State v. James A.

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STATE v. JAMES A.—CONCURRENCE
ROBINSON, C. J., with whom McDONALD, J., joins,
and ECKER, J., joins as to part II, concurring in the
judgment. I join in the judgment of the court upholding
the conviction of the defendant, James A., of numerous
crimes, including sexual assault and threatening offenses.1
I write separately because I part company from the
majority’s analysis of the defendant’s claims on appeal
in two significant ways. First, I conclude that the trial
court abused its discretion when it joined the defen-
dant’s threatening in the second degree and disorderly
conduct charges (threatening case) for trial with his
sexual assault, risk of injury to a child, and strangulation
in the first degree charges (sexual assault case), but I
ultimately agree with the majority that this improper
joinder was harmless error not requiring reversal of the
affected convictions, namely, those in the threatening
case. Second, I reach the merits of and agree with the
defendant’s claim that the trial court improperly denied
his request for permission to testify about his prior
felony convictions without opening the door to disclos-
ing the names of those underlying felonies as a remedy
for an inadvertent disclosure about his prior incarcera-
tion by one of the state’s witnesses. As with the first
claim, I conclude that this ruling was harmless error
not requiring reversal. Accordingly, I concur in the judg-
ment of the court.2
I
I begin my discussion by addressing the defendant’s
joinder claim, which requires the court to consider the
standard for cross admissibility for purposes of joining
for trial, pursuant to Practice Book § 41-19,3 the charges
in the separate sexual assault and threatening cases.
See footnote 1 of this opinion. As the majority aptly
observes, ‘‘[the] General Statutes and rules of practice
expressly authorize a trial court to order a defendant
to be tried jointly on charges arising from separate
cases.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Part I of
the majority opinion, quoting State v. Rivera, 260 Conn.
486, 490, 798 A.2d 958 (2002). In State v. LaFleur, 307
Conn. 115, 159, 51 A.3d 1048 (2012), and State v. Payne,
303 Conn. 538, 544–50, 34 A.3d 370 (2012), two cases
discussing the standards for reviewing a trial court’s
ruling on a motion pertaining to joinder, ‘‘we rejected
the notion of a blanket presumption in favor of joinder
and clarified that, when charges are brought in separate
informations, and the state seeks to join those informa-
tions for trial, the state bears the burden of proving
that the defendant will not be substantially prejudiced
by joinder pursuant to Practice Book § 41-19. . . . The
state may satisfy this burden by proving, by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, either that the evidence in the
cases is cross admissible or that the defendant will not
be unfairly prejudiced pursuant to the factors set forth
in State v. Boscarino, [204 Conn. 714, 722–24, 529 A.2d
1260 (1987)].4 Although the state bears the burden of
proof in the trial court, [i]t is the defendant’s burden
on appeal to show that joinder was improper by proving
substantial prejudice that could not be cured by the
trial court’s instructions to the jury . . . . As we
emphasized in LaFleur, our appellate standard of
review remains intact. Accordingly, [i]n deciding
whether to [join informations] for trial, the trial court
enjoys broad discretion, which, in the absence of mani-
fest abuse, an appellate court may not disturb. . . .
State v. Devon D., 321 Conn. 656, 664–65, 138 A.3d
849 (2016).’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis in original;
footnote added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Part
I of the majority opinion.
‘‘A long line of cases establishes that the paramount
concern is whether the defendant’s right to a fair trial
will be impaired. Therefore, in considering whether
joinder is proper, this court has recognized that, whe[n]
evidence of one incident would be admissible at the
trial of the other incident, separate trials would provide
the defendant no significant benefit. . . . Under such
circumstances, the defendant would not ordinarily be
substantially prejudiced by joinder of the offenses for
a single trial. . . . Accordingly, we have found joinder
to be proper [when] the evidence of other crimes or
uncharged misconduct [was] cross admissible at sepa-
rate trials. . . . [When] evidence is cross admissible,
therefore, our inquiry ends. . . . State v. LaFleur,
supra, 307 Conn. 155; see Leconte v. Commissioner of
Correction, 207 Conn. App. 306, 327, 262 A.3d 140 ([I]t
is well established that [when] the evidence in one case
is cross admissible at the trial of another case, the
defendant will not be substantially prejudiced by join-
der. . . . Our case law is clear that a court considering
joinder need not apply the Boscarino factors if evidence
in the cases is cross admissible’’ . . .), cert. denied,
340 Conn. 902, 263 A.3d 387 (2021).’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Part I of the majority opinion.
I agree generally with the majority’s response to the
defendant’s claims with respect to the requirements for
establishing cross admissibility for purposes of joinder,
and I particularly agree that, under State v. Crenshaw,
313 Conn. 69, 95 A.3d 1113 (2014), and State v. LaFleur,
supra, 307 Conn. 115, the fact that evidence may be
admitted only for a limited purpose in one of the cases
to be joined does not defeat a finding of cross admissi-
bility for purposes of joinder. See part I of the majority
opinion. As the majority observes, requiring complete
congruence as to the admissibility of the evidence in
both cases is inconsistent with the principle that, ‘‘in
making the discretionary, pretrial decision to join multi-
ple cases, [the trial court] rules on whether the evidence
could be admissible, not whether the evidence actually
is admitted.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., quoting State v. Crenshaw, supra,
89. Moreover, requiring the state to establish full con-
gruence would defeat the benefits of judicial economy
and context for the trier that are afforded by joinder,
with appropriate jury instructions serving to mitigate
any prejudicial effect from that joinder.5 See State v.
Crenshaw, supra, 89–90.
I emphasize, however, that joinder on the basis of
cross admissibility requires that evidence of the crimes
set forth in each separate information be admissible at
the trials of the other incidents. See State v. LaFleur,
supra, 307 Conn. 154–55. Put differently, cross admissi-
bility does not rely on the specific evidence that is
required to prove every element of each of the crimes
charged in each case but, rather, whether ‘‘evidence of
one incident would be admissible at the trial of the
other incident . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) State v. Anderson, 318 Conn. 680, 692, 122 A.3d
254 (2015); see State v. Crenshaw, supra, 313 Conn. 84(‘‘[w]e consistently have found joinder to be proper if
we have concluded that the evidence of other crimes
or uncharged misconduct would have been cross admis-
sible at separate trials’’ (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)). Thus, our inquiry is whether evidence of the
conduct giving rise to the threatening and disorderly
conduct charges could be admissible in the sexual
assault case, and whether evidence of the conduct giv-
ing rise to the sexual assault, risk of injury, and strangu-
lation charges could be admissible in the threatening
case.6 As the majority states, if we determine that the
evidence is not cross admissible in each case, then we
consider whether joinder is nevertheless proper insofar
as the defendant has not been unfairly prejudiced under
the Boscarino factors.
With respect to the first half of the cross admissibility
inquiry, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the
defendant’s violent response to the accusation of sexual
assault, which led to the threatening and disorderly
conduct charges, was relevant to establishing his con-
sciousness of guilt in the sexual assault case, as well
as to proving fear on the part of J and L that led to the
delayed disclosure of their sexual assault allegations.
I further agree with the majority’s conclusion that the
prejudicial effect of this evidence did not outweigh its
probative value in the sexual assault case and that join-
der of the charges was not otherwise unduly prejudicial
with respect to the defense of the sexual assault case.
Where I part company from the majority is the second
half of the cross admissibility inquiry, namely, our con-
sideration of the reverse—whether the trial court cor-
rectly determined that evidence of the conduct giving
rise to the sexual assault case could be admissible in
the threatening case. Like the majority, I agree with the
state’s argument that the evidence that the defendant
sexually assaulted J and L establishes the requisite
intent in the threatening case, namely, that the defen-
dant threatened to commit a ‘‘crime of violence with
the intent to terrorize another person . . . .’’ General
Statutes § 53a-62 (a) (2).
Evidence of other crimes is admissible for nonpro-
pensity purposes, ‘‘such as to show intent, an element
[of] the crime, identity, malice, motive or a system of
criminal activity.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Anderson, supra, 318 Conn.
693; see Conn. Code Evid. § 4-5 (a) and (c). ‘‘Such evi-
dence is admissible if: (1) it is relevant and material to
at least one of the circumstances encompassed by the
exceptions; and (2) its probative value outweighs its
prejudicial effect.’’ State v. James G., 268 Conn. 382,
390, 844 A.2d 810 (2004). For purposes of relevance, I
cannot say that the evidence of the conduct giving rise
to the sexual assault, risk of injury, and strangulation
charges has no logical bearing on the probability that
the defendant intended to terrorize the relatives of his
victims following their disclosure of his sexual abuse.
See, e.g., State v. Bermudez, 341 Conn. 233, 249, 267
A.3d 44 (2021) (‘‘Relevant evidence is evidence that has
a logical tendency to aid the trier in the determination
of an issue. . . . Evidence is relevant if it tends to make
the existence or nonexistence of any other fact more
probable or less probable than it would be without such
evidence. . . . To be relevant, the evidence need not
exclude all other possibilities [or be conclusive] . . . .’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.)). Nor can I say that
the evidence bears no relevance toward establishing a
motive for the defendant’s threats and conduct. See
State v. Lopez, 280 Conn. 779, 795, 911 A.2d 1099 (2007)
(‘‘[e]vidence of prior misconduct that tends to show that
the defendant harbored hostility toward the intended
victim of a violent crime is admissible to establish
motive’’).
However, I still must determine whether the proba-
tive value of the evidence of the specific acts of sexual
assault outweighs its prejudicial effect. See, e.g., State
v. James G., supra, 268 Conn. 390. I part company with
the majority on this point. If the probative value is
outweighed by its prejudicial effect, then this evidence
was inadmissible in the threatening case, and the evi-
dence in the two cases is not cross admissible. ‘‘[T]he
test for determining whether evidence is unduly prejudi-
cial is not whether it is damaging to the [party against
whom the evidence is offered] but whether it will
improperly arouse the emotions of the jur[ors].’’ (Empha-
sisadded; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Sandoval, 263 Conn. 524, 544, 821 A.2d 247 (2003); see
Conn. Code Evid. § 4-3.
Nothing in the record supports the inference that the
trial court specifically considered the prejudicial effect
that the sexual assault, risk of injury, and strangulation
charges would have on the threatening case.7 Neverthe-
less, detailed evidence that the defendant sexually
assaulted two children on numerous occasions and
strangled a child to the point of unconsciousness cer-
tainly would improperly arouse the emotions of the
jurors in the threatening case to the extent that its
prejudicial effect exceeds the probative value in that
case. See State v. Ellis, 270 Conn. 337, 377, 852 A.2d 676(2004) (‘‘[t]he effect of testimony regarding the intimate
details of sexual misconduct on a jury’s ability to con-
sider separate charges in a fair and impartial manner
cannot be underestimated’’). In my view, this evidence
served to elevate the defendant from someone whose
alcohol fueled ill temper led him to commit acts that
were both violent and offensive to one who is a genuine
sexual predator.8 This has, in my view, the effect of
transforming the nature of the threatening case in the
eyes of the jurors.
I acknowledge the state’s arguments, echoed by the
majority opinion, that the two cases were factually
related and that ‘‘to place the threats and conduct [fol-
lowing the defendant’s wedding] in context, it would
be necessary at any trial on those charges to elicit
evidence of [the defendant’s] sexual assaults of J and
L . . . .’’9 The majority also posits that evidence of the
specific acts of sexual abuse is ‘‘relevant to the question
of whether the persons at whom the threats were
directed and others would interpret them as a genuine
threat of violence or, instead, as drunken bluster.’’ Part
I of the majority opinion. The majority questions rhetori-
cally ‘‘how the threatening and disorderly conduct
charges could be tried without introducing any evi-
dence related to the sexual assault cases.’’ (Emphasis
in original.) Id. I respectfully disagree. That relevant
context, and the motive for the defendant’s outbursts,
would have been amply provided by S’s accusations
that the defendant sexually abused J and L. Indeed,
the evidence of S’s accusations, including calling the
defendant a ‘‘child molester’’ and a ‘‘pedophile son of
a bitch,’’ is precisely what the state elicited in limited
fashion at trial to provide context for the defendant’s
conduct on the nights leading to the threatening and
disorderly conduct charges.10 Beyond those accusa-
tions, specific evidence of the defendant’s sexually
assaultive acts against J and L, including his strangula-
tion of J, would serve only to inflame the jurors with
respect to the threatening case. Accordingly, my review
of the record shows that the prejudicial effect of the
evidence did outweigh its probative value, and the evi-
dence of the specific conduct giving rise to the sexual
assault case, therefore, was inadmissible in the threat-
ening case. Thus, the evidence was not cross admissible
with respect to the threatening case, and I move to an
analysis of the Boscarino factors to determine whether
joinder was proper.
In State v. Boscarino, supra, 204 Conn. 722–24, this
court ‘‘identified several factors that a trial court should
consider in deciding whether a severance [or denial of
joinder] may be necessary to avoid undue prejudice
resulting from consolidation of multiple charges for
trial. These factors include: (1) whether the charges
involve discrete, easily distinguishable factual scenar-
ios; (2) whether the crimes were of a violent nature or
concerned brutal or shocking conduct on the defen-
dant’s part; and (3) the duration and complexity of the
trial. . . . If any or all of these factors are present, a
reviewing court must decide whether the trial court’s
jury instructions cured any prejudice that might have
occurred.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
LaFleur, supra, 307 Conn. 156.
As the majority aptly notes, there is substantial over-
lap between the second Boscarino factor and the analy-
sis by which we determine whether otherwise relevant
evidence is more prejudicial than probative for pur-
poses of admissibility.11 Thus, I turn briefly to the defen-
dant’s claims with respect to the second Boscarino
factor.12 With respect to the second Boscarino factor,
the defendant argues that the crimes charged in the
sexual assault case are both brutal and shocking, as
they related to the repeated sexual assault and strangu-
lation of two minor children, who were both members
of the defendant’s family. In response, the state posits
instead that the defendant has failed to demonstrate
‘‘that the relative levels of brutal or shocking conduct
unduly prejudiced one charge or another.’’ Largely for
the same reasons that led me to conclude that the preju-
dicial value of the specific evidence of sexually assaultive
acts sharply outweighs its probative value for purposes
of cross admissibility with the threatening case, I agree
with the defendant and conclude that the second Bosc-
arino factor was present.
‘‘Whether one or more offenses involve brutal or
shocking conduct likely to arouse the passions of the
jurors must be ascertained by comparing the relative
levels of violence used to perpetrate the offenses
charged in each information.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. LaFleur, supra, 307 Conn. 160. ‘‘The
second factor in Boscarino permits joinder if, when
comparing the defendant’s conduct in separate inci-
dents, his alleged conduct in one incident is not so
shocking or brutal that the jury’s ability to consider
fairly and objectively the remainder of the charges is
compromised.’’ Id., 160–61. As both cases involved vio-
lence, we must determine whether the defendant’s con-
duct in the sexual assault case, as the more violent
of the crimes, was particularly shocking or brutal in
comparison to his conduct in the threatening case.
Given the particular issues in this case, my conclusion
that specific evidence of the defendant’s sexually assaultive
acts is more prejudicial than probative for purposes of
admissibility in the threatening case because of their
relative brutality reduces my analysis of the second
Boscarino factor almost to a matter of form. As I stated
previously, the sexual assault case contained allega-
tions of digital penetration, cunnilingus, and analingus
involving two minor children, as well as the strangula-
tion of one minor child to the point of unconsciousness.
In comparison, the threatening case involved violent
threats and acts of property damage, namely, punching
a hole in a wall and flipping over a table, and the defen-
dant’s making highly obscene gestures while throwing
an open beer can at someone who was pointing a fire-
arm at him. It is beyond cavil that the defendant’s con-
duct in the sexual assault case, which was directed at
two young children, was significantly more brutal and
shocking than his conduct in the threatening case. See,
e.g., State v. Ellis, supra, 270 Conn. 377 (‘‘We have
recognized that the crime of sexual assault [is] violent
in nature, irrespective of whether it is accompanied by
physical violence. Short of homicide, [sexual assault]
is the ultimate violation of self. It is also a violent crime
because it normally involves force, or the threat of force
or intimidation, to overcome the will and the capacity
of the victim to resist.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal
quotation marks omitted.)); cf. State v. Payne, supra,303 Conn. 552 (murder case ‘‘was significantly more
brutal and shocking’’ than jury tampering case); State
v. Ellis, supra, 343–48, 378 (case in which defendant
groped minor’s breasts and in between her legs, and
attempted to force her to perform oral sex on him and
to kiss him, was ‘‘substantially more egregious’’ than
cases in which defendant only groped victims’ breasts).
Thus, I conclude that the second Boscarino factor was
present and that the evidence from the sexual assault
case was prejudicial to the defendant in the threaten-
ing case.
As a result of the presence of a Boscarino factor,
I now must determine whether the trial court’s jury
instructions cured any prejudice that might have
occurred from the improper joinder, rendering that
error harmless. See, e.g., State v. Randolph, 284 Conn.
328, 338, 933 A.2d 1158 (2007). In considering the cura-
tive effects of the jury instructions, I also consider the
relative strength of the state’s case as to the threaten-
ing charges.
‘‘When reviewing claims of error, we examine first
whether the trial court abused its discretion, and, if so,
we next inquire whether the error was harmless. . . .
When an error is not of constitutional magnitude, the
defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the
error was harmful. . . . The proper standard for
review of a defendant’s claim of harm is whether the
jury’s verdict was substantially swayed by the error.
. . . Accordingly, a nonconstitutional error is harmless
when an appellate court has a fair assurance that the
error did not substantially affect the verdict.’’ (Citations
omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Payne, supra, 303 Conn. 552–53.
Having reviewed the record, I have the requisite fair
assurance that the improper joinder of the charges did
not substantially sway the jury’s verdict as to the threat-
ening case. First, the jury instructions in this case miti-
gated the effect of the improper joinder by admonishing
the jury to consider all counts separately. During its
preliminary instructions to the jury, the trial court twice
admonished the jury with the following statement:
‘‘Each charge against the defendant is set forth in the
information as a separate count, and you must consider
each count separately in deciding this case.’’ The trial
court again instructed the jury at the close of trial that
it was to consider each charge separately.13 See State
v. Payne, supra, 303 Conn. 553–54 (‘‘The record reveals
that, during voir dire, the trial court instructed the
potential jurors that, although the cases had been joined
for judicial economy, the jurors, if called [on] to serve,
must ‘treat each and every case separately. . . .’ The
court expanded [on] this warning multiple times
throughout the trial, including after the jury was impan-
eled, during the state’s presentation of evidence, and
in its final charge.’’ (Footnotes omitted.)); State v. Perez,
147 Conn. App. 53, 110–11, 80 A.3d 103 (2013)
(instructing jury as to separate nature of each charge
at conclusion of state’s evidence regarding one case, on
first day of and during state’s presentation of evidence
regarding other case, and during jury charge), aff’d, 322
Conn. 118, 139 A.3d 654 (2016). These instructions have
recently been held adequate ‘‘[to cure] the risk of sub-
stantial prejudice to the defendant and . . . [to pre-
serve] the jury’s ability to fairly and impartially consider
the offenses charged in the jointly tried cases.’’14 State
v. McKethan, 184 Conn. App. 187, 200, 194 A.3d 293,
cert. denied, 330 Conn. 931, 194 A.3d 779 (2018); see
State v. Norris, 213 Conn. App. 253, 285, 287, 277 A.3d
839, cert. denied, 345 Conn. 910, 283 A.3d 980 (2022).
Second, given the general adequacy of these instruc-
tions, I consider the strength of the state’s evidence in
the threatening case. See, e.g., State v. Payne, supra,303 Conn. 554; State v. Norris, supra, 213 Conn. App.
285–86. I agree with the majority that the evidence was
overwhelming, as multiple witnesses—including one of
the defendant’s own witnesses—testified consistently
about the defendant’s violent conduct after S’s accusa-
tions, including his threats to decapitate those who
made allegations against him. Although, as the defen-
dant points out, all the witnesses had consumed at
least some alcoholic beverages at the wedding prior to
witnessing the defendant’s conduct, there is no evi-
dence that any of those witnesses were under the influ-
ence of alcohol to the extent it affected their perception.
Indeed, all the witnesses testified that they had sobered
up by that point, with no evidence in the record sug-
gesting otherwise. Further, the accounts of the defen-
dant’s conduct at the after-party in Naugatuck, specifically,
his punching holes in the wall, are corroborated by
photographic evidence of the repairs to the wall. More-
over, the testimony of Sergeant Matthew Geddes estab-
lished the disorderly conduct charge portion of the
threatening case without challenge, insofar as he testi-
fied that the defendant was the primary aggressor dur-
ing the altercation with A and M during which M shot
him. See footnote 3 of the majority opinion and accom-
panying text.
Finally, and most telling, defense counsel’s closing
argument indicates that the threatening charges were
not a significant factual issue in the trial of this joined
case, insofar as defense counsel did not contest the
underlying allegations, instead focusing on the sexual
assault charges and referring to the events on the night
of the wedding only to point out that, when the police
responded to a neighbor’s noise complaint during the
after-party, no one in the family told them about S’s
accusation that the defendant had sexually abused J
and L. See, e.g., State v. Osimanti, 299 Conn. 1, 20–23,
6 A.3d 790 (2010) (reviewing summations to discern
significant factual issues in case); cf. State v. Favoccia,
306 Conn. 770, 811–13, 51 A.3d 1002 (2012) (reviewing
prosecutor’s summation in determining that improperly
admitted expert testimony with effect of vouching for
teenage victim was harmful given extent to which vic-
tim’s credibility was significant issue in sexual assault
trial). Indeed, in strategically conceding that the defen-
dant was not ‘‘a saint,’’ while simultaneously making
the point that he was also not a child molester, defense
counsel acknowledged significant portions of the
events, including that the defendant ‘‘was drunk the
night of the wedding,’’ that he had thrown the wedding
ring at D during their altercation, and that ‘‘things got
out of hand’’ to the point that M shot him the following
evening. To this point, in concluding her closing, defense
counsel asked only whether the state had met its burden
of proof with respect to the sexual assault and strangu-
lation charges. Accordingly, given the strength of the
state’s evidence in the threatening case and the jury
instructions, I have a fair assurance that the otherwise
improper joinder of the threatening case with the sexual
assault case was harmless error not requiring reversal.
II
I next address the defendant’s claim that the trial
court’s instruction to the jury to disregard a statement
by M referring to the defendant’s prior incarceration
was insufficient to remedy the prejudice resulting from
that improper testimony and, therefore, that the trial
court abused its discretion by denying the defendant
his requested additional remedy of allowing him to tes-
tify as to the nonsexual nature of his prior felony record
without opening the door to disclosing the names of
the underlying felonies. The defendant also argues that,
because the state had a weak case as to each of the
charges, the error, which functioned to preclude the
defendant from testifying in his own defense, was not
harmless. In response, the state argues that the trial
court was well within its discretion to rule that, if the
defendant testified as to his prior felony record, then
the state could inquire into the names of his prior felony
convictions, and that, even if the trial court’s ruling
was an abuse of its discretion, any error was harmless.
Although I agree with the defendant’s argument that
the trial court abused its discretion by denying him his
requested remedy, I also agree with the state that the
error was harmless and does not require reversal of the
convictions.
The record reveals the following additional facts and
procedural history that are relevant to our consider-
ation of this claim. On the first day of trial, prior to
bringing out the jury, defense counsel asked the trial
court for a ruling on the defendant’s motion in limine
to limit the introduction of evidence of his prior convic-
tions. The prosecutor responded that he had already
‘‘admonished all of [the state’s] witnesses’’ and ‘‘made
them aware of what they are not allowed to say . . .
in court.’’ Based on the prosecutor’s response, the court
stated that, ‘‘technically,’’ it would grant the defen-
dant’s motion.
During the trial, the prosecutor conducted a direct
examination of M, the victims’ grandfather. While testi-
fying about the night of the defendant’s wedding to D
and the commotion that had ensued at the after-party,
the prosecutor asked M whether he had heard the defen-
dant say anything. M answered that the defendant ‘‘was
just yelling [that] he wasn’t going back to jail . . . .’’
The prosecutor immediately interjected and asked that
the jury be excused. The prosecutor then asked the
court to strike the statement from the record and
informed the court that the witness had been ‘‘admon-
ished repeatedly not to say anything about’’ the defen-
dant’s history of incarceration, to which M responded,
‘‘[y]eah, I was.’’ Both parties agreed that the testimony
should be stricken and that a curative instruction should
be given to the jury. Upon the jury’s return, the trial
court promptly stated: ‘‘I’m going to strike [M’s] last
statement. I will order you . . . to not consider that
at any point in time in your deliberation[s]. Reminding
you, and you will get full instructions, that, when a
statement or an exhibit or an item is stricken, you can-
not consider that as part of your deliberations.’’15 The
prosecutor then continued with his examination, asking
M leading questions to avoid any other improper dis-
closures.
The next day, following the close of the state’s case-
in-chief, defense counsel asked the trial court to modify
its ruling regarding the defendant’s prior convictions.
Defense counsel noted that, the day before, M had
implied that the defendant had a prior criminal record
when he mentioned the defendant’s statement that he
was ‘‘not going back to jail . . . .’’ Defense counsel
thus sought permission for the defendant to testify that
he was ‘‘a convicted felon of a nonsexual crime,’’ while
also precluding the state from mentioning that those
felony convictions were for robberies or the details
of those crimes. The prosecutor responded that the
defendant’s prior record did not consist of one felony
conviction but, rather, of seven convictions, and argued
that, if evidence of the felonies came in, they should
be named because they were relevant to his truthfulness
and veracity, particularly because the defendant
planned to present a character witness in his defense.
The trial court denied defense counsel’s request, rea-
soning that the jury had been instructed to ignore the
improper testimony and that, if the defendant ‘‘open[ed]
the door’’ to the convictions, the court would allow the
prosecutor to inquire as to the names of the felonies
but not the details, so as to avoid getting into collat-
eral issues.
The issue before us is whether the trial court abused
its discretion in determining that, if the defendant testi-
fied about the nonsexual nature of his prior felony con-
victions as a remedy for M’s inadvertent disclosure of
the defendant’s past incarceration, he necessarily
would have opened the door to disclosing the names
of the underlying felonies through cross-examination
by the state.16 Section 6-8 (a) of the Connecticut Code
of Evidence governs the scope of cross-examination
and subsequent examinations.17 ‘‘Generally, a party who
delves into a particular subject during the examination
of a witness cannot object if the opposing party later
questions the witness on the same subject. . . . The
party who initiates discussion on the issue is said to
have opened the door to rebuttal by the opposing party.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mark T.,
339 Conn. 225, 236, 260 A.3d 402 (2021). ‘‘Even though
the rebuttal evidence would ordinarily be inadmissible
on other grounds, the court may, in its discretion, allow
it [when] the party initiating inquiry has made unfair
use of the evidence. . . . [T]his rule operates to prevent
a defendant from successfully excluding inadmissible
prosecution evidence and then selectively introducing
pieces of this evidence for his own advantage, without
allowing the prosecution to place the evidence in its
proper context.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Payne, supra, 303 Conn. 557.
‘‘In determining whether otherwise inadmissible evi-
dence should be admitted to rebut evidence offered by
an opposing party, the trial court must carefully con-
sider whether the circumstances of the case warrant
further inquiry into the subject matter . . . and should
permit it only to the extent necessary to remove any
unfair prejudice [that] might otherwise have ensued
from the original evidence . . . . Accordingly, the trial
court should balance the harm to the state in restricting
the inquiry with the prejudice suffered by the defendant
in allowing the rebuttal. . . . We will not overturn the
trial court’s decision unless the trial court has abused its
discretion.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id. ‘‘In determining whether there has been
an abuse of discretion, every reasonable presumption
should be made in favor of the correctness of the trial
court’s ruling . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) State v. Mark T., supra, 232.
The trial court’s decision indicates that it determined
that the harm to the state in restricting the inquiry
about the exact convictions would be greater than the
prejudice the defendant would have suffered from
allowing that questioning by the state. The trial court
did not, however, discuss what the harm to the state
would have been from the defendant’s proffered testi-
mony. Nor did the state offer any principled reason as
to why it insisted on inquiring into the names of the
felonies18 when the defendant’s request was made solely
because of misconduct committed by the state’s wit-
ness in the first instance. This is exactly what our case
law warns against. See State v. Griggs, 288 Conn. 116,
141, 951 A.2d 531 (2008) (‘‘[t]he doctrine of opening the
door cannot . . . be subverted into a rule for injection
of prejudice’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). I con-
clude that the trial court should have considered
whether the circumstances of the case warranted fur-
ther inquiry into the subject matter, as well as the extent
to which the further inquiry by the state was necessary
to remove any prejudice introduced by the defendant’s
proposed testimony, namely, that his prior convictions
were of a nonsexual nature. This is particularly so given
that the defendant’s testimony was proposed as a cura-
tive measure to address the prejudicial effect of
improper testimony from one of the state’s witnesses
in the first instance. Thus, I conclude that the trial
court abused its discretion in allowing the prosecutor
to inquire further into the specific nature of the defen-
dant’s felony record given the circumstances under
which the defendant proposed to testify.
I acknowledge that the trial court stated that it would
limit the rebuttal evidence to only the names of the
felonies to avoid raising collateral issues. Additionally,
the trial court struck M’s disclosure from the record
and instructed the jury that it was prohibited from con-
sidering the testimony it had heard prior to its dismissal.
However, our case law does not support a conclusion
that the trial court was within its discretion when it
concluded that the defendant would have opened the
door to further inquiry by testifying about the nonsexual
nature of his prior convictions, given that it was offered
solely to remedy the prejudicial effect of M’s improper
testimony about the defendant’s history of incarcera-
tion in the first instance. Cf. State v. Griggs, supra, 288
Conn. 139–40 (trial court did not abuse its discretion
in concluding that defendant opened door to evidence
of his four domestic violence convictions involving
assaultive or threatening behavior when defendant tes-
tified ‘‘that he had only ‘[a] couple’ of domestic violence
convictions and had never been engaged in any kind
of physical assault’’); State v. Gonzalez, 272 Conn. 515,
543–44, 864 A.2d 847 (2005) (trial court did not abuse
its discretion in concluding that defendant opened door
to evidence to rebut testimony introduced by defense
regarding witness’ disbelief of allegations); State v. Phil-
lips, 102 Conn. App. 716, 733–37, 927 A.2d 931 (trial
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence
of prior conviction when defendant’s testimony implied
that he had no prior convictions), cert. denied, 284
Conn. 923, 933 A.2d 727 (2007). The present case is also
distinguishable from those cases in which the trial court
properly allowed further inquiry in order to cure preju-
dice caused by the defendant’s own testimony, insofar
as the purpose of the defendant’s proposed testimony
in the present case was to cure prejudice occasioned
in the first instance by the improper testimony of M,
who was the state’s witness.19 Cf. State v. Graham, 200
Conn. 9, 14, 509 A.2d 493 (1986) (‘‘The introduction of
the other crimes evidence was not essential to cure
the unfairness, if any, that the state may have suffered
by . . . defense counsel’s limited inquiry into the other
robberies. The trial court therefore abused its discretion
. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)).
The jury heard an inadmissible statement from the
state’s witness that the defendant desired to remedy
with a brief reference to the nonsexual nature of his
prior convictions, and there is nothing in the record or
presented by the state in the present appeal as to how
this testimony would have harmed the state, an inquiry
required by the opening the door doctrine. See State v.
Payne, supra, 303 Conn. 557. On the other hand, the
jury’s hearing further testimony about convictions that
are considered to speak to truth and veracity would
undoubtedly have introduced additional prejudice to
the defendant, on top of any created in the first instance
by M’s improper testimony about the defendant’s his-
tory of incarceration. Therefore, it was unreasonable
for the trial court to determine that the harm to the
state in restricting the inquiry about the exact convic-
tions would be greater than the prejudice the defendant
would have suffered from allowing further inquiry by
the state.20 Accordingly, I conclude that the trial court
abused its discretion in determining that the defendant’s
proposed testimony regarding his prior felony convic-
tions opened the door to inquiry by the state regarding
the names of the underlying felonies.
I now must determine whether this error was harm-
less. ‘‘The law governing harmless error for nonconsti-
tutional evidentiary claims is well settled. When an
improper evidentiary ruling is not constitutional in
nature, the defendant bears the burden of demonstra-
ting that the error was harmful. . . . [W]hether [an
improper ruling] is harmless in a particular case
depends [on] a number of factors, such as the impor-
tance of the witness’ testimony in the [defendant’s] case,
whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence
or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting
the testimony of the witness on material points, the
extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and,
of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.
. . . Most [important], we must examine the impact of
the . . . evidence on the trier of fact and the result of
the trial. . . . [T]he proper standard for determining
whether an erroneous evidentiary ruling is harmless
should be whether the jury’s verdict was substantially
swayed by the error. . . . Accordingly, a nonconstitu-
tional error is harmless when an appellate court has a
fair assurance that the error did not substantially affect
the verdict.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Fernando V., 331 Conn. 201, 215, 202 A.3d 350 (2019).
Accordingly, I must consider whether the jury’s not
hearing that the defendant’s prior convictions were of
a nonsexual nature substantially affected the verdict.
The defendant argues that, without his proposed tes-
timony, the jury might have speculated as to whether
his prior felony convictions were of a sexual nature
and then made an impermissible propensity inference
regarding the sexual assault case. See State v. George
A., 308 Conn. 274, 293, 63 A.3d 918 (2013) (evidence to
establish propensity in sex related cases is admissible
only if certain conditions are met). However, to deter-
mine that the jury might have drawn this inference
because of the defendant’s inability to testify about the
nonsexual nature of his prior convictions, there must
be some indication that the jury did not follow the trial
court’s instruction to disregard M’s disclosure about
the defendant’s wish not to return to jail. See, e.g., State
v. Holley, 327 Conn. 576, 618, 175 A.3d 514 (2018); see
also id., 629. The defendant does not argue that there
is any indication of such but, instead, argues that the
trial court’s ‘‘rote reliance’’ on this legal principle was
an abuse of its discretion. Not only has this court repeat-
edly reaffirmed the principle that the jury is presumed
to have followed the trial court’s instruction in the
absence of any indication to the contrary, but we have
also stated that ‘‘instructions are far more effective in
mitigating the harm of potentially improper evidence
when delivered contemporaneously with the admission
of that evidence, and addressed specifically thereto.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 618. In the pres-
ent case, the jury was excused immediately following
the improper statement at issue, and, upon its return,
the trial court promptly stated that it was going to strike
M’s last statement and that it was not to be considered
at any point during deliberations. Thus, I will presume
that the jury followed the trial court’s instruction to
disregard M’s comment and, thus, did not draw an
impermissible propensity inference.
Harmlessness is further supported by the collateral
nature of the defendant’s proposed testimony. To the
extent any testimony improperly was excluded, it was
not central to, or even a part of, the defense. See State
v. Rinaldi, 220 Conn. 345, 357–58, 599 A.2d 1 (1991)
(improper exclusion of evidence central to defendant’s
defense was not harmless error). The testimony did
not, for example, relate to the credibility of a significant
witness who had testified at the trial. Cf. State v. Cul-
breath, 340 Conn. 167, 197, 263 A.3d 350 (2021) (‘‘[when]
credibility is an issue and, thus, the jury’s assessment
of who is telling the truth is critical, an error affecting
the jury’s ability to assess a [witness’] credibility is not
harmless error’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The proposed testimony concerned only one statement
that the jury is presumed to have disregarded, as I have
noted.
Moreover, despite the defendant’s argument to the
contrary, the trial court’s conclusion, although improper,
did not specifically preclude the defendant from testi-
fying as to the nonsexual nature of his prior convictions,
and it certainly did not preclude the defendant from
denying the allegations against him. Finally, as detailed
in the majority opinion, the evidence was overwhelming
as to all the charged offenses, with substantial corrobo-
ration of the various sexual assault charges. Accord-
ingly, I have a fair assurance that the improperly
excluded testimony did not substantially affect the ver-
dict in the sexual assault case.
Because I would affirm the defendant’s convictions,
but for reasons different from those stated in the major-
ity opinion, I concur in the judgment of the court.
1
The trial court rendered judgments, in accordance with the jury’s ver-
dicts, convicting the defendant of the following offenses charged in the
sexual assault case: three counts of sexual assault in the first degree, in
violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (2); one count of sexual assault
in the second degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-71 (a) (1); three
counts of risk of injury to a child, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-21
(a) (2); and one count of strangulation in the first degree, in violation of
General Statutes § 53a-64aa (a) (1) (B).
The trial court rendered judgments, in accordance with the jury’s verdicts,
of the following offenses charged in the threatening case: one count of
threatening in the second degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-62
(a) (2); and one count of disorderly conduct, in violation of General Statutes
§ 53a-182 (a) (1).
2
I agree with the majority’s comprehensive recitation of the facts, proce-
dural history, and the parties’ arguments in this case. For the sake of brevity,
unless otherwise necessary, my discussion of this case’s facts and procedural
history is confined to my analysis of the defendant’s specific claims on
appeal.
3
Practice Book § 41-19 provides: ‘‘The judicial authority may, upon its
own motion or the motion of any party, order that two or more informations,
whether against the same defendant or different defendants, be tried
together.’’
4
In State v. Boscarino, supra, 204 Conn. 722–24, ‘‘we . . . identified sev-
eral factors that a trial court should consider in deciding whether a severance
[or denial of joinder] may be necessary to avoid undue prejudice resulting
from consolidation of multiple charges for trial. These factors include: (1)
whether the charges involve discrete, easily distinguishable factual scenar-
ios; (2) whether the crimes were of a violent nature or concerned brutal or
shocking conduct on the defendant’s part; and (3) the duration and complex-
ity of the trial. . . . If any or all of these factors are present, a reviewing
court must decide whether the trial court’s jury instructions cured any
prejudice that might have occurred.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. LaFleur, supra, 307 Conn. 156.
5
Requiring complete congruence in the cross admissibility of the underly-
ing evidence necessary to establish each charge could also effectively pre-
vent any two cases from being cross admissible. It is not difficult to imagine,
for instance, testimony regarding the age of a victim being necessary to
establish an element of one crime but having no legal relevance to the
commission of the second crime and, thus, being deemed inadmissible on
that basis with respect to the trial for the second charge. Based on the
defendant’s rigid conception of cross admissibility, this scenario would
preclude joinder of the two cases, despite evidence of both crimes being
admissible in both cases.
6
It appears that, given the posture of the present case, the majority frames
its cross admissibility inquiry in terms of relevance, stating that evidence
is cross admissible if it is relevant and has probative value exceeding any
unfairly prejudicial effect. See part I of the majority opinion. Although
evidence must always be relevant to be admissible, I emphasize that rele-
vance is not the only evidentiary doctrine that permits, or potentially pre-
cludes, a finding of cross admissibility for joinder purposes. See State v.
Payne, supra, 303 Conn. 543 n.3.
7
I acknowledge that I must review the entire record for whether we can
infer that the trial court considered any unduly prejudicial effect of admitting
evidence of the conduct giving rise to the sexual assault, risk of injury,
and strangulation charges in the threatening case, and weigh it against the
probative nature prior to its ruling on cross admissibility. See State v. James
G., supra, 268 Conn. 395. Although the trial court’s discussion prior to
deciding the state’s motion to consolidate leaves me assured that it consid-
ered the prejudicial effect of the threatening and disorderly charges on the
sexual assault case, it does not provide me with the same assurance that
it completed the cross admissibility analysis by considering the prejudicial
effect of the sexual assault, risk of injury, and strangulation charges on the
threatening case. Specifically, the trial court’s discussion expressly refer-
enced ‘‘adding a disorderly conduct and a threatening charge to the two
sex assault charges . . . .’’ Further, the trial court was certainly not consid-
ering the first degree sexual assault and first degree strangulation charges
when it stated that the crimes were ‘‘not [violent] to the extent it’s brutal or
shocking violence on the defendant’s part.’’ Indeed, the trial court specifically
stated that it was ‘‘setting aside the sex assault charges’’ in its discussion
of whether the crimes were brutal or shocking. Additionally, the trial court
also never directly addressed defense counsel’s assertion during argument
on the motion to consolidate that the ‘‘sexual assault cases certainly are
shocking’’ and would prejudice the defense in the threatening case with
mentions of ‘‘digital penetration [and] cunnilingus with minor children
. . . .’’
8
I respectfully suggest that the majority understates the gravity of the
defendant’s conduct in the sexual assault case when it acknowledges that
‘‘any sexual assault on a child is . . . brutal and shocking,’’ but then charac-
terizes ‘‘the assaults in the present case [as] not unusually so.’’ Part I of the
majority opinion. I suggest that the proper focus is not whether the sexually
assaultive acts on J and L were more or less brutal than those committed
in other child sexual abuse cases, although I disagree with the majority’s
suggestion that they were not extreme in their brazenness and violence
given the strangulation aspects of this case. In any event, I respectfully
submit that the details of the sexually assaultive conduct were sufficiently
different in kind from the acts that gave rise to the threatening charges that
they would arouse the jurors’ emotions so as to consider the defendant a
sexually violent predator, rather than a particularly obnoxious and angry
drunk.
9
Specifically, the state argues that defendants in threatening cases fre-
quently argue that their words were ‘‘mere puffery,’’ rendering it necessary
for the jury in this case to learn about the defendant’s sexual abuse of J
and L to establish the defendant’s motivation for making threats in violation
of the statute. The state further argues that evidence of the sexual assaults
would also be relevant to establish the elements of disorderly conduct
pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-182 (a) (1), specifically, that the context
of why M and A were patrolling outside the house and what led the defendant
to the home is necessary to evaluate whether the defendant engaged in
violent or tumultuous conduct intending to cause inconvenience, annoyance,
or alarm.
10
I note that, upon overruling defense counsel’s hearsay objections to S’s
statements, the trial court granted her request for jury instructions limiting
the use of S’s statements calling the defendant a ‘‘child molester’’ and a
‘‘pedophile son of a bitch’’ and indicated that they were not admitted for the
truth of the matter asserted but, rather, to show their effect on the listener.
11
I recognize that evaluating undue prejudice pursuant to § 4-3 of the
Connecticut Code of Evidence in connection with the cross admissibility
determination may be consistent with, and accomplishes the aim of, the
second Boscarino factor. See, e.g., State v. Best, 337 Conn. 312, 322–23, 253
A.3d 458 (2020) (‘‘[t]he test for determining whether evidence is unduly
prejudicial is not whether it is damaging to the [party against whom the
evidence is offered] but whether it will improperly arouse the emotions of
the jur[ors]’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, on this record, the
trial court exceeded its obligations when it reviewed the Boscarino factors
following its determination that the evidence was cross admissible. See
State v. LaFleur, supra, 307 Conn. 155.
12
With respect to the other two Boscarino factors, I observe that the
defendant presents no discernable argument as to the third Boscarino factor,
namely, the consideration of the duration and complexity of the trial, likely
because this was not a particularly long or complex trial, with only four
days of evidence. As to the first Boscarino factor, the defendant argues
that, although the dates related to each case were discrete, there was ‘‘a
confusing cast of witnesses, mostly related to each other,’’ and that joining
the trials changed the temporal and geographical scope of each case. In
response, the state argues that there is little to no risk that the jury in the
present case would have been confused in evaluating which evidence applied
to which charge. I agree with the state on this point.
As the defendant notes in his brief to this court, the events leading to the
charges in the two cases occurred on entirely different days. The informa-
tions concerned different victims, as the sexual assault case pertained to J
and L, whereas the threatening case pertained to S, A, A’s partner, and M.
Each case involved different locations and distinct factual scenarios, with
the disorderly conduct charges in particular arising at A’s home in Prospect.
Cf. State v. Brown, 195 Conn. App. 244, 252–53, 224 A.3d 905 (two counts
of second degree breach of peace, among other charges, involving same
location and victim, but different dates, times of day, and injuries, were
discrete and easily distinguishable), cert. denied, 335 Conn. 902, 225 A.3d
685 (2020). Accordingly, I conclude that the first Boscarino factor, namely,
confusion as to the applicable factual scenarios, was not present.
13
In the present case, the trial court instructed the jury: ‘‘Now, the defen-
dant is charged with ten separate counts in a long form information. The
defendant is entitled to and must be given, by you, a separate and indepen-
dent determination of whether he is guilty or not guilty as to each of the
counts—each of the counts charged as a separate crime.
‘‘The state is required to prove each element in each count beyond a
reasonable doubt. Each count must be deliberated upon separately. The
total number of counts charged does not add strength to the state’s case.
You may find that some evidence applies to more than one count in the infor-
mation.
‘‘The evidence, however, must be considered separately as to each element
in each count. Each count is a separate entity. This includes a separate
consideration as to the charges related to each victim and the evidence
pertaining to each victim. You must consider each count separately and
return a separate verdict for each count. A decision on one count does not
bind your decision on another count. This means you may reach opposite
verdicts on different counts.’’
14
Although I conclude that the trial court’s instructions, on the specific
facts of the present case, were sufficient to mitigate any prejudice from the
improper joinder, it would have been ‘‘preferable’’ for the court to have
been more specific in instructing ‘‘the jury that the cases had been consoli-
dated solely for the purpose of judicial economy,’’ with the specific sexual
assault allegations not to be considered as proof in the threatening cases.
State v. Norris, 213 Conn. App. 253, 287, 277 A.3d 839, cert. denied, 345
Conn. 910, 283 A.3d 980 (2022). This instruction would have been consistent
with the limiting instruction it gave with respect to S’s accusatory statements
that precipitated his conduct at the after-party, made in response to defense
counsel’s hearsay objection. See footnote 10 of this opinion. I note, however,
that the defendant did not request a specific instruction to this effect with
respect to joinder.
15
While instructing the jury following summations, the trial court reiter-
ated: ‘‘Any testimony that has been stricken or excluded, again, is not
evidence.’’
16
I note that the majority concludes, sua sponte, that the record is inade-
quate for review of this claim because it does not squarely reflect (1) the
reason for the defendant’s ultimate decision not to testify, and (2) whether
the defendant intended to testify only that his prior conviction was nonsex-
ual, or instead, deny his guilt with respect to the charged offenses. See part
II of the majority opinion. I respectfully disagree.
First, given the ample arguments offered by counsel and the trial court’s
clear ruling on this point, the absence of this proffer relates to the strength
of the defendant’s evidentiary claims on their merits, and not whether the
record is adequate for review. Consistent with the state’s not challenging
the adequacy of the record for review, I believe that the majority’s analysis
conflates the adequacy of the record for review with the extent to which
the defendant has established the merits of his claim that the trial court
abused its discretion by denying him permission to testify as to the nonsexual
nature of his criminal record. Because a review of the transcripts fully
establishes what happened before the trial court, thus setting the factual
predicate for the defendant’s claim on appeal, I conclude that it is adequate
for review and reach the merits of the defendant’s claims. See, e.g., State
v. Correa, 340 Conn. 619, 682–83, 264 A.3d 894 (2021); State v. Edmonds,
323 Conn. 34, 64, 145 A.3d 861 (2016); Schoonmaker v. Lawrence Brunoli,
Inc., 265 Conn. 210, 232–33, 828 A.2d 64 (2003).
Second, in any event, the topics of the defendant’s proposed testimony are
not outcome determinative with respect to the correctness of this particular
ruling because his veracity and credibility would have become relevant as
soon as he took the stand to testify as to any topic in his own defense.
17
Section 6-8 (a) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence provides: ‘‘Cross-
examination and subsequent examinations shall be limited to the subject
matter of the preceding examination and matters affecting the credibility
of the witness, except in the discretion of the court.’’
18
As I stated, the prosecutor argued that further inquiry would be relevant
to the defendant’s truthfulness and veracity. However, the trial court had
already ruled that the prior convictions were not relevant for use against
the defendant, or his cohort in the robberies, who had already testified as
a witness for the state without the prior convictions being introduced.
19
I also note that the opening the door doctrine ‘‘operates to prevent a
defendant from successfully excluding inadmissible prosecution evidence
and then selectively introducing pieces of this evidence for his own advan-
tage, without allowing the prosecution to place the evidence in its proper
context.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brown, 309 Conn.
469, 479, 72 A.3d 48 (2013). This was not the concern in the present case.
20
Although there are certainly other measures the defendant could have
requested, and the trial court could have taken, to further remedy the inadver-
tent disclosure, the question presented here is the narrow evidentiary issue
of the limited circumstances in which testimony ‘‘opens the door’’ to inquiry
into inadmissible evidence.