleski]: Why?
[Ex-wife]: Yes.
[Meleski]: Because that puts a violent act at
the house.
¶ 5 Based on this conversation, the prosecution charged Meleski
with tampering with a witness or victim in violation of section 18-8-
707, C.R.S. 2021. A jury found him guilty.
II. Sufficient Evidence Supported the Conviction
¶ 6 Regardless of whether a criminal defendant has preserved a
claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the
3
record de novo to determine whether the evidence presented was
sufficient in both quantity and quality to sustain the conviction.
McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, ¶¶ 34, 63. In determining whether
the prosecution has met its burden to establish a prima facie case
of guilt, we consider “whether the relevant evidence, both direct and
circumstantial, when viewed as a whole and in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, is substantial and sufficient to support
a conclusion by a reasonable mind that the defendant is guilty of
the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at ¶ 63 (quoting Clark
v. People, 232 P.3d 1287, 1291 (Colo. 2010)).
¶ 7 As relevant here, a person commits witness or victim
tampering if he intentionally attempts to induce a witness or victim
or a person he believes is to be called to testify as a witness or
victim in any official proceeding or who may be called to testify as a
witness to or victim of any crime to testify falsely or unlawfully
withhold any testimony. § 18-8-707(1)(a). The plain language of
this subsection of the statute “does not require that the witness or
victim actually testify at a proceeding for the crime to occur.”
People v. Cunefare, 102 P.3d 302, 305-06 (Colo. 2004). Indeed, “the
language does not even require that the witness or victim have been
4
legally summoned to appear at the proceeding.” Id. at 306. Rather,
such a person need only “be in a position such that he or she may
offer testimony in an official proceeding.” Id.
¶ 8 At trial, Meleski did not dispute that the conversation occurred
between him and his ex-wife. Nor did he dispute that he was
attempting to induce his ex-wife to lie about the location of the
stabbing incident. He instead argued that the prosecution failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he believed his ex-wife was
likely to be called to testify in an “official proceeding” because there
was “no evidence that shows the stabbing [was] somehow tied to
[the] protection orders.” He reiterates this position on appeal,
arguing that he did not mention the protection order in the
conversation but rather “specifically refer[red] to the stabbing”
incident and there were “no official proceedings related to the
stabbing” because “[n]o one was charged or being prosecuted” for
that act.
¶ 9 However, the prosecution offered evidence at trial that Meleski
knew he had violated the protection order protecting his ex-wife
when the stabbing incident occurred at her home. Indeed, Meleski
himself confirmed that he was charged with violating a protection
5
order for “being at [his ex-wife’s] residence on 2-23-2018,” which is
when the stabbing incident was alleged to have occurred. He
further confirmed that the probation violation hearing was coming
up when he called his ex-wife and asked her to lie about the
location of the stabbing incident. And though he testified that he
did not know whether his ex-wife would be called at that hearing,
he confirmed that she was a witness to the events that led to it.
Finally, Meleski confirmed that his intent in requesting that his ex-
wife say that the stabbing occurred at City Market instead of her
home was to get her to lie about where the stabbing occurred.
¶ 10 Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, we conclude that the prosecution presented
substantial and sufficient evidence to support a conclusion by a
reasonable mind that Meleski committed the crime of tampering
with a witness or victim.
¶ 11 His argument that the conversation with his ex-wife centered
on his belief that the stabbing “would affect his ability to get his
daughter back from foster care” is unavailing. That is, the jury was
free to reject this testimony as not credible and draw a contrary
inference about Meleski’s intent based on the timing of his phone
6
call, his admission that he was attempting to get his wife to lie, and
the fact that his ex-wife was “in a position such that . . . she may
offer testimony” in the probation violation proceeding. See
Cunefare, 102 P.3d at 306.
III. Conclusion
¶ 12 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE NAVARRO and JUDGE GROVE concur.