Citation Numbers: 118 A. 42, 97 Conn. 571
Judges: KEELER, J.
Filed Date: 7/7/1922
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/12/2023
The defendants assign error in the charge of the court, and in its refusal to charge as requested by them. They claim that the effect of the charge as given involved holding, as matter of law, either that the plaintiff was not the owner of the motorcycle, or that, if he was the owner, the vehicle was properly registered, even though in fact the plaintiff had not at the time of the accident actually procured registration in his own name, nor procured and affixed number-plates.
The defendants claim that the agreement, Exhibit C, in form a lease with privilege of purchase, is *Page 575
in fact, as between the parties, a conditional sale of the vehicle. We deem this claim well founded. That the instrument was not acknowledged or recorded, only affected its validity as against a third party, who might treat it as an absolute sale; as between the parties thereto it was valid for its expressed purpose. General Statutes, § 4746. We held in the case of Lambert HoistingEngine Co. v. Carmody,
It would seem, in view of the general purpose of the motor-vehicle law as regards identification of vehicles in connection with their ownership, that registration by a conditional vendee in possession would more fully serve the design of the statute than registration continued in the name of the vendors. If, after such a contract as was made in this case, the vendors had, under the law, a right to retain registration of this vehicle under their general registration as dealers and by virtue of such interest or ownership as they retained, as to which we do not deem it necessary now to decide, then the contention of plaintiff that he was a licensed driver of a registered vehicle would be beyond cavil, for the disability to recover established by Chapter 233, § 44, of the Public Acts of 1919, applies only to an owner, and a person not an owner, if he is a licensed driver, can under such circumstances recover.
But we do not think that this question is fairly raised in the case, as a proper construction of the charge of the trial judge seems to rest the plaintiff's right to recover upon a registration made by the vendors which, at the time of the injury, still enured to the benefit of the plaintiff, and took the place for five days of actual registration in the latter's name; and this is the controlling point in the case which we have now to consider. It appears from the record that the vendors were duly-registered dealers in motor-vehicles, and as such, therefore, they were not obliged to register each vehicle acquired by them, but could hold the same in possession by virtue of the provision *Page 577 of § 11(a) of Chapter 233 of the Public Acts of 1919 by a sort of blanket or general registration. The Act further provides that each vehicle so registered shall be regarded as registered under the distinguishing number or mark until sold; also (§ 11(c)) that the dealer may loan to a purchaser his number-plates for a period not exceeding five days. Had the dealers, or any one of them, or one in their employ, driven the motorcycle for such purposes as the law allows, and been negligently injured by the act of any person, the fact that the number-plate had not been changed from that of a former owner to that of the dealers, would not have precluded a recovery. Not to carry proper markers while operating a car is a violation of § 13 of Chapter 233 of the Public Acts of 1919, and a penalty is provided for such violation; but § 44 of this last-cited Act does not prohibit a recovery for a violation of § 13; such a disability only arises from a violation of §§ 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the Act. There is nothing in the five sections last referred to which requires the carrying of number-plates; that requirement is made by § 13.
The plaintiff claims that a dealer's registration protects a purchaser for a period of five days from the date of purchase, although the purchaser has not in fact completed the registration of the vehicle purchased, and that by virtue of such protection the latter may operate the vehicle for such period as fully and freely as the dealer might have done and with the same rights and immunities; in short, that the dealer's registration still covers the vehicle. On the other hand, the defendants contend that the provision of the statute of 1919, § 11(c), permitting the dealer to loan his markers for five days to a purchaser, is only in aid of the latter when he has registered his motor-vehicle but has not yet received his number-plates, and that the dealer's plates may be then temporarily placed upon the *Page 578
vehicle, and when so placed the latter may be legally operated for a period of five days. In Kiely v. Ragali,
Passing to the final contention of the defendants, we find them claiming that even if the law permits a purchaser to operate a motor-vehicle for five days by virtue of the registration of his vendor, the privilege of so doing is only available when the purchaser carries the number-plates of the vendor, that is, that the placing of the markers upon the vehicle is a condition precedent to the exercise of the right of operation. Reading the Automobile Act as a whole and correlating its various provisions, we cannot regard this contention as valid. It seems clear that the right to operate, enuring to a vendee of a motor-vehicle upon the registration *Page 579 of his vendor, is a right to exercise for five days the same privileges which enured to the vendor under the law. If the latter operates a vehicle with improper number-plates affixed thereto, he is not an outlaw on the highway, and without redress for injury received from the negligent act of another. He is merely subject to the penalties provided in § 13 of the Act of 1919. Putting the matter in another way, we may take the case of a purchaser of a motor-vehicle who has in fact procured his certificate of registration, but who inadvertently displays number-plates not assigned to him upon the vehicle while operating the same. Clearly he is not debarred a recovery from one who injures him. We therefore conclude that the registration of the vendors was, in effect, for the period of five days from the purchase of the motorcycle by the plaintiff, the equivalent of a certificate of registration granted to him individually, and that he had a right of recovery in his action, and that there was nothing erroneous in the charge of the trial judge.
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.