Citation Numbers: 41 A.2d 771, 131 Conn. 622, 1945 Conn. LEXIS 135
Judges: Maltbie, Brown, Jennings, Ells, Dickenson
Filed Date: 2/21/1945
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
The plaintiff brought this action to recover damages for injuries resulting from a fall as she was about to enter a bus operated by the defendant. The jury returned a general verdict in her favor, but, in connection with it, answered two interrogatories: to one, asking whether the plaintiff fell on the icy highway before she had placed her foot on the step of the bus, they answered "No"; and to the other, asking whether she fell as a result of her right foot slipping on the step of the bus at the time when her left foot had already been lifted from the highway, they answered "Yes." The defendant made a motion in the first paragraph of which it asked to have the general verdict set aside and in the second paragraph of which it sought the entry of judgment in its favor upon the basis of the jury's answers to the second interrogatory, notwithstanding the general verdict. The trial court granted the motion in so far as it sought to have the general verdict set aside, but denied the other relief asked. From its memorandum of decision it appears that it set the verdict aside because of a fatal variance between the allegations of the complaint as to the cause of the plaintiff's fall and proof that it was due to her slipping on the step of the bus. It later made a finding of the circumstances which led it to refuse to enter a verdict in the defendant's favor because of the answers to the interrogatories. The trial court concluded, as appears from this finding, that linguistic difficulties on the part of the plaintiff as a witness and a consideration of other testimony offered would make it improper and unfair to her to direct judgment in the defendant's favor upon the evidence as offered, and also that the court had no power to direct the entry of such a judgment, either under our decision in the case of Belchak v. New York, N. H. H.R. Co.,
If the trial court was correct in its last conclusion above stated, there would be no occasion to consider the case further. It apparently treated the four cases it cited as presenting the single question whether, under our present practice, a judgment non obstante veredicto could in any event be entered. Such judgments were early given recognition by us. Fitch v. Scot, 1 Root 351; Church v. Tomlinson,
In Fay v. Hartford Springfield Ry. Co.,
A reading of the opinions in these cases indicates some inconsistency in our decisions, but they lead to this statement of our conclusions: A judgment non obstante veredicto may be rendered where the application of legal principles to facts conclusively established by pleadings or judicially admitted shows that the party against whom the verdict was rendered is entitled to judgment; it cannot properly be entered where the person in whose favor the general verdict was rendered is not entitled to judgment upon it because of a failure of proof at the trial which may be remedied at a new trial; and, even though upon the pleadings as they stand judgment might be entered, the trial court may in its discretion refuse to direct it, if it concludes that, in justice to the party against whom it is claimed, a further opportunity should be afforded him upon repleading to establish his case. In the cases of Streitweiser v. Lightbourn, supra, and Harris v. Sissa, supra, *Page 628
we referred to the fact that by the English common law a judgment non obstante veredicto could not be rendered for a defendant. Whatever the reason therefor, this restriction upon the rendition of such a judgment has been quite generally repudiated in this country by statutes or decisions of the courts. Tarbell v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co.,
Thus far we have been speaking of judgments non obstante veredicto. The motion of the defendant was not in reality one for such a judgment. A judgment entered contrary to a general verdict as the result of application of principles of law to a special verdict or to answers to interrogatories returned in connection with a general verdict is not a judgment non obstante veredicto but is one entered upon the verdict as the result of giving controlling weight to the special finding of facts made by the jury rather than to the conclusions embodied in the general verdict. Ellison v. Railway Co.,
In the instant case, the jury have determined by the answers to the interrogatories the cause of the plaintiff's fall, and assuming, as the trial court held, that this was beyond the scope of permissible recovery under the allegations of the complaint, the application of principles of law to the facts so found would point to the result that the defendant should have judgment. It could be argued that the defendant was just as much entitled to have judgment entered upon the facts so found by the jury as is a party in whose favor a general verdict is rendered to have judgment entered upon that verdict; that is to say that in such a case as this, the entry of judgment for the defendant is compulsory. Upon this question we have found little help in the decisions of other states, because they usually have been dictated by controlling statutes, the provisions of which vary. For example, the statutes of West Virginia in such a situation require that judgment be entered upon the special finding; Grass v. Development Co.,
There is a close analogy between judgments non obstante veredicto and judgments entered upon a special finding by a jury contrary to the general verdict, and some of the considerations we have pointed out with reference to the former apply to the latter. The very inconsistency in this case between the special finding and the general verdict shows that in some way the jury went astray. It accords with the policy of our decisions to give to a party who claims to have suffered a wrong at the hands of another every reasonable opportunity to establish his right to redress. Where a trial court is confronted with a situation such as the one before us, even though it might direct judgment for a party against whom a general verdict is rendered, we conclude that, if it is of the opinion that it would not be just to the party against whom the judgment would enter to foreclose him from any further *Page 632 opportunity to establish his right to recover, either upon the pleadings as they stand or upon amendments to them, it may, in its discretion, direct a new trial instead of the entry of a judgment. In this case the ruling of the trial court in the exercise of its discretion that judgment should not enter for the defendant cannot be held erroneous.
The plaintiff questions the propriety of the action of the trial court in making a finding in this case. In the Belchak case, we stated that in determining whether to grant the motion only matters of record could be considered, without resort to the evidence; and we added that under our practice this would necessarily be so because our rules provide no method by which the evidence could be brought before us in order to review the entry of such a judgment. What we meant was that no such judgment could in any event be rendered unless upon the bare facts of record, apart from the evidence, it could be found that the party against whom the general verdict was rendered was entitled to it. What we now hold is that, although those conditions be met, the trial court can still, in the exercise of a sound discretion, refuse to render it. Obviously, for the purpose of testing the exercise of its discretion in ruling upon a motion for such a judgment, a finding may be necessary; and to this extent we modify the statement in the Belchak case. The action of the trial court in making a finding was proper.
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Walker v. New Mexico & Southern Pacific Railroad , 17 S. Ct. 421 ( 1897 )
Greco v. Keenan , 115 Conn. 704 ( 1932 )
Streitweiser v. Lightbourn , 87 Conn. 527 ( 1913 )
Lamenza v. Shelton , 96 Conn. 403 ( 1921 )
Harris v. Sissa , 91 Conn. 249 ( 1917 )
Fay v. Hartford & Springfield Street Railway Co. , 81 Conn. 578 ( 1909 )
Shives v. Eno Cotton Mills , 151 N.C. 290 ( 1909 )
Fay v. Hartford & Springfield Street Railway Co. , 81 Conn. 330 ( 1908 )
Ruocco v. Logiocco , 104 Conn. 585 ( 1926 )
Belchak v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad , 119 Conn. 630 ( 1935 )
Koops v. Gregg , 130 Conn. 185 ( 1943 )
Murdock v. Croughwell, No. Cv 98 058 1593 (Mar. 8, 2002) , 31 Conn. L. Rptr. 529 ( 2002 )
Craine v. Trinity College, No. Cv 95-0555013s (Dec. 27, ... , 1999 Conn. Super. Ct. 16839 ( 1999 )
Bilodeau v. City of Bristol, No. Cv91 0387424 S (Dec. 13, ... , 1993 Conn. Super. Ct. 10796 ( 1993 )
Petrozzi v. Ensign-Bickford Company, No. Cv 97-0574903-S (... , 28 Conn. L. Rptr. 30 ( 2000 )
Dutcher v. Lewis , 1974 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 1125 ( 1974 )
White v. Edmonds, No. Cv89 0262023s (Nov. 9, 1993) , 1993 Conn. Super. Ct. 9674 ( 1993 )
Nugent v. Delvecchio , 36 Conn. Super. Ct. 532 ( 1980 )
Mohawk Mt. Ski Area v. American Home Assce., No. Cv 056905 (... , 1995 Conn. Super. Ct. 573 ( 1995 )
Levandoski v. Cone, No. 542714 (Aug. 30, 2001) , 2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 12042 ( 2001 )
Wilson v. Kent Realty, No. Cv 99 0081115s (Jun. 26, 2002) , 2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 8203-al ( 2002 )
Licata v. Spector , 26 Conn. Super. Ct. 378 ( 1966 )
Foley v. the Huntington Co., No. Cv87 246145 S (Mar. 18, ... , 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 2891 ( 1994 )
Nugent v. Delvecchio , 36 Conn. Super. Ct. 532 ( 1980 )
Fitch v. State , 139 Conn. 456 ( 1953 )
Wooster v. Wm. C. A. Fischer Plumbing & Heating Co. , 153 Conn. 700 ( 1966 )
Tough v. Ives , 162 Conn. 274 ( 1972 )