Citation Numbers: 40 A.2d 190, 131 Conn. 396
Judges: ELLS, J.
Filed Date: 11/30/1944
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/12/2023
In so far as General Statutes, 1420, applies to the facts of this case, it provides that any person injured by means of a defective road may recover damages from a municipality bound to keep it in repair, but that no action for any such injury shall be maintained unless written notice containing certain specified information shall be given to the city clerk "within ten days thereafter," that is, within ten days after the occurrence of the injury. The question is whether a notice given on December 26 as to an injury sustained on December 15 satisfied the time requirement of the statute. The complaint alleged a fall on an icy sidewalk maintained by the defendant city on December 15 and the giving of the notice on December 26; the defendant demurred because it thus appeared that the notice was not given within the required time; the trial court sustained the demurrer, and the plaintiff, refusing to plead further, appealed to this court from the judgment rendered against her.
The plaintiff claims that the word "thereafter" was put into the statute for the purpose of giving the injured party ten full or clear days within which to give the notice before being barred of the right of recovery given by the same statute, and that, therefore, both terminal days should be excluded. It is well settled *Page 398
that the day of the act from which a future time is to be ascertained is to be excluded from the computation. Austin, Nichols Co., Inc. v. Gilman,
Excluding the date of the injury, the first full day of the period was December 16 and the tenth day was December 25. December 26 would be the eleventh day, and consequently the notice given on that day was not within ten calendar days.
The major question, and the only one considered by the trial court in its memorandum of decision, is whether the fact that December 25 was a legal holiday served to extend the time until the succeeding day. In Avery v. Stewart,
The legislature has designated certain days as legal holidays without stipulating in any general way what is the effect intended. General Statutes, 6565. It must have intended to attach to those days the significance generally accorded a holiday in the civil law, *Page 400
that is, it is a day on which the ordinary occupations are suspended, a day of exemption or cessation from work, a day of religious observance or of recreation or amusement. 29 C.J. 761; 40 C.J.S. 410; 29 Am. L. Reg. (N.S.) 137. When the legislature provides a time within which an act must be done, and the last day of the period allowed is a holiday, it becomes necessary to determine, as between the intent of the legislature expressed in that statute, and in the statute designating certain days as holidays, which shall prevail. Whether the act may be performed on the day succeeding the holiday is a matter of statutory construction. We do not have here a situation where the giving of the notice requires action only by the person injured or someone in his behalf. The giving of that notice involves a duty to receive it on the part of the proper municipal official. Certainly when the legislature declares a day to be a holiday, it means at least to free public officers from the obligation of keeping open their offices or attending to their duties on that day, and it might well be that on such a day the officer or officers of a municipality to whom, under the statute, notice must be given would be out of town and far away. The injured party could not safely leave the giving of notice to the last day if it is a holiday, or, if that day falls on Monday, to either the Sunday or succeeding holiday. Practically, where the last day of the period falls on a holiday, not to permit the notice to be filed on the succeeding day would be to cut down the time permitted for giving the notice from ten to nine days, or, if the holiday followed a Sunday, to eight days. We cannot believe that the legislature had such an intention. The situation falls fairly within the principle that, where there is a general provision and one addressed to a particular situation which may in certain circumstances *Page 401
be in conflict with the general law, the intention expressed in the particular provision will be given effect, and to that extent the general provision will be modified. Caffrey v. Alcorn,
Whatever the rule may be in other jurisdictions where, as in this state, there is no controlling statute to the contrary, we believe that the rule we are adopting evinces the intent of our legislature as shown by the language of 1420 and 6565. In reaching this result we do not read an exception into 1420; instead, we harmonize as far as possible two somewhat conflicting statutes. Furthermore, 1420 gives the injured party ten days in which to give the notice. The practical effect of a rule contrary to the one we adopt would be, in the situations we have discussed above, to give the injured party, not ten days, but at most nine days, and in the second contingency only eight, in which to give notice. Such a holding would defeat the evident legislative intent as expressed in the very language of the statute. It is true that the effect of our rule is to give the injured party more than ten calendar days, and that, if only 1420 is to be considered, this would seem to read an exception into the statute; but when 1420 is read in connection with 6565, as it must be, the language of the legislative acts clearly expresses the intent that holidays are to be excluded from the computation.
There is error, the judgment is set aside and the case
Whitford v. Lee , 97 Conn. 554 ( 1922 )
Sommers v. Adelman , 90 Conn. 713 ( 1916 )
Alderman Bros. Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co. , 91 Conn. 383 ( 1917 )
Austin, Nichols Co., Inc. v. Gilman , 100 Conn. 81 ( 1923 )
Caffrey v. Alcorn , 115 Conn. 605 ( 1932 )
Wentworth v. L. L. Dining Co., Inc. , 116 Conn. 364 ( 1933 )
United States v. Chas. B. Peters, United States of America ... , 220 F.2d 544 ( 1955 )
Krajniak v. Wilson , 157 Conn. 126 ( 1968 )
Royce v. Freedom of Information Commission , 177 Conn. 584 ( 1979 )
Hubbard v. Planning Commission , 151 Conn. 269 ( 1963 )
Rapid Motor Lines, Inc. v. Cox , 134 Conn. 235 ( 1947 )
Schwarzschild v. Binsse , 170 Conn. 212 ( 1976 )
Estate of Skasko v. Dzamko, No. 30 85 83 (Jul. 29, 1992) , 1992 Conn. Super. Ct. 7198 ( 1992 )
State v. Ahern, No. Crnh 9106-1197 (Mar. 13, 1996) , 16 Conn. L. Rptr. 526 ( 1996 )
Brennan v. Town of Fairfield, No. Cv 32 91 36 S (Oct. 15, ... , 23 Conn. L. Rptr. 149 ( 1998 )
Sutera v. Board of Firearms, No. 52 45 34 (Jan. 19, 1993) , 1993 Conn. Super. Ct. 224 ( 1993 )
Cayo v. City of Norwalk, No. Cv 92 292351 (Jun. 11, 1992) , 1992 Conn. Super. Ct. 5827 ( 1992 )
Rutter v. Janis , 180 Conn. App. 1 ( 2018 )
Norwich Land Co. v. Public Utilities Commission , 170 Conn. 1 ( 1975 )
Campion v. Town of Hamden, No. Cv97-0396727s (Oct. 5, 1997) , 1997 Conn. Super. Ct. 9960 ( 1997 )
Paletsky v. Town of Morris, No. 0059619 (Aug. 18, 1992) , 7 Conn. Super. Ct. 1011 ( 1992 )
Maratea v. North Haven Crossing, No. Cv97 05 95 03 (Mar. 19,... , 21 Conn. L. Rptr. 565 ( 1998 )
Yeomans v. Zoning Comm., Town of Andover , 17 Conn. Super. Ct. 115 ( 1950 )
Tucker v. Connecticut Ins. Placement Facility , 38 Conn. Super. Ct. 722 ( 1983 )