Judges: Ells, Maltbie, Avery, Brown, Jennings, Eels
Filed Date: 6/26/1941
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
The defendant is charged in thirteen counts with violations of 968e of the Cumulative Supplement, 1939, quoted in full in the footnote,1 the *Page 162 alleged offenses being that he, a stockholder in a brewing company, extended credit for a period of more than thirty days, through various banks in Hartford, to designated holders of retail liquor permits issued by the liquor control commission. The charges are set forth in the information substantially in the language of the statute. There is involved a construction of 968e, and the applicability of 1083c of the Cumulative Supplement, 1935, also quoted in full in the footnote.2 The defendant's claims, as raised by his demurrer, fall into several categories and the questions reserved by stipulation are directed at the issues thus raised. In substance it is claimed that 968e is so vague and uncertain that it is unenforceable; that the legislature did not intend to define a crime but to state a regulation; that the section contains an exclusive penalty, the revocation or suspension of the permit, and that therefore the general penalty section, 1083c, is inapplicable; and that 968e is unconstitutional.
The second and third claims are sufficiently related to warrant discussion as a single issue. A reading of 968e shows that it is plainly aimed at an evil long recognized in the history of liquor control legislation, the "tied house." This is the subject of legislative prohibition in many states. Rigid restriction in this respect was recommended by the special liquor study *Page 163 commission in its model bill, reported to the Connecticut General Assembly in 1933, Connecticut House Journal, 1933, pp. 1124, 1139, and adopted in substance by the General Assembly, General Statutes, Cum. Sup. 1933, 703b; Cum. Sup. 1935, 1047c; Cum. Sup. 1939, 968e. These sections are perhaps, strictly speaking, regulatory, but there is not any reason why the legislature could not make the violation of these regulations criminal acts. The Liquor Control Act itself is regulatory, but contains many criminal penalties of undoubted validity.
In its application to this case, 968e prohibits the permittee from receiving credit in excess of thirty days, and one in the position of the defendant from extending credit, directly or indirectly, to a permittee. The demurrer admits that the defendant has done the forbidden act, and the only remaining question upon this aspect of the case is whether his dereliction is punishable as a crime. As 968e now stands, accepting a credit requires the revocation of a permit held by the permittee, but that of course does not apply to the lender. Unless the penalty of 1083c applies, there is no penalty to be inflicted upon him; and he is the only one we are concerned with in this case. The provision concerning a mandatory revocation of the permit, contained in 968e, was inserted in 1939, and previously was not in the Liquor Control Act. Before the provision was inserted, a violation of the existing enactment would have been ground for the revocation of a permit in the discretion of the commission. General Statutes, Cum. Sup. 1935, 1026c; Cum. Sup. 1935, 1052c as amended by Cum. Sup. 1939, 971e; Cum. Sup. 1935, 1053c as amended by Cum. Sup. 1939, 972e; and the purpose of the insertion was plainly to make revocation mandatory in case of a violation of the statute, instead of leaving *Page 164 it as a discretionary matter. The defendant's claim that the commission's duty to revoke permits relieves him of criminal responsibility must necessarily be based upon the erroneous assumption that the legislature saw fit to forbid a serious evil and at the same time made the prohibition useless by rendering it unenforceable. It is obvious that 968e was designed to place definite restrictions upon nonpermittees as well as permittees and the defendant cannot be allowed to place himself beyond the reach of the law upon the wholly untenable theory that only permittees are subject to penalties thereunder.
We conclude that 968e and 1083c, read together, provide for a criminal penalty for the violation in question. The defendant relies upon Central Trust Co. v. Mann's Restaurants,
Based upon the accepted legal proposition that where a criminal statute is too indefinite in its terms to enable one to determine what it requires, it violates the due process clause (International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky,
The further claim is made that the statute is discriminatory, — and so it is, but its discrimination is not unconstitutional within the holding of any authority the defendant has advanced or we have been able to discover. A law which is uniform in its operation is not rendered invalid merely because of the limited number of persons who will be affected by it. Walp v. Mooar,
In addition to the thirteen counts we have discussed, the information contains ten counts alleging a like extension of credit to designated persons who were not permittees when the credit was extended, but had filed applications for permits, and had become permittees thereafter during the life of the credit. The credits did not terminate when the defendant signed as co-maker or indorser; they continued for a considerable period after the applicant became an actual permittee, and the state contends that as soon as the permit was *Page 167
granted the defendant was, in law and in fact, unlawfully extending credit to a permittee, and that this unlawful conduct continued throughout the period of the loan. It is further claimed that these credits were patently extended to gain economic advantage over potential outlets even before they came into formal existence, and constituted in a sense even more flagrant conduct than the defendant's activities in connection with established businesses. These are powerful and persuasive arguments. The statute, being penal, must be rather strictly construed and its meaning cannot be extended by presumption or intendment. State v. Weber,
The Superior Court is advised to overrule the demurrer to all twenty-three counts. Costs will be taxed upon this reservation as upon an appeal by the defendant on which he did not prevail.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Sanger v. City of Bridgeport ( 1938 )
Allyn's Appeal From County Commissioners ( 1909 )
United States v. Corbett ( 1909 )
United States v. Lacher ( 1890 )
International Harvester Co. of America v. Kentucky ( 1914 )
International Harvester Co. of America v. Kentucky ( 1914 )