DocketNumber: 15049
Citation Numbers: 234 Conn. 704
Judges: Berdon, Borden, Peters
Filed Date: 8/8/1995
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 9/8/2022
The sole issue in this certified appeal is whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that, in the circumstances of this case, compulsory arbitration proceedings under the Teacher Negotiation Act (TNA); General Statutes § 10-153a et seq.; are exempt from the public meeting requirement of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA); General Statutes §§ l-18a and 1-21;
The record reveals the following facts. After the GE A and the board had failed to reach agreement on a new union contract, compulsory binding arbitration was imposed by the commissioner of the department of education pursuant to General Statutes § 10-153Í.
The GEA, the commissioner of education and the arbitration panel appealed to the trial court, which sustained their appeal. That court held that, because compulsory arbitration proceedings are a continuation of strategy and negotiations with respect to collective bargaining, they do not constitute “meetings” pursuant to § l-18a (b) and thus they need not be open to the pub-
The FOIC challenges the Appellate Court’s conclusion that the relationship between compulsory binding arbitration hearings and collective bargaining automatically excludes such hearings in their entirety from the ambit of “meetings” of government agencies that are presumptively open to the public under § 1-21 (a). The statutory exclusion from the open meeting requirement contained in § l-18a (b) provides that “ ‘[mjeeting’ shall not include . . . strategy or negotiations with respect to collective bargaining . ...” In the view of the FOIC, the legislature intended this exclusion to encompass only those aspects of any collective bargaining process, including compulsory binding arbitrations, that directly involve strategy or negotiations. Although we agree with the FOIC in part, on the present record we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.
This appeal raises two interrelated issues of statutory construction. What is the scope of the exclusion for collective bargaining contained in § l-18a (b)?
Inquiry into the scope of the statutory exclusion for collective bargaining contained in § l-18a (b) must com
In light of these principles, the statutory definition of public meetings contained in § l-18a (b) must be read
Our interpretation of § l-18a (b) finds further support in related provisions of the FOIA that provide limited exceptions to the public disclosure requirement for those portions of proceedings that relate to strategy or negotiations. In § l-18a (e) (2), for example, the legislature authorized a public agency to adjourn a meeting into executive session for “strategy and negotiations with respect to pending claims and litigation” to which the agency itself is a party. Pointedly, the legislature did not adopt a more sweeping approach, such as closing the entire meeting, to achieve its purpose of sheltering specified components of the proceedings from public scrutiny. See Board of Police Commissioners v. Freedom of Information Commission, 192 Conn. 183, 190, 470 A.2d 1209 (1984) (agency’s
With these principles in mind, we turn to the structure of the TNA. Although TNA arbitrations arise out of an initial failure to reach agreement in ordinary collective bargaining, they were designed to provide incentives for further bargaining between the parties. The TNA establishes a sequence of increasingly formal collective bargaining procedures to ensure the existence of a teacher contract by the beginning of the town’s fiscal year. A board of education and representatives of the teachers’ union have a statutory duty to negotiate concerning salary and other conditions of employment. General Statutes § 10-153d (b). Those negotiations must commence no later than 210 days- prior to the budget submission date for the board. General Statutes § 10-153d (b). If a complete negotiated settlement has not been reached by 160 days prior to the submission date, the statutes mandate that the parties proceed to mediation. General Statutes § 10-153Í (b). Finally, if mediation has not settled all remaining disputes by 135 days prior to the submission date, the statute imposes mandatory last best offer arbitration.
The issue raised by this three-step collective bargaining process is how to fit the process into the open meetings provisions of the FOIA. The various steps contemplated by the TNA could be construed as establishing a structural division between “negotiation,” which occurs at step one, and “arbitration,” which occurs at step three and occurs only if both negotiation and mediation have failed to result in a contract. Such a construction of the TNA would not comport, however, with the underlying realities of the TNA process.
The TNA contemplates arbitration proceedings that interface with collective bargaining between the parties and collective bargaining’s attendant “strategy and negotiations.” The TNA permits the arbitration proceedings to be continued, at the discretion of the arbitrators, provided that the arbitration hearing concludes within twenty-five days after its commencement. General Statutes § 10-153Í (c) (3). The apparent purpose of this provision is to afford the parties an opportunity to pursue further negotiations on their own even after compulsory arbitration has commenced, if the arbitration panel believes that such negotiations could prove fruitful. Even when not formally recessed for “negotiations,” the arbitration hearing itself contains elements of strategy and negotiations.
Uncontradicted evidence in the record before the FOIC documents that a TNA arbitration does not oper
This description comports with the general understanding of how compulsory binding interest arbitration hearings are usually conducted. One outside commentator has observed that the theory undergirding last best offer arbitration is that “the logic of the procedure would force negotiating parties to continue moving closer together in search of a position that would be most likely to receive neutral sympathy. . . . Flexible procedures of this kind, clearly designed to encourage voluntary settlements prior to, during and even after the completion of the hearing, are obviously a. hybrid of mediation and arbitration. . . . Flexible final-offer procedures . . . almost inevitably result in a proceeding which is known as mediation-arbitration, often called simply ‘med-arb’. . . . Ordinary interest arbitration is normally a somewhat judicial procedure in which the neutral [arbitrator] takes evidence and then drafts the parties’ ‘agreement’ in the loneliness of his own study. In med-arb [however] the neutral
These operational characteristics of compulsory arbitration under the TNA persuade us that the actual presentation of last best offers by the parties sufficiently resembles “negotiations,” despite the fact that they occur during a proceeding denominated as “arbitration,” to be excluded from the “meeting” requirements of the FOIA. Because the FOIC order in this case determined that Stack should have been permitted to attend the entire arbitration hearing, and ordered that similar hearings in the future likewise be open to the public in their entirety, the FOIC’s unconditional order was improper as a matter of law.
We note that the TNA permits each party, in its presentations to the arbitral board, “to submit all relevant evidence, to introduce relevant documents and written material, and to argue on behalf of its” last best offer. General Statutes § 10-153Í (c) (2). In aid of this evidentiary process, the arbitrators have the “power to administer oaths and affirmations and to issue subpoenas requiring the attendance of witnesses.” General Statutes § 31-108; see General Statutes § 10-153f (d). Thus, the arbitration hearing also provides an opportunity for the parties to create an evidentiary record on which the arbitrators can rely in making their final
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
In this opinion Callahan and Palmer, Js., concurred.
General Statutes § l-18a provides in relevant part: “definitions. As used in this chapter, the following words and phrases shall have the following meanings, except where such terms are used in a context which clearly indicates the contrary:
“(a) ‘Public agency’ or ‘agency’ means any executive, administrative or legislative office of the state or any political subdivision of the state and any state or town agency, any department, institution, bureau, board, com
“(b) ‘Meeting’ means any hearing or other proceeding of a public agency, any convening or assembly of a quorum of a multimember public agency, and any communication by or to a quorum of a multimember public agency, whether in person or by means of electronic equipment, to discuss or act upon a matter over which the public agency has supervision, control, jurisdiction or advisory power. ‘Meeting’ shall not include . . . strategy or negotiations with respect to collective bargaining . . . .”
General Statutes § 1-21 provides in relevant part: “meetings of government agencies to be public. . . . (a) The meetings of all public agencies . . . shall be open to the public. . . .” The parties do not dispute that the state arbitration panel is a public agency so we do not reach this issue.
General Statutes § l-21i provides in relevant part: “denial of access to public records or meetings, appeals. . . .
“(b) (1) Any person denied the right to inspect or copy records under section 1-19 or wrongfully denied the right to attend any meeting of a public agency or denied any other right conferred by sections 1-15, l-18a, 1-19 to l-19b, inclusive, l-20a and 1-21 to l-21k, inclusive, may appeal therefrom to the Freedom of Information Commission, by filing a notice of appeal with said commission. ...”
General Statutes § 4-183 provides in relevant part: “appeal to superior court, (a) A person who has exhausted all administrative remedies
Even though the proceedings at issue here long since have concluded, and hence there is nothing to which a remand could be directed, the appeal is not moot because of the continuing order to the plaintiffs to conduct future negotiations in accordance with the FOIC order under challenge in this appeal. As a result, the justiciable question before us relates to the plaintiffs’ future negotiations under the TNA, not to whether Stack was wrongly denied admission to any part of the arbitration hearing held on December 9,1990. The concern expressed in part III of the concurring opinion apparently is grounded in a misunderstanding of this procedural posture.
General Statutes § 10-153f provides in relevant part: “mediation and ARBITRATION OF DISAGREEMENTS. . . .
“(b) ... . On the one hundred sixtieth day prior to the budget submission date, the commissioner shall order the parties to report their settlement. If, on such one hundred sixtieth day, the parties have not reached agreement and have failed to initiate mediation, the commissioner shall order the parties to notify the commissioner of the name of a mutually selected mediator and to commence mediation. . . .
“(2) The chairperson of the arbitration panel or the single arbitrator shall set the date, time and place for a hearing to be held in the school district between the fifth and twelfth day, inclusive, after such chairperson or such single arbitrator is selected. At least five days prior to such hearing, a written notice of the date, time and place of the hearing shall be sent to the board of education and the representative organization which are parties to the dispute, and, if a three-member arbitration panel is selected or designated, to the other members of such panel. Such written notice shall also be sent to the fiscal authority having budgetary responsibility or charged with making appropriations for the school district, and a representative designated by such body may be heard at the hearing as part of the presentation and participation of the board of education. At the hearing each party shall have full opportunity to submit all relevant evidence, to introduce relevant documents and written material, and to argue on behalf of its positions. At the hearing a representative of the fiscal authority having budgetary responsibility or charged with making appropriations for the school district shall be heard regarding the financial capability of the school district, unless such opportunity to be heard is waived by the fiscal authority. The nonappearance of the representative shall constitute a waiver of the opportunity to be heard unless there is a showing that proper notice was not given to the fiscal authority. The chairperson of the arbitration panel or the single arbitrator shall preside over such hearing.
“(3) The hearing may, at the discretion of the arbitration panel or the single arbitrator, be continued but in any event shall be concluded within twenty-five days after its commencement.
“(4) After hearing all the issues, the arbitrators or the single arbitrator shall, within twenty days, render a decision in writing, signed by a majority of the arbitrators or the single arbitrator, which states in detail the nature of the decision and the disposition of the issues by the arbitrators or the single arbitrator. The written decision shall include a narrative explaining the evaluation by the arbitrators or the single arbitrator of the evidence
“(d) The commissioner and the arbitrators or single arbitrator shall have the same powers and duties as the board under section 31-108 for the purposes of mediation or arbitration pursuant to this section, and subsection (c) of section 10-153d, and all provisions in section 31-108 with respect to procedure, jurisdiction of the superior court, witnesses and penalties shall apply. . . .”
The GEA later asked to be made a party to the proceedings before the FOIC; the FOIC granted that request.
The parties do not dispute that the arbitration panel convened under the TNA is a public agency for purposes of the meeting requirement of § 1-18a (b).
Arbitration under § 10-153f also commences upon the legislative veto of a negotiated contract; see General Statutes § 10-153d (c); or on the fourth day following the end of mediation. General Statutes § 10-153f (c) (1).
In interpreting a nearly identical statute, General Statutes § 7-473c, this court noted that the “primary emphasis of the legislation was to induce settlement of disputes Ay negotiation under the impetus that the most reasonable proposal would probably gain acceptance by the arbitrators.” (Emphasis added.) Carofano v. Bridgeport, 196 Conn. 623, 635, 495 A.2d 1011 (1985).
The statute specifically contemplates the presentation of certain financial data. General Statutes § 10-153f (c) (2) provides in relevant part: “At the hearing a representative of the fiscal authority having budgetary responsibility or charged with making appropriations for the school district shall be heard regarding the financial capability of the school district, unless such opportunity to be heard is waived by the fiscal authority. The nonappearance of the representative shall constitute a waiver of the opportunity to be heard unless there is a showing that proper notice was not given to the fiscal authority.”