Judges: Wheeler, Maltbie, Haines, Hinman
Filed Date: 7/30/1926
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
The plaintiff is suing to recover a balance of freight charges it claims to be due upon certain shipments of coal from Pennsylvania to the defendant at Groton, Connecticut. While the amount claimed is made up by adding together the balances due on various shipments, no one of which, if separately made the subject-matter of an action, would be within the jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas, the complaint states that amount as constituting one debt, and *Page 730
we must assume that, by agreement or custom, the parties treated the account as a continuing one, and the debt due at any one time as the total of the various charges that had been incurred. So regarded, the action was within the jurisdiction of the court. Main v.First School District,
It was agreed that the shipments were all made and delivered to the defendant between November 29th, 1920, and March 28th, 1921; and that the defendant had paid the plaintiff such sums as would be due in accordance with the tariff of freight charges for this route in effect previous to November 18th, 1920, but refused to pay additional amounts required to make the charges comply with a tariff schedule for the route, filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission, to be effective on that day. When the case came on for trial, the plaintiff produced in evidence certified copies of the schedule of rates on file with the commission and in effect before November 18th, 1920, and of a supplemental schedule on file with the commission, to be effective on that day, and thereupon rested its case. The defendant offered no testimony. The principal question of law in the case is, was the plaintiff entitled to recover the charges stated in the supplemental schedule without offering proof that that schedule was effective against the shippers other than the production of a copy certified by the secretary of the Interstate Commerce Commission as on file with it?
The statutes of the United States provide that no change shall be made in the rates, fares and charges which have been filed by a common carrier with the commission, "except after thirty days' notice to the commission and to the public published as aforesaid." 8 United States Comp. Stat. (1916) § 8569. The defendant *Page 731
claims that under this provision no changes in rates are valid unless they have been published by the carrier by placing them in its stations and offices open to public inspection for the period stated, while the plaintiff claims that the statute only requires that they be filed with the commission. We incline to the position taken by the defendant. The statute begins with a provision for the filing of the schedules, but it then continues with a requirement that they be printed and kept open to public inspection, and thereafter in two instances, it speaks of the schedules as those "filed and published"; and we may not assume that Congress used the word "published" without meaning thereby to convey some intent. Louisville N. R. Co. v. Mottley,
The plaintiff contends that, even if a change in rates could only be effectively established after such a publication *Page 733
of them, it was entitled to rely upon a presumption that it had complied with these requirements of the law. The Federal courts recognize such a presumption.Cincinnati, N. O. T. P. Ry. Co. v.Rankin,
Moreover, the statutes of the United States provide that "copies of schedules, and classifications and tariffs of rates, fares, and charges," as well as other documents on file with the commission, "shall be preserved as public records in the custody of the secretary of the commission, and shall be received as prima facie evidence of what they purport to be for the purpose of investigations by the commission and in all judicial proceedings." 8 United States Comp. Stat. (1916) § 8584, subsection (12). It is too narrow a construction *Page 735 of this provision to say that copies of schedules are admissible in evidence merely to show the tariffs on file with the commission. Had that been intended, it would have been sufficient simply to provide that they should be admissible in evidence, and to say no more. Tariffs such as those here in question "purport to be" schedules of effective rates and charges, and the copies here in question were prima facie evidence that the rates therein stated were valid and effective as against the defendant. Hanish v. United States, 227 F. 584, 588.
One other claim of error requires discussion. It was argued that the shipments in question consisted of ordinary anthracite, of egg, stove or chestnut size, and the defendant claims that they were not embraced within the terms of the supplemental schedule. Both the schedule in effect before the supplemental schedule was filed and that schedule are entitled "Joint Coal Tariff, applying on Anthracite Coal and Anthracite Briquettes and Boulets, in Carloads," and they state four rates in as many columns, headed, respectively, "Prepared and Anthracite Briquettes and Boulets," "Pea," "Buckwheat," "Rice and smaller sizes." Defendant's counsel contend that the phrase "Prepared and Anthracite Briquettes and Boulets" purports to cover only artificial coal products, and not coal in its native form, or at least that the trial court could not apply it to the latter in the absence of information from those versed in such matters, that it properly included such coal. "Prepared Coal," in the anthracite coal trade, has, however, an established meaning; it is used to describe the sizes of coal above pea. Rates forTransportation of Anthracite Coal, 35 I. C. C. Rep. 220, 223; Meeker Co. v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 21 I. C. C. Rep. 129, 131. Read in connection with the title of these schedules, the heading of the first column *Page 736 can only be interpreted to include anthracite coal in its native form in sizes above pea and briquettes and boulets made from anthracite coal. It therefore includes the coal in question.
The situation before the court was, then, this: The schedules of rates offered in evidence applied to the shipments in question, if they had been validly established; both by reason of the presumption that the plaintiff had taken all steps necessary validly to establish the rates contained in them, and by reason of the provisions of the statute making the copies prima facie evidence of their contents, the plaintiff was entitled, upon putting them in evidence, to rest its case, and, in the absence of other evidence, the verdict in its favor was well found. The trial court improperly treated as evidence certain statements of counsel, to the effect that there were no tariffs in existence covering shipments of anthracite coal over this route other than those in evidence, but, in view of the situation presented, no harm could have been done thereby. The charge was in other respects somewhat informal, but it was rather favorable to the defendant than otherwise and contains nothing which could have misled the jury. In the light of our conclusions upon the main issues of the case, the other claims of error do not require discussion.
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
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