DocketNumber: SC 15913
Citation Numbers: 249 Conn. 242
Judges: Berdon, Palmer
Filed Date: 6/8/1999
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 9/8/2022
Opinion
In this certified appeal, the defendant, Marlik Mourning, claims that the Appellate Court improperly affirmed the judgment of the trial court revoking his probation and sentencing him to serve his previously suspended three year prison sentence. We conclude that the dispositional phase of the defendant’s probation revocation hearing was flawed because the defendant was not permitted personally to address the court at that phase of the hearing. Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court in part and direct that court to remand the case to another trial court for a new dispositional hearing at which the defendant will have the right of allocution.
On April 1,1996, the defendant’s school apprised the defendant’s probation officer that, during the month of March, 1996, the defendant twice had been absent from school without a bona fide excuse, had been tardy twelve times,
A probation revocation hearing was conducted on October 17, 1996. Immediately prior to the evidentiary portion of that hearing, counsel for the defendant sought a continuance of the hearing so that a psychiatric evaluation of the defendant, which had been initiated several days earlier, could be completed. The trial court,
The defendant, who testified in his own behalf, did not contest the state’s evidence. Rather, he emphasized that, although he frequently had been tardy, he had been absent from school only two days during the relevant time period. He also testified that he had been ill-with the flu on those two days, and that he merely had failed to report his illness until his return to school. Finally, the defendant testified that his suspension was due to the fact that, on one occasion, he had unwittingly violated a school policy by leaving school grounds to buy a soda while school was still in session.
At the conclusion of the testimony, the state argued that the defendant’s repeated tardiness constituted a violation of the conditions of his probation.
The defendant appealed from the trial court’s judgment to the Appellate Court, which, in a per curiam opinion, summarily affirmed the judgment of the trial court. State v. Mourning, 47 Conn. App. 916, 703 A.2d 1194 (1997). We granted the defendant’s petition for certification, limited to the following issue: “Under the circumstances of this case, did the trial court abuse its discretion by revoking the defendant’s probation of a conviction as a youthful offender and by sentencing the defendant to imprisonment?” State v. Mourning, 244 Conn. 924, 714 A.2d 11 (1998). We conclude that the trial court properly found the defendant in violation
I
The defendant first contends that the trial court improperly found a violation of the conditions of probation. In particular, the defendant claims that: (1) the trial court unduly limited his right to present evidence by rejecting his request for a continuance at the dispositional phase of the probation revocation hearing until completion of the psychiatric evaluation; and (2) the defendant’s tardiness was not wilful and, moreover, his overall attendance record had improved markedly since his adjudication as a youthful offender. These claims, which require little discussion, are meritless.
With respect to the defendant’s contention that he was entitled to a continuance of the hearing so that the psychiatric evaluation could be completed,
With regard to the defendant’s second claim, the record supports the trial court’s determination that the state had demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence,
The defendant further contends that, in light of his improved overall attendance record, the trial court’s
II
The defendant next claims that he is entitled to a new dispositional hearing. Specifically, he contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying him a continuance at the dispositional phase of the hearing so that the defendant’s psychiatric evaluation could be completed. We need not address that argument in light of our determination that the defendant is entitled to a new dispositional hearing because he was denied the
In State v. Strickland, 243 Conn. 339, 354, 703 A.2d 109 (1997), we held that what is now Practice Book § 43-10 (3),
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed to the extent that it affirmed the trial court’s finding that the defendant violated the conditions of his probation; the judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed to the extent that it affirmed the trial court’s revocation of the defendant’s probation and order sentencing him to serve his previously suspended three year prison sentence, and the case is remanded to the Appellate Court with direction to remand the case to a new trial court to conduct another dispositional hearing at which the defendant is to be afforded the right of allocution.
In this opinion BORDEN, NORCOTT and KATZ, Js., concurred.
On January 25, 1999, five days after oral argument in this appeal, we granted the defendant a new dispositional hearing. Because the defendant already had served over 800 days of his three year sentence as of that date, we immediately issued a per curiam decision reversing the judgment of the Appellate Court and remanding the case to that court with direction to: (1) reverse the judgment of the trial court in part; and (2) remand the case to the trial court for a new dispositional hearing. State v. Mourning, 247 Conn. 634, 635, 723 A.2d 316 (1999). We also indicated that this opinion, which more fully explains our reasons for reversing the judgment of the Appellate Court, would be released subsequently. Id.
See General Statutes § 54-76b et seq.
General Statutes § 53a-72a provides in relevant part: “Sexual assault in the third degree ... (a) A person is guilty of sexual assault in the third degree when such person (1) compels another person to submit to sexual contact (A) by the use of force against such other person or a third person, or (B) by the threat of use of force against such other person or against a third person, which reasonably causes such other person to fear physical injury to himself or herself or a third person . . . .”
The defendant also was required, as a condition of his probation, to undergo random urine testing due to his illegal drug use.
The report submitted to the defendant’s probation officer by the school indicated that there were twenty-two days in the month of March when school was open and the defendant was expected to be in attendance.
General Statui es (Rev. to 1995) § 53a-32 provides in relevant part: “Violation of probation or conditional discharge: Arrest; procedure, (a) At any time during the period of probation or conditional discharge, the court or any judge thereof may issue a warrant for the arrest of a defendant for violation of any of the conditions of probation or conditional discharge . . . . Any probation officer may arrest any defendant on probation without a warrant or may deputize any other officer with power to arrest to do so by giving him a written statement setting forth that the defendant has, in the judgment of the probation officer, violated the conditions of his probation. . . . Thereupon, or upon an arrest by warrant as herein provided, the court shall cause the defendant to be brought before it without unnecessary delay for a hearing on the violation charges. At such hearing the defendant shall be informed of the manner in which he is alleged to have violated the conditions of his probation or conditional discharge, shall be advised by the court that he has the right to retain counsel and, if indigent, shall be entitled to the services of the public defender, and shall have the right to cross-examine witnesses and to present evidence in his own behalf.
“(b) If such violation is established, the court may continue or revoke the sentence of probation or conditional discharge or modify or enlarge the conditions, and, if such sentence is revoked, require the defendant to serve the sentence imposed or impose any lesser sentence. No such revocation shall be ordered, except upon consideration of the whole record and unless such violation is established by reliable and probative evidence.”
The probation revocation hearing was held before the same trial judge who had adjudicated the defendant a youthful offender and imposed the suspended three year prison sentence.
Although the state, in closing argument, directed the court’s attention specifically to the defendant’s repeated tardiness, the state also relied on the defendant’s unexcused absences and suspension from school to support its claim that the defendant had violated the conditions of his probation.
Defense counsel also indicated that she needed the additional time to find a suitable residential placement for the defendant.
Immediately after the trial court had imposed sentence and remanded the defendant to custody, the defendant asked: “Your Honor, can I please talk to you?” Shortly thereafter, the defendant again tried to get the court’s attention, but was interrupted by his mother, who insisted upon addressing the court — sometimes in wholly inappropriate terms — even after the sentence had been imposed. Finally, before the sheriff removed the defendant from the courtroom, the defendant once again stated: “Your Honor, can I please talk to you, please? Talk to me, please? I want to talk to you — ”
As we have stated, “a probation revocation hearing has two distinct components. . . . The trial court must first conduct an adversarial evidentiary hearing to determine whether the defendant has in fact violated a condition of probation. ... If the . . . court determines that the evidence has established a violation of a condition of probation, then it proceeds to the second component of probation revocation, the determination of whether the defendant’s probationary status should be revoked. On the basis of its consideration of ‘the whole record,’ the trial court ‘may continue or revoke the sentence of probation or conditional discharge or modify or enlarge the conditions, and, if such sentence is revoked, require the defendant to serve the sentence imposed or impose any lesser sentence.’ General Statutes § 53-32 (b). In malting this second determination, the trial court is vested with broad discretion. State v. Smith, 207 Conn. 152, 167, 540 A.2d 679 (1988) (Citation omitted.) State v. Davis, 229 Conn. 285, 289-90, 641 A.2d 370 (1994).
The psychiatric evaluation was not completed by October 17, 1996, the date of the probation revocation hearing, even though the defendant had been arrested for allegedly violating the conditions of his probation on May 9, 1996.
The state has the burden of establishing a violation of the conditions of probation by a fair preponderance of the evidence. State v. Davis, 229 Conn. 285, 295, 641 A.2d 370 (1994).
The defendant testified that he did not have an alarm clock. He gave no reason, however, for not obtaining one.
The defendant does not claim that the condition of his probation requiring that he not be tardy was unlawful or otherwise improper.
We note that the trial court, when imposing sentence in connection with the defendant’s third degree sexual assault conviction, indicated that the defendant needed structure in his life and expressly informed the defendant that he would be imprisoned if he did not comply strictly with the conditions of his probation. Indeed, defense counsel, who had acknowledged that the defendant’s “real problem in life is his chronic tardiness, which has affected his schoolwork and family,” urged the court to “[p]ut something hanging over his head that’s going to force him to follow the rules.”
The dissent gratuitously iqjects the specter of racial discrimination into this case. This case is not about discrimination, and no such allegation ever has been raised by the defendant or defense counsel, either in the trial court or on appeal.
As we indicated in our per curiam decision announcing our judgment in this case; see State v. Mourning, 247 Conn. 634, 635 n.1, 723 A.2d 316 (1999); the defendant now will have the opportunity to pursue the psychiatric evaluation if he still wishes to do so.
Practice Book § 43-10, formerly § 919, provides in relevant part: "Sentencing Hearing; Procedures to Be Followed
“Before imposing a sentence or making any other disposition after the acceptance of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or upon a verdict or finding of guilty, the judicial authority shall, upon the date previously determined for sentencing, conduct a sentencing hearing as follows . . .
“(3) The judicial authority shall allow the defendant a reasonable opportunity to make a personal statement in his or her own behalf and to present any information in mitigation of the sentence. . . .”
We note that the per curiam decision of the Appellate Court in this case was issued on December 2, 1997, the very same day on which we released our decision in Strickland.
It bears mention that even though this case is controlled by our holding in Strickland, neither party referred to that case, or raised the issue decided by that case, in their briefs or at oral argument. Although we normally would not decide an issue that has not been raised by the parties without first affording the parties an opportunity to address it, we have chosen to deviate from that practice in this case because we are satisfied that Strickland, which we decided approximately one and one-half years ago, cannot be distinguished from this case. Moreover, for whatever reasons, we did not hear oral argument in this case until the defendant had completed approximately three quarters of his three year prison sentence. In light of our holding in Strickland, any further delay in the resolution of this appeal simply cannot be justified.