Furber v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act

Bogdanski, J.

(dissenting). I disagree for the reason that the majority opinion goes far afield of our Connecticut statute which controls the decision in this case.

The commissioner in this case concluded that the unemployment of the plaintiffs was not caused by any labor dispute at the factory at Bristol where they were employed and held that they were eligible for benefits. It is undisputed that Bristol did not go on strike, did not do any picketing, and continued to work and maintain production. It is further undisputed that the strikes by the out-of-state G. M. plants caused the shortages at Bristol and the layoffs of the plaintiffs. The question before the trial court and before this court now is whether this conclusion was unreasonable, arbitrary or illegal in view of the subordinate facts found. Bartlett v. Administrator, 142 Conn. 497, 505, 115 A.2d 671.

The statute that governs is § 31-236 (3), which provides that a claimant shall be ineligible for benefits when it is found by the administrator that his unemployment is due to the existence of a labor dispute at the factory at which he is employed. To render a claimant ineligible under this statute, it must be found by the administrator not only that a labor dispute existed at the factory where he was employed but also that the labor dispute at that factory, only, caused the unemployment. This intent is clear from the legislative history of the statute.

Prior to 1947, the disqualification statute was basically the same as the present §31-236 (3). In that year, the legislature expanded this statute by adding to it the New Departure amendment which broadened the area in which the unemployment-causing dispute could exist. Sup. 1947, § 1391i. The resulting statute then provided that unemployment due to the existence of a labor dispute at the factory at which a claimant had been employed “or at a factory . . . operated by his employer in the state of Connecticut” would disqualify him from benefits. In 1967, however, the legislature eliminated the quoted phrase, limiting the scope of the statute and restricting the unemployment-causing dispute to the particular factory where the employee worked. In proposing this legislation, the bilFs sponsor left no doubt as to its purpose: “[W]e have proposed repeal of the so-called New Departure amendment and a return to the old laws so that employees thrown out of work at a plant of an employer in this state because of a strike or lock out at another plant will not be disqualified.” 12 H.R. Proc., Pt. 2,1967 Sess., p. 4965.

In this case, employees laid off “at a plant of an employer in this state because of a strike ... at another plant” are being disqualified by the majority of this court. Admitting that the unemployment at Bristol was caused by a falling-off of orders from struck plants in Michigan and Indiana, the majority, nevertheless, asserts that the remoteness of those plants does not make them any less of a causal factor. This approach, which seeks to establish a causal link between the layoffs in Bristol and the labor disputes as they existed at plants elsewhere in the nation, is clearly beyond the scope of the statute, which at no time in its history, even in its most expanded form, permitted disqualification of a claimant due to factors existing outside of Connecticut.

Moreover, I am not satisfied that the majority has met the causal requirement of the statute by saying that the plaintiffs’ voluntary acts, -which acts were to continue in their employment, caused their unemployment. Admittedly, the unemployment was caused by a falling-off of orders from ¡Struck plants elsewhere, so that the unemployment of the plaintiffs at Bristol was attributable, not to their own voluntary acts of continued employment, but to the independent decisions by members of locals in other states as to how long they would stay away from work. In equating the voluntary acts of the plaintiffs at Bristol with the independent decisions and acts of employees at other factories in other states, the majority has ignored the expressed intent of the legislature in enacting § 31-236 (3) and has further ignored the significance of the statute’s history.

The reliance by the majority on Lanyon v. Administrator, 139 Conn. 20, 89 A.2d 558, is, I believe, misplaced. In Lanyon, the question was whether a refusal by the claimants to cross a picket line and go to work constituted participation in the labor dispute. There, the court was required to determine whether an act of unemployment by the claimants, i.e., their refusal to cross the picket line, was voluntary, in which case they would be participants, or involuntary. In attempting to characterize the act of unemployment, the court asked what motivated the claimants not to go to work. Here, the majority changes this subjective intent test as applied in Lanyon and asks what motivated the plaintiffs to remain at work. I do not believe Lanyon is authority for asking why employees choose to remain at work, nor is such an inquiry relevant under our Unemployment Compensation Act as long as employees do choose to remain at work.

Moreover, the Lanyon case was not concerned with the question whether the claimants there fell within the disqualification clause, for it was conceded that they did. The issue there was whether the claimants came within that provision of the statute which, if certain requirements are met, exempts from disqualification claimants who would otherwise be ineligible. One such requirement is that the claimant must satisfy the administrator that he was not a participant in the dispute. Here, we are concerned with the disqualification clause of the statute, and not the exemption clause. While intent might be relevant in determining whether a claimant was a participant, it is not relevant in determining whether Ms unemployment was due to the existence of a labor dispute at the factory at which he had been employed. As the plaintiffs here, unlike those in Lanyon, did not raise the issue of their participation in a labor dispute in the administrative proceedings or the trial court, it seems neither proper nor relevant for tMs court to address the issue of either participation or intent.

An unemployment commissioner is an administrative officer. An appeal from Ms decision to the Superior Court is allowed by statute, but the court does not try the matter de novo. Lanyon v. Administrator, supra, 28. It is not the court’s function to adjudicate questions of fact; New Haven Metal & Heating Supply Co. v. Danaher, 128 Conn. 213, 217, 21 A.2d 383; nor may the court substitute its own conclusions for those of the commissioner. Almada v. Administrator, 137 Conn. 380, 391, 77 A.2d 765. It may go no further than to determine whether the commissioner acted unreasonably, arbitrarily or illegally. Hoffman v. Kelly, 138 Conn. 614, 617, 88 A.2d 382; Beaverdale Memorial Park, Inc. v. Danaher, 127 Conn. 175, 181, 15 A.2d 17.

Since both the commissioner and the trial court found that the struck plants in Michigan and Indiana caused the shortages and the layoffs of the plaintiffs in Bristol, this court cannot find on review, or substitute its own conclusion, that the unemployment of the plaintiffs was caused by any controversy at Bristol. Such a holding is inconsistent with the decision of General Motors Corporation v. Mulquin, 134 Conn. 118, 55 A.2d 732, where a similar situation was presented.