Citation Numbers： 101 A. 92, 91 Conn. 727, 1917 Conn. LEXIS 77
Judges： Beach, Gager, Prentice, Roraback, Wheeler
Filed Date： 6/14/1917
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 11/3/2024
It is too plain for discussion that the act of setting off a single firework is not a change of occupation from that of gardener to that of a user or handler of fireworks.
The other ground of defense—that the injury was caused by voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger-rests upon the determination of a motion to correct the *730 finding, by erasing therefrom the finding that the death was not from any cause excepted in the policy, and by substituting therefor a proposed finding that the plaintiff offered no evidence to show that decedent did not voluntarily expose himself to unnecessary danger. It is, however, unnecessary to follow the defendant’s argument any further, because the finding of the trial court is supported by the evidence, and the defense of voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger is disposed of on the merits in the plaintiff’s favor. There was evidence tending to show that the bombs were ordinarily safe, that from one to two minutes usually elapsed between the lighting of the fuse and the explosion of the charge which threw the bomb upward, and that the decedent, his employer, and members of the employer’s family, had set off great numbers of them at Independence Day celebrations. This was enough to show that the act of setting off one of these bombs in the usual way was not a voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger.
Then the question remained whether Johnson attempted to set the bomb off in some unusual way, or in some other way voluntarily exposed himself to unnecessary danger in setting it off. On this point his declarations made while being taken to the hospital are relevant and admissible, and they make it more probable than otherwise that the accident occurred because of a defective quick-firing fuse. Defendant excepted to the admission of these declarations, and now makes the claim that they were too vague and indefinite to be admitted in evidence. This, however, was the fault of the witness to whom the declarations were made, who was obliged to give the substance of what was said because he could not remember the words. Taking these disconnected phrases as expressing the substance of Johnson’s declarations, there is no *731 difficulty whatever in supporting the finding of the trial court that the death was not from any cause excepted in the policy.
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.