In re A'vion A.

***********************************************
The “officially released” date that appears near the be-
ginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub-
lished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was
released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be-
ginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions
and petitions for certification is the “officially released”
date appearing in the opinion.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut
Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of
discrepancies between the advance release version of an
opinion and the latest version appearing in the Connecticut
Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports
or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to
be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the
opinion as it appears in the Connecticut Law Journal and
bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the
Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not
be reproduced and distributed without the express written
permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publica-
tions, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
***********************************************
IN RE A’VION A. ET AL.*
(AC 45357)
Elgo, Cradle and Clark, Js.
Syllabus
The respondent mother appealed to this court from the judgments of the
trial court terminating her parental rights with respect to her minor
children, A, L, and Z. She claimed that the trial court improperly denied
her motion to compel the Department of Children and Families to pro-
vide additional reunification services to her, improperly concluded that
she had failed to achieve the requisite degree of personal rehabilitation
required by statute (§ 17a-112 (j) (3) (B)) with respect to Z, and errone-
ously determined that the department made reasonable efforts at reunifi-
cation pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (1), which requires a trial court to find
by clear and convincing evidence that the department made reasonable
efforts to reunify a parent and children unless it finds, instead, that the
parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from such efforts. The trial court
found, pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (1), that the mother also was unwilling
or unable to benefit from reunification efforts. Held:
1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the respondent
mother’s motion to compel the department to provide additional reunifi-
cation services: it was within the court’s discretion to make decisions
relating to its case management authority and it was not improper for
the court to have predicated its decision on the fact that the termination
trial had been postponed months earlier and was scheduled to begin in
eighteen days, more than two years after the children had been trans-
ferred to the custody of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and
Families; moreover, because the adequacy of the department’s efforts
at reunification would have been an issue at the termination trial, the
mother would have had the opportunity to present argument and evi-
dence at that trial refuting the petitioner’s claims that she was provided
with appropriate reunification services or that she was unwilling or
unable to benefit from them.
2. The respondent mother could not prevail on her claim that the trial court
improperly concluded that she had failed to achieve the requisite degree
of personal rehabilitation so as to encourage the belief that, within a
reasonable time, she could assume a responsible position in the life of
Z: record evidence supported the court’s findings that the mother failed
to fully comply with key portions of the court-ordered specific steps to
facilitate her reunification with the minor children, including that she
had refused to participate in certain services for which she had been
referred, she had rescinded releases with some providers, she refused
to cooperate with home visits by department workers, and she failed
to properly notify the department of a change in her household when
she subsequently became pregnant and gave birth to another child during
the termination proceedings; moreover, the court also found that she
continued to exhibit inappropriate behaviors during visits with the minor
children, was argumentative and hostile with visitation supervisors and
had not acknowledged her personal issues that had led to the removal
of the children; furthermore, the mother failed to challenge the court’s
determination that she had not achieved the requisite degree of rehabili-
tation with respect to her older children.
3. This court concluded that the respondent mother’s claim that the trial court
improperly determined that the department made reasonable efforts to
reunify her with the minor children was moot: because the mother did
not challenge the trial court’s finding that she was unable or unwilling
to benefit from reunification efforts, but challenged only one of the two
separate and independent bases for upholding the trial court’s determina-
tion that the requirements of § 17a-112 (j) (1) had been satisfied, there
existed a separate independent basis for upholding the court’s determi-
nation, and, therefore, even if this court agreed with the mother’s claim,
there was no practical relief that could be afforded to her; accordingly,
that portion of the appeal was dismissed as moot.
Argued October 3, 2022—officially released, January 12, 2023**
Procedural History
Petitions by the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
lies to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with
respect to their minor children, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of New Britain, Juvenile
Matters, and tried to the court, C. Taylor, J.; judgments
terminating the respondents’ parental rights, from
which the respondent mother appealed to this court.
Appeal dismissed in part; affirmed.
Joshua Michtom, assistant public defender, for the
appellant (respondent mother).
Chelsea Ruzzo, assistant attorney general, with
whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney gen-
eral, and Evan O’Roark, assistant attorney general, for
the appellee (petitioner).
Opinion
ELGO, J. The respondent mother appeals from the
judgments of the trial court rendered in favor of the
petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families,
terminating her parental rights as to A’vion, Aaliyah, and
Azra, her minor children.1 On appeal, the respondent
claims that the court improperly (1) denied her October
2, 2019 motion to compel the Department of Children
and Families (department) to provide additional reunifi-
cation services, (2) concluded that she failed to achieve
the requisite degree of personal rehabilitation required
by General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) with respect
to Azra, and (3) determined that the department made
reasonable efforts to reunify her with the minor children
pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (1). We conclude that the
appeal is moot as to the final claim and dismiss that
portion of the appeal. We otherwise affirm the judg-
ments of the trial court.
The following facts, as found by the trial court, and
procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this
appeal. The respondent is a convicted felon who has a
variety of mental health issues. She has been diagnosed
with bipolar disorder, recurrent depression, borderline
personality disorder, and adult antisocial behaviors.
The respondent began a romantic relationship with
the father in 2011, and they married in 2015. Both the
respondent and the father have extensive histories of
domestic violence incidents and violations of protec-
tive orders.
A’vion and Aaliyah were born in 2012 and are fraternal
twins. On April 17, 2014, the department received a
report of an incident involving the respondent and
A’vion and Aaliyah. After the father left the family’s
home following a domestic altercation with the respon-
dent, the respondent sent him a text message stating
that she was holding a knife to A’vion; she then threat-
ened to kill A’vion and Aaliyah if he did not return. The
respondent at that time also slashed the couches in the
home. Police responded and arrested the respondent
for threatening A’vion and Aaliyah with a knife.
Following that incident, A’vion and Aaliyah were
adjudicated neglected and placed under an order of
protective supervision, which was allowed to expire in
June, 2016. The department referred the respondent to
two parenting programs and an individual therapy and
medication management program, which she com-
pleted. The respondent also participated in a psycholog-
ical evaluation conducted by Bruce Freedman, a
licensed psychologist. In his written evaluation, Freed-
man stated that the respondent’s ‘‘history of fighting
and assaults, her inadequately treated psychological
problems, her early maladjustment, and her failure to
accept court restriction on her behavior all are factors
associated with a high probability of future aggressive
behavior.’’ Between May 5, 2014, and February 24, 2016,
the respondent was arrested for threatening to kill her
mother, creating a public disturbance, and violating a
protective order on multiple occasions that had been
issued to protect the father.
On May 11, 2017, the department received a report
of physical neglect pertaining to A’vion and Aaliyah
stemming from a motor vehicle accident in which the
vehicle operated by the respondent struck another vehi-
cle and then fled the scene. The police later located
the respondent’s vehicle and confirmed that, although
A’vion and Aaliyah were inside, the vehicle contained
no booster seats for the children. The respondent, who
at that time was seven and one-half months pregnant,
refused a request by the police to have the children
evaluated for injuries.
On May 18, 2017, the department received another
report alleging physical abuse of A’vion by the respon-
dent. A bystander witnessed the respondent strike
A’vion on the back of the head, causing him to fall
to the sidewalk. The bystander flagged down a police
officer, who found the respondent to be uncooperative
with his investigation and expressed concern about the
respondent’s use of profanity around the child.
Although the allegations of physical abuse were unsub-
stantiated, the case was transferred to ongoing services
with the department. Azra was born several weeks later.
On October 3, 2017, the department received a report
from school officials of facial injuries to A’vion, which
A’vion indicated were caused when the respondent
struck him in the face. Although the respondent denied
any involvement in causing those injuries and blamed
a teenage babysitter,2 Aaliyah subsequently confirmed
that the respondent had hit A’vion in the face with a
boot. In response, the department initiated a ninety-six
hour hold on behalf of the minor children.
The next day, A’vion and Aaliyah were evaluated by
Rebecca Moles, a pediatrician at Connecticut Children’s
Medical Center, who was admitted without objection
at trial as an expert in child abuse pediatrics. Moles
opined that the injuries to A’vion’s face were ‘‘highly
suspicious for inflicted injury.’’ Moles also observed
bruising on Aaliyah’s forehead and linear scars on her
back, which Moles opined were ‘‘suspicious for inflicted
injury.’’ The respondent later was arrested and pleaded
guilty to risk of injury to a child in violation of General
Statutes § 53-21 with respect to the injuries sustained
by A’vion.
On October 6, 2017, the petitioner applied for and
secured an order of temporary custody for all three
minor children, which was sustained on October 13,
2017. The minor children thereafter were adjudicated
neglected and were committed to the care and custody
of the petitioner on January 11, 2018. At that time, the
court issued specific steps for the respondent to take
to facilitate her reunification with the children, which
the respondent signed.3 The children subsequently dis-
closed additional details regarding the trauma they
endured while in the respondent’s care, including addi-
tional acts of physical violence and an incident in which
A’vion and Aaliyah had soiled themselves and ‘‘were
so afraid that they were going to get beat[en]’’ by the
respondent that they ate their own feces.
On March 27, 2019, the petitioner filed petitions to
terminate the respondent’s parental rights predicated
on her failure to achieve a sufficient degree of personal
rehabilitation pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B). In
response, the respondent denied the substance of those
allegations and filed a motion to revoke the commit-
ment of the minor children.4 A trial on the termination
petitions was held over the course of ten days on various
dates in 2021, at which the parties submitted documen-
tary and testimonial evidence. On December 28, 2021,
the court issued its memorandum of decision, in which
it granted the petitions to terminate the respondent’s
parental rights. In so doing, the court made extensive
findings of fact and concluded that the petitioner had
established that the adjudicatory grounds for termina-
tion existed and that termination was in the best inter-
ests of the minor children. From those judgments, the
respondent now appeals.
Before turning to the respondent’s claims, we first
set forth the legal principles that govern our review.
‘‘Proceedings to terminate parental rights are governed
by § 17a-112. . . . Under [that provision], a hearing on
a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two
phases: the adjudicatory phase and the dispositional
phase. During the adjudicatory phase, the trial court
must determine whether one or more of the . . .
grounds for termination of parental rights set forth in
§ 17a-112 [(j) (3)] exists by clear and convincing evi-
dence. The [petitioner] . . . in petitioning to terminate
those rights, must allege and prove one or more of the
statutory grounds. . . . Subdivision (3) of § 17a-112 (j)
carefully sets out . . . [the] situations that, in the judg-
ment of the legislature, constitute countervailing inter-
ests sufficiently powerful to justify the termination of
parental rights in the absence of consent. . . . Because
a respondent’s fundamental right to parent his or her
child is at stake, [t]he statutory criteria must be strictly
complied with before termination can be accomplished
and adoption proceedings begun.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) In re Tresin J., 334 Conn. 314, 322–23,
222 A.3d 83 (2019).
Section 17a-112 (j) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The
Superior Court, upon notice and hearing . . . may
grant a petition . . . if it finds by clear and convincing
evidence that (1) the [department] has made reasonable
efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with
the parent in accordance with subsection (a) of section
17a-111b, unless the court finds in this proceeding that
the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunifi-
cation efforts, except that such finding is not required
if the court has determined at a hearing pursuant to
section 17a-111b, or determines at trial on the petition,
that such efforts are not required, (2) termination is in
the best interest of the child, and (3) . . . (B) the child
(i) has been found by the Superior Court or the Probate
Court to have been neglected, abused or uncared for
in a prior proceeding, or (ii) is found to be neglected,
abused or uncared for and has been in the custody of
the [petitioner] for at least fifteen months and the parent
of such child has been provided specific steps to take
to facilitate the return of the child to the parent . . .
and has failed to achieve such degree of personal reha-
bilitation as would encourage the belief that within a
reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the
child, such parent could assume a responsible position
in the life of the child . . . .’’
I
The respondent first claims that the court improperly
denied her motion to compel the department to provide
additional reunification services. We do not agree.
The following additional facts are relevant to the
respondent’s claim. After securing an order of tempo-
rary custody for the minor children in October, 2017,
the department provided the respondent with a variety
of mental health resources, parenting education
resources, intensive family preservation services, anger
management and domestic violence services, and psy-
chological evaluations. The petitioner subsequently
filed petitions to terminate the respondent’s parental
rights on March 27, 2019. The department thereafter
continued to provide services to the respondent to facil-
itate her reunification with the minor children, includ-
ing domestic violence treatment and supervised visita-
tion services.
On May 20, 2019, the petitioner filed a motion for
review of the permanency plan, in which she sought
approval of the proposed plan of termination and adop-
tion of the minor children and a finding that the depart-
ment made reasonable efforts to achieve that plan.5 The
respondent filed an objection, in which she contested
the issue of whether the department had made reason-
able efforts at reunification. The trial court then con-
ducted an evidentiary hearing in accordance with Gen-
eral Statutes § 46b-129 (k) (1) (A), at which department
worker Kaylee Cordero testified and counsel presented
argument. At the conclusion of that hearing, the trial
court found on the record that the department had
made reasonable efforts and ordered the respondent
to sign releases necessary for certain referrals. The
permanency plan ultimately was approved by the
trial court.
Although the termination trial was scheduled to begin
in June, 2019, the parties agreed to a postponement so
that Freedman could conduct an updated
psychological evaluation of the respondent. Freed-
man completed that evaluation and submitted his report
to the court in August, 2019. In that report, Freedman
noted that the respondent had ‘‘continued to visit her
children. The visits have gone reasonably well for the
most part, although [the respondent] is sometimes cold
to the children, other times gets angry with them for
normal child behaviors, and has repeatedly made inap-
propriate comments.’’ During that evaluation, the
respondent admitted that she did not have much
patience with the minor children, that she would
become agitated and lose her temper with them, that
she used too much physical discipline, and that she had
struck the children on their heads. With respect to her
current psychological functioning, Freedman stated
that the respondent’s ‘‘psychological testing during the
current evaluation produces results similar to those
from the previous evaluation. Her defensiveness, diffi-
culty in acknowledging problems and tendency to say
what sounds best are strong enough to render the psy-
chological testing of little value.’’ While Freedman indi-
cated that he was ‘‘cautiously optimistic’’ about the
respondent’s potential for reunification, he did not
endorse reunification or any particular permanency
plan.
One of the referral questions asked Freedman to iden-
tify the types of services that he would recommend if
the respondent lacked ‘‘the ability to meet the needs
of her children given the trauma’’ that they had experi-
enced. Freedman opined that the respondent ‘‘would
need some parent coaching and family therapy to help
her regain her children’s trust, tolerate criticism and
normal misbehavior from them.’’ Freedman also was
asked, ‘‘[i]f it is not recommended for the [minor chil-
dren] to live with [the respondent] at this time, when
might reunification be possible and what specific rec-
ommendations are made before reunification takes
place?’’ In his report, Freedman did not answer the first
part of that question as to when reunification would be
possible. Instead, he stated: ‘‘If the court is inclined to
consider reunification, it would be recommended that
[the respondent and minor children] be referred to a
reunification program.’’ (Emphasis added.) Soon after
receiving Freedman’s updated evaluation, the depart-
ment issued a referral for parent coaching services to
the respondent.6
On October 2, 2019, the respondent filed a motion
to compel the department to refer her for additional
reunification services. The court held a hearing on that
motion on October 17, 2019, at which the parties
acknowledged that the previously postponed termina-
tion trial was scheduled to begin in eighteen days. At
that time, the court noted that an objection to the per-
manency plan had been filed and inquired whether that
matter had been resolved. Counsel for the parties
acknowledged that they had already had an evidentiary
hearing in July, and the petitioner represented that the
plan for termination and adoption had been approved.
The parties then disputed whether the department had
provided appropriate referrals following the filing of
Freedman’s updated evaluation and whether Freedman
had recommended reunification services and in what
context, and counsel for the petitioner raised concerns
that the respondent had been involved in a recent
domestic violence incident that would be addressed in
the termination trial.7 At the conclusion of that brief
hearing, the court ruled on the respondent’s motion
from the bench, stating: ‘‘Based on what I’ve heard
[and] in view of the fact that the [termination trial is
scheduled] to start fairly soon [and] [a]lso in view of
the age of the case, the motion to compel is denied.’’
The respondent now challenges the propriety of that
determination.
As a preliminary matter, we note that we are aware
of no Connecticut authority in which a trial court has
entertained a motion to compel additional reunification
services by a respondent, particularly in light of the
procedural backdrop of this case, nor has the respon-
dent furnished any such authority. Here, the record
indicates that the motion to compel was filed shortly
before the termination of parental rights trial was sched-
uled to commence and followed an evidentiary hearing
that was held two and one-half months earlier, which
the trial court had scheduled pursuant to the respon-
dent’s objection to the court’s finding that the depart-
ment made reasonable efforts at reunification pursuant
to § 46b-129 (k) (1) (A).
We also note that the parties disagree as to the appli-
cable standard of review. The respondent maintains
that our review of the court’s decision to deny her
motion to compel is plenary, as it implicates her consti-
tutional rights and involves a purely legal determina-
tion.8 The petitioner, by contrast, submits that a motion
to compel the department to provide additional reunifi-
cation services that is filed shortly before the com-
mencement of trial is governed by a more deferential
standard, as it implicates the court’s case management
authority and a variety of other factors, including the
interests of the minor children, the age of the case, and
the fact that the department’s provision of reunification
services and the respondent’s ability to benefit from
such services are issues subsumed in the litigation of
the termination petition itself. Because the trial court
is in a superior position to balance those factors, we
agree with the petitioner that deference is warranted.
See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Palumbo, 296 Conn. 253, 279,
994 A.2d 174 (2010) (Rogers, C. J., concurring) (‘‘we
afford trial courts broad discretion to make determina-
tions requiring the balancing of multiple factors because
trial courts are often in a better position to make this
type of determination’’). We therefore review the court’s
denial of the motion to compel for an abuse of discre-
tion.
The transcript of the October 17, 2019 hearing on the
respondent’s motion to compel plainly indicates that
the court’s decision to deny that motion was predicated
on the fact that the termination trial was scheduled to
begin in eighteen days, which implicated the court’s
case management authority. As our Supreme Court has
explained, ‘‘case management decisions [are reviewed]
for abuse of discretion, giving [trial] courts wide lati-
tude. . . . A party adversely affected by a [trial] court’s
case management decision thus bears a formidable bur-
den in seeking reversal. . . . A trial court has the
authority to manage cases before it as is necessary.
. . . Deference is afforded to the trial court in making
case management decisions because it is in a much
better position to determine the effect that a particular
procedure will have on both parties. . . . The case
management authority is an inherent power necessarily
vested in trial courts to manage their own affairs in
order to achieve the expeditious disposition of cases.’’
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Krevis v. Bridgeport, 262 Conn. 813, 818–19, 817 A.2d
628 (2003).
With trial scheduled to begin in fewer than three
weeks, the respondent’s motion to compel the depart-
ment to issue a referral and thereafter provide addi-
tional services was tantamount to a request for a contin-
uance, which likewise is a matter entrusted to the
discretion of the trial court.9 See In re Ivory W., 342
Conn. 692, 730, 271 A.3d 633 (2022). We further reiterate
that the motion to compel also followed an evidentiary
hearing held on July 23, 2019, pursuant to the respon-
dent’s objection to the petitioner’s motion for review
of permanency plan. Under § 46b-129 (k) (4) (E) and
(F), the court is required to determine ‘‘the services
to be provided to the parent if the court approves a
permanency plan of reunification and the timetable
for such services’’ and ‘‘whether the commissioner has
made reasonable efforts to achieve the permanency
plan.’’ (Emphasis added.) Against that backdrop
wherein the parties have already had the opportunity
to litigate similar and/or overlapping issues and would
be litigating those same issues, albeit under a higher
standard of proof at the termination trial, the court
properly could consider the impact that a further delay
to the termination trial could have on the minor chil-
dren. See In re Ivory W., supra, 731 (concluding that
‘‘it was not unreasonable for the trial court to conclude
that the interests of the children and the petitioner
in having the matter resolved as soon as reasonably
possible outweighed the respondent’s interest in post-
poning the matter’’); In re Alexander V., 25 Conn. App.
741, 748, 596 A.2d 934 (1991) (‘‘[b]ecause of the psycho-
logical effects of prolonged termination proceedings on
young children, time is of the essence’’ when resolving
issues related to permanent care of neglected children),
aff’d, 223 Conn. 557, 613 A.2d 780 (1992); Burkett v.
Arkansas Dept. of Human Services, 507 S.W.3d 530,
534 (Ark. App. 2016) (trial court did not abuse discretion
in denying father’s motion to stay termination trial pend-
ing conclusion of related criminal proceedings because
‘‘a child’s need for permanency and stability may over-
ride a parent’s request for additional time to improve
the parent’s circumstances’’).
Moreover, because the adequacy of the department’s
efforts at reunification necessarily would be an issue
at the termination trial scheduled to begin in eighteen
days, the respondent remained free to present argument
and evidence at the termination trial refuting the peti-
tioner’s claims that the respondent was provided appro-
priate reunification services or that she was unwilling
or unable to benefit from them.
In its oral decision, the court also indicated that it
had considered ‘‘the age of the case’’ in denying the
respondent’s motion to compel.10 As this court has
observed, the ‘‘statutory mandates [contained in Gen-
eral Statutes §§ 17a-110a, 17a-111a, 17a-111b, and 46b-
129 (j) (6) (B)] . . . reflect the legislature’s desire to
shift the focus of juvenile proceedings from parental
rights to the child’s right to safety, stability, and perma-
nency.’’ In re Adelina A., 169 Conn. App. 111, 122 n.14,
148 A.3d 621, cert. denied, 323 Conn. 949, 169 A.3d 792(2016). Given the interests of the children ‘‘in having
the matter resolved as soon as reasonably possible’’;
In re Ivory W., supra, 342 Conn. 731; as well as other
public policy concerns such as eligibility for federal
funding for foster care in this state,11 we cannot say
that the court’s consideration of the age of the case
was improper in ruling on a motion to compel the
department to provide additional reunification ser-
vices.
In matters for which discretion is vested in the trial
court, that court is ‘‘in a much better position to pass
upon [the] question than we are.’’ State v. Laudano, 74
Conn. 638, 646, 51 A. 860 (1902). Such is the case here,
where the court exercised its discretion over the man-
agement of cases before it and balanced several factors
in acting on the respondent’s motion to compel. More-
over, the court’s exercise of discretion occurred in the
context of a statutory scheme that requires that the
department and the court provide multiple, regular and
timely opportunities for parents to be heard and to
challenge the adequacy and propriety of the depart-
ment’s treatment plan and reunification services. See
footnote 11 of this opinion; cf. In re Tyqwane V., 85
Conn. App. 528, 541, 857 A.2d 963 (2004) (noting ‘‘the
extensive nature of the judicial resources involved
throughout the termination process’’). On the record
before us, the court did not abuse its discretion in mak-
ing the decision not to further delay a termination trial
that had been postponed months earlier and was sched-
uled to begin more than two years after the children
were transferred to the care of the petitioner. We there-
fore conclude that the respondent’s challenge to the
denial of her motion to compel is without merit.
II
The respondent also claims that the court improperly
concluded that she failed to achieve the requisite degree
of personal rehabilitation required by § 17a-112 (j) (3)
(B) with respect to Azra, the youngest of the minor
children. We disagree.
Failure to achieve a sufficient degree of personal
rehabilitation is one of the seven statutory grounds on
which parental rights may be terminated under § 17a-
112 (j) (3). Section § 17a-112 (j) permits a court to grant
a petition to terminate parental rights ‘‘if it finds by
clear and convincing evidence that . . . (3) . . . (B)
the child . . . has been found by the Superior Court
. . . to have been neglected . . . in a prior proceeding
. . . and the parent of such child has been provided
specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child
to the parent . . . and has failed to achieve such degree
of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief
that within a reasonable time, considering the age and
needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsi-
ble position in the life of the child . . . .’’ In making
that determination, ‘‘the critical issue is not whether
the parent has improved her ability to manage her own
life, but rather whether she has gained the ability to
care for the particular needs of the child at issue.’’
In re Danuael D., 51 Conn. App. 829, 840, 724 A.2d
546 (1999).
‘‘We review the trial court’s subordinate factual find-
ings for clear error,12 and review its finding that the
respondent failed to rehabilitate for evidentiary suffi-
ciency. . . . In reviewing that ultimate finding for evi-
dentiary sufficiency, we inquire whether the trial court
could have reasonably concluded, upon the facts estab-
lished and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom,
that the cumulative effect of the evidence was sufficient
to justify its [ultimate conclusion]. . . . [I]t is not the
function of this court to sit as the [fact finder] when
we review the sufficiency of the evidence . . . rather,
we must determine, in the light most favorable to sus-
taining the verdict, whether the totality of the evidence,
including reasonable inferences therefrom, supports
the [judgment of the trial court] . . . . In making this
determination, [t]he evidence must be given the most
favorable construction in support of the [judgment] of
which it is reasonably capable. . . . In other words,
[i]f the [trial court] could reasonably have reached its
conclusion, the [judgment] must stand, even if this court
disagrees with it.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote added;
internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jayce O., 323
Conn. 690, 715–16, 150 A.3d 640 (2016). Applying that
standard, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence
in the record to support the trial court’s finding that
the respondent failed to achieve a sufficient degree of
personal rehabilitation.
In its memorandum of decision, the court found that
the respondent had ‘‘failed to fully comply with the key
portions’’ of the specific steps ordered by the court to
facilitate her reunification with the minor children. See
In re Devon B., 264 Conn. 572, 584, 825 A.2d 127 (2003)
(‘‘the failure to comply with specific steps ordered by
the court typically weighs heavily in a termination pro-
ceeding’’); In re Jermaine S., 86 Conn. App. 819, 833, 863
A.2d 720 (respondent’s failure to comply with specific
steps supported finding that she failed to attain suffi-
cient degree of rehabilitation), cert. denied, 273 Conn.
938, 875 A.2d 43 (2005). The court found, inter alia, that
the respondent had refused to participate in certain
services for which she had been referred; that she had
rescinded her releases with some providers, which
impaired the department’s ability to monitor her prog-
ress; that she refused to cooperate with home visits by
department workers; and that she failed to promptly
notify the department of a change to her household
when she became pregnant and subsequently gave birth
to another child in March, 2020. Those findings are
amply supported by the testimonial and documentary
evidence in the record before us.
The court also found that the respondent continued
to exhibit inappropriate behavior during visits with the
minor children. The record substantiates that finding.
Nordia Savage, an employee of Connecticut Youth
Resources who provides supervised visitation services,
testified at trial that the respondent would yell at the
minor children during visits. Savage also testified that
the respondent would become easily triggered by the
children, leaving them terrified. As one example, Savage
recounted a visit at a McDonald’s restaurant when Sav-
age asked A’vion and Aaliyah not to take refillable soda
containers home with them. Savage testified that, when
she explained to the respondent that the children had
spilled soda in her car the previous week, the respon-
dent ‘‘snapped at them.’’ Savage testified that the chil-
dren got ‘‘this terrified look in their eyes. . . . [They]
started crying [and apologizing]. . . . [T]heir reaction
made me feel like they didn’t feel safe.’’ Cordero simi-
larly testified that the respondent ‘‘consistently’’ was
‘‘very critical’’ of the minor children during supervised
visits. In his updated psychological evaluation, Freed-
man similarly noted that, although the respondent’s vis-
its with the children ‘‘have gone reasonably well . . .
[the respondent] is sometimes cold to the children,
other times gets angry with them for normal child
behaviors, and has repeatedly made inappropriate com-
ments [including] criticism of the foster care [family]
and [the department], promises for reunification and a
trip to Disney.’’ Moreover, the court credited evidence
that, during a visit in December, 2018, Azra was
‘‘extremely upset’’ and ‘‘cried for most of the two hour
visit, but [the respondent] did not attempt to console
her. Instead, [the respondent] yelled at Azra to stop
crying several times.’’
The court further found, and the evidence indicates,
that the respondent frequently became argumentative
and hostile with visit supervisors. During one visit, a
supervisor encouraged the respondent to participate in
Azra’s potty training. As visitation worker Alexandria
Szantyr testified, the respondent was not receptive to
that advice and ‘‘in a very aggressive tone [she] told
me that she was not going to kiss anybody’s butt to get
her children back and that she did not want to partici-
pate in Azra’s potty training.’’ When asked what type
of language the respondent had used, Szantyr testified
that the respondent would ‘‘use vulgar language [and
was] very aggressive, very hostile. She will curse at me.
. . . [I]t was very argumentative . . . when it came to
feedback.’’
Significantly, the court also found that the respondent
had not acknowledged her own personal issues that led
to the removal of her minor children and was ‘‘unable
to acknowledge any wrongdoing’’ with respect to her
own conduct. See In re Vincent D., 65 Conn. App. 658,
670, 783 A.2d 534 (2001) (‘‘[i]n determining whether a
parent has achieved sufficient personal rehabilitation,
a court may consider whether the parent has corrected
the factors that led to the initial commitment’’). The
court specifically noted an incident that transpired dur-
ing a supervised visit with Azra at a restaurant on
December 13, 2019, as to which the court heard uncon-
troverted testimony at trial. During that visit, Azra had
an accident that required a diaper change and left her
‘‘soaking wet from the urine.’’ The respondent admon-
ished Azra, who was two years old at the time, and
began ‘‘huffing and puffing’’ about her accident.
Although the respondent had been instructed to bring
supplies for Azra during visits, she failed to bring a
change of clothes for the child. As a result, Szantyr
wrapped Azra in a cardigan that Szantyr had been wear-
ing. Szantyr then brought up the issue of accountability
with the respondent. The respondent asked what
accountability had to do with parenting, and Szantyr
explained that it pertained to the respondent’s ‘‘role [in]
what has happened with the children.’’ The respondent
became extremely upset and stated: ‘‘I don’t understand
what this has to do with anything. . . . I don’t need to
do [any of] this . . . .’’ Although Szantyr told the
respondent that she needed her to ‘‘calm down’’ and
‘‘bring [her] tone down,’’ the respondent was ‘‘adamant’’
that she did not want to discuss the issue of accountabil-
ity. When Szantyr explained that they needed to talk
about ‘‘what [the respondent’s] role was’’ in the events
that led to the removal of the children, the respondent
became more agitated and began to curse at Szantyr.
As the situation continued to escalate, Szantyr
informed the respondent that she had to conclude the
visit. At that point, the respondent, who was holding
Azra, grew even more irate and started screaming at
Szantyr. When Szantyr said that she needed to take
Azra back, the respondent threw Azra in the air at
Szantyr, who caught the child.13 The respondent’s out-
burst continued as they exited the restaurant. As
Szantyr testified: ‘‘She was still very aggressive, very
hostile towards me. Her language was still very cursing,
she was angry. . . . [The respondent said] you’re going
to make up my visit bitch. . . . I don’t give an f, I don’t
give an f. I’m calling my lawyer.’’ The respondent then
threw Azra’s wet diaper at Szantyr. Once in her vehicle,
Szantyr called her supervisor and informed her that she
was very concerned for her own personal safety as
well as Azra’s safety. Freedman, who had submitted
his updated psychological evaluation approximately six
months prior to this incident, testified at trial that the
respondent’s behavior during that visit demonstrated a
lack of parenting skills and a lack of self-control.
As the United States Supreme Court has observed,
‘‘[a]cceptance of responsibility is the beginning of reha-
bilitation.’’ McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 47, 122 S. Ct.
2017, 153 L. Ed. 2d 47 (2002). A finding that a respondent
parent has failed to acknowledge her own personal
issues that led to a child’s removal may form the basis
for a court’s determination that she had not achieved
a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation. See, e.g.,
In re Shane M., 318 Conn. 569, 589, 122 A.3d 1247(2015) (‘‘the respondent’s failure to acknowledge the
underlying personal issues that form the basis for the
department’s concerns indicates a failure to achieve a
sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)); In re Jermaine S., supra,
86 Conn. App. 834 (respondent’s inability to admit she
had substance abuse problem ‘‘thwarted her ability to
achieve rehabilitation’’); In re Sheila J., 62 Conn. App.
470, 481, 771 A.2d 244 (2001) (respondent failed to
‘‘accept or recognize her need’’ for recommended coun-
seling).
In its decision, the court also expressly credited evi-
dence that ‘‘[t]he department continues to have con-
cerns regarding [the respondent’s] ability to parent [the
minor] children, given her explosive reactions to things
that can trigger her. [She] has a history of intimate
partner violence . . . and continues to demonstrate
poor insight [into] the past as to how domestic violence
has impacted her ability to provide safe, stable, appro-
priate, and adequate supervision to her children. . . .
Despite completing [two] parenting programs, [the
respondent] continued to use excessive physical disci-
pline which led to the removal of her children. When
engaged in services, [she] is . . . fully engaged . . .
[but] she continues to demonstrate poor judgment with
regard to her interaction with her children. . . . [Her]
behaviors observed are an ongoing concern for the
department. . . . The department continues to have
concerns regarding the type of interaction [the respon-
dent] would have if there was no supervision, all of
which remain a barrier to reunification.’’ That evidence
provides further support for the court’s determination
that the respondent has not achieved a sufficient degree
of personal rehabilitation.
On appeal, the respondent implicitly concedes that
she has not achieved the requisite degree of rehabilita-
tion with respect to A’vion and Aaliyah, as she has
not challenged the court’s determination in that regard.
Rather, she claims that, because there was no evidence
that Azra suffered from the particular trauma symptoms
exhibited by A’vion and Aaliyah, the court’s determina-
tion as to Azra was improper. We do not agree. The
factual findings that underlie the court’s failure to reha-
bilitate determination—including the respondent’s
inability to acknowledge her own personal issues that
led to the removal of the minor children, her failure to
fully comply with the specific steps ordered by the
court, and her inappropriate behavior during visits with
the minor children—bear directly on the ultimate ques-
tion of whether the respondent had achieved a sufficient
degree of personal rehabilitation to assume a responsi-
ble position in Azra’s life. Indulging every reasonable
presumption in favor of the court’s ruling, as our stan-
dard of review requires; see In re Jayce O., supra, 323
Conn. 716; we conclude that the evidence credited by
the court supports its conclusion that the respondent
failed to achieve the requisite degree of personal reha-
bilitation required by § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B).
III
As a final matter, we address the respondent’s con-
tention that the court improperly determined that the
department made reasonable efforts to reunify her with
the minor children. We conclude that the respondent’s
appeal is moot with respect to that claim.
‘‘Mootness is a question of justiciability that must be
determined as a threshold matter because it implicates
[this] court’s subject matter jurisdiction . . . .
Because courts are established to resolve actual contro-
versies, before a claimed controversy is entitled to a
resolution on the merits it must be justiciable. . . . A
case is considered moot if [the] court cannot grant the
appellant any practical relief through its disposition of
the merits . . . . In determining mootness, the disposi-
tive question is whether a successful appeal would ben-
efit the plaintiff or defendant in any way. . . . Our
review of the question of mootness is plenary.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) In re Katia V., 214 Conn.
App. 468, 482, 281 A.3d 509, cert. denied, 345 Conn. 913,
283 A.3d 980 (2022).
Section 17-112 (j) (1) provides in relevant part that the
Superior Court ‘‘may grant a petition [for termination
of parental rights] if it finds by clear and convincing
evidence that . . . the [department] has made reason-
able efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child
with the parent . . . unless the court finds . . . that
the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunifi-
cation efforts . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) In construing
that statutory language, our Supreme Court has
explained that, ‘‘[b]ecause the two clauses are sepa-
rated by the word ‘unless,’ this statute plainly is written
in the conjunctive. Accordingly, the department must
prove either that it has made reasonable efforts to
reunify or, alternatively, that the parent is unwilling or
unable to benefit from reunification efforts. . . .
[E]ither showing is sufficient to satisfy this statutory
element.’’ (Emphasis in original.) In re Jorden R., 293
Conn. 539, 552–53, 979 A.2d 469 (2009).
Because ‘‘either finding, standing alone, provides an
independent basis for satisfying § 17a-112 (j) (1)’’; id.,
556; in cases in which the trial court concludes that
both findings have been proven, a respondent on appeal
must demonstrate that both determinations are
improper. If the respondent fails to challenge either one
of those ‘‘independent alternative’’ bases; id., 555; ‘‘the
trial court’s ultimate determination that the require-
ments of § 17a-112 (j) (1) were satisfied remains unchal-
lenged and intact.’’ Id., 557. In such instances, the appeal
is moot, as resolution of a respondent’s claim of error
in her favor ‘‘could not [afford] her any practical
relief.’’14 Id., 554.
In In re Natalia M., 190 Conn. App. 583, 585, 210
A.3d 682 (per curiam), cert. denied, 332 Conn. 912,
211 A.3d 71 (2019), this court dismissed a respondent’s
appeal for precisely that reason. As we explained: ‘‘In
the present case, the [trial] court found that both alter-
natives set forth in § 17a-112 (j) (1) had been satisfied—
the department had made reasonable efforts to reunify
the respondent with the child, and the respondent was
unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.
Because the respondent challenges only one of the two
separate and independent bases for upholding the
court’s determination that the requirements of § 17a-
112 (j) (1) had been satisfied, even if we were to agree
with his claim, the fact that there is a second indepen-
dent basis for upholding the court’s determination,
which he does not challenge, renders us unable to pro-
vide him with any practical relief on appeal.’’ (Emphasis
in original.) Id., 588.
Like In re Jorden R., supra, 293 Conn. 556, and In
re Natalia M., supra, 190 Conn. App. 588, the trial court
in the present case found that both alternatives set
forth in § 17a-112 (j) (1) had been satisfied. To obtain
practical relief, it therefore was incumbent on the
respondent to properly challenge both findings. That
she failed to do.
In part II of her appellate brief, the respondent con-
tests the propriety of the court’s finding that the depart-
ment made reasonable efforts to reunify her with the
minor children. Over the course of ten pages, she dis-
cusses relevant legal authority and the evidence before
the court with respect to that claim. She has not, how-
ever, briefed any claim with respect to the court’s find-
ing that she alternatively was unwilling or unable to
benefit from reunification efforts. The sole reference
to that independent basis under § 17a-112 (j) (1) comes
in a paragraph designated as subsection (a) and labeled
‘‘Introduction,’’ in which the respondent argues that
the department’s reunification efforts ‘‘fell short of any
standard of reasonableness.’’ At the end of that intro-
ductory paragraph, the respondent states: ‘‘[The court]
erred when it found that the [department] made reason-
able efforts and when it found that [the respondent]
was unable or unwilling to rehabilitate.’’ In a subsequent
subsection titled ‘‘The trial court erred when it found
that [the department] fulfilled its statutory duty to make
reasonable efforts at reunification, ignoring evidence
that the agency refused to make referrals recommended
by clinicians,’’ the respondent offers her analysis of that
claim. Nowhere in her appellate brief does she address
the propriety of the court’s finding that she was unwill-
ing or unable to rehabilitate.
As our Supreme Court has noted, ‘‘[o]rdinarily,
[c]laims are inadequately briefed when they are merely
mentioned and not briefed beyond a bare assertion.
. . . Claims are also inadequately briefed when they
. . . consist of conclusory assertions . . . with no
mention of relevant authority and minimal or no cita-
tions from the record . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) In re Elijah C., 326 Conn. 480, 495, 165 A.3d
1149 (2017); see also Gonzalez v. O & G Industries,
Inc., 341 Conn. 644, 697, 267 A.3d 766 (2021) (‘‘[a]naly-
sis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in
order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief
the issue properly’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Apart from one conclusory sentence in the introduction
subsection, the respondent makes no mention of any
claim regarding the court’s unwilling or unable to reha-
bilitate finding, nor does she provide any legal authority
or discussion related thereto. Such a claim is not readily
discernible from the respondent’s brief and the record
before us, which is the ‘‘dispositive question’’ in
determining whether a claim has been adequately
briefed. In re Elijah C., supra, 495; see also Burton v.
Dept. of Environmental Protection, 337 Conn. 781, 803,
256 A.3d 655 (2021) (‘‘[f]or a reviewing court to judi-
ciously and efficiently . . . consider claims of error
raised on appeal . . . the parties must clearly and fully
set forth their arguments in their briefs’’ (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). Rather, the respondent’s appel-
late brief focuses exclusively on the department’s
alleged failure to make reasonable efforts at reunifica-
tion.15
Because the respondent has failed to properly chal-
lenge the court’s findings with respect to both indepen-
dent bases under § 17a-112 (j) (1), we decline to con-
sider the merits of her claim that the court improperly
determined that the department made reasonable
efforts to reunify her with the minor children. Even if
we were to agree with that claim, this court could not
provide her any practical relief due to her failure to
challenge the court’s alternative finding regarding her
unwillingness or inability to rehabilitate. Her claim,
therefore, is moot. See In re Jorden R., supra, 293 Conn.
557; In re Natalia M., supra, 190 Conn. App. 588.
The appeal is dismissed with respect to the respon-
dent’s claim that the court improperly determined that
the department made reasonable efforts at reunifica-
tion; the judgments are affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this
appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open
for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
order of the Appellate Court.
Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3)
(2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization
Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to
identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection
order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied
for, or others through whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.
** January 12, 2023, the date that this decision was released as a slip
opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
1
The court also terminated the parental rights of the biological father of
A’vion, Aaliyah, and Azra, whom we refer to as the father in this opinion.
Because he has not appealed, we refer to the respondent mother as the
respondent. We refer to A’vion, Aaliyah, and Azra collectively as the
minor children.
We also note that both the attorney for the minor children and the guardian
ad litem for the minor children filed statements adopting the brief of the
petitioner in this appeal pursuant to Practice Book §§ 67-13 and 79a-6 (c).
2
The pediatrician who treated the children prepared a written report that
was admitted into evidence and testified at trial regarding her conversation
with the respondent following that incident. On the day that the injuries to
A’vion were discovered, the respondent stated that she received a text
message from a ‘‘ ‘male companion’ ’’ at 2 a.m. or 3 a.m., that she departed
the family home to be with that companion, that she left the minor children
in the care of a seventeen year old babysitter, and that she did not return
home until after A’vion and Aaliyah had left for school that morning.
3
The specific steps issued on January 11, 2018, required, among other
things, the respondent (1) to ‘‘[t]ake part in counseling and make progress
toward the identified treatment goals,’’ (2) to ‘‘[s]ign releases allowing [the
department] to communicate with service providers to check on your atten-
dance, cooperation and progress toward identified goals,’’ and (3) to
‘‘[i]mmediately let [the department] know about any changes in the make-
up of the household . . . .’’
4
The respondent thereafter filed a motion to consolidate the termination
trial with her motion to revoke the commitment of the minor children, which
the court granted.
5
‘‘A ‘permanency plan’ is the proposal for what the long-term, permanent
solution for the placement of the child should be. . . . Our statutory scheme
provides five permanency options: (1) reunification with a parent; (2) long-
term foster care; (3) permanent guardianship; (4) transfer of either guardian-
ship or permanent guardianship; or (5) termination followed by adoption.’’
(Citations omitted; footnote omitted.) In re Adelina A., 169 Conn. App. 111,
121, 148 A.3d 621, cert. denied, 323 Conn. 949, 169 A.3d 792 (2016). If a
court does not approve a proposed permanency plan, it may order the
petitioner to submit another permanency plan, on which another hearing
must be scheduled. See Practice Book § 35a-14 (e).
6
The record indicates that the department initially referred the respondent
to All Pointe Care for parenting education services. When that provider did
not have any staff members available in August or September, 2019, the
department issued a referral to AHAVA Family Services, LLC. As the court
found in its memorandum of decision, although the department ‘‘immediately
contacted [the respondent] by email to attempt to coordinate scheduling’’
with that provider, the respondent ‘‘refused to confirm any dates or times
that would accommodate her schedule . . . .’’ The respondent ultimately
received parent coaching services with Connecticut Youth Services in
late 2019.
7
As the petitioner’s counsel emphasized at the October 17, 2019 hearing,
the motion to compel was not predicated on any intentional violation of a
court order by the petitioner. Rather, it was based on the respondent’s
contention that the department should provide additional services in light
of the updated evaluation recently filed by Freedman.
8
In her appellate brief, the respondent asserts that reunification ‘‘is funda-
mentally constitutional in nature’’ and cites to In re Teagan K.-O., 335 Conn.
745, 755, 242 A.3d 59 (2020), in which our Supreme Court observed that
‘‘[a] constellation of constitutional and statutory rights serve to protect the
integrity of the family unit, the parent-child relationship, and the best interest
of the child.’’ She has provided no authority that supports the claim that
vindication of those rights must be advanced via a motion to compel given
the procedural posture of this case.
9
For that reason, we reject the petitioner’s alternative contention that the
court’s denial of the motion to compel constituted an immediately appealable
order that precludes appellate review due to the respondent’s failure to take
an interlocutory appeal. Unlike the orders of temporary custody at issue in
In re Shamika F., 256 Conn. 383, 773 A.2d 347 (2001), and Madigan v.
Madigan, 224 Conn. 749, 620 A.2d 1276 (1993), which our Supreme Court
expressly considered in light of ‘‘constitutional considerations’’; In re Sha-
mika F., supra, 404; the denial of a motion to compel additional services
filed shortly before the commencement of a termination trial, at which the
petitioner bears the burden of establishing that it made reasonable efforts
at reunification, does not terminate ‘‘a separate and distinct proceeding, or
. . . so [conclude] the rights of the parties that further proceedings cannot
affect them.’’ State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 31, 463 A.2d 566 (1983). We
therefore conclude that, on the particular facts of this case, the denial of
the respondent’s motion to compel was not an immediately appealable
interlocutory order.
10
The minor children were removed from the respondent’s care on October
3, 2017; the hearing on the motion to compel was held on October 17, 2019.
11
To continue to receive federal funding, the federal Adoption and Safe
Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115, requires states to
enact certain provisions, which in turn require timely action in juvenile
proceedings. See, e.g., General Statutes § 17a-15 (b) (requiring petitioner to
review permanency plan for each child under her care ‘‘at least every six
months’’); General Statutes § 17a-110a (a) (‘‘[i]n order to achieve early perma-
nency for children, decrease children’s length of stay in foster care, reduce
the number of moves children experience in foster care and reduce the
amount of time between termination of parental rights and adoption, the
[petitioner] shall establish a program for concurrent permanency planning’’);
General Statutes § 17a-111a (a) (1) (requiring petitioner to file petition to
terminate parental rights when ‘‘the child has been in the custody of the
[petitioner] for at least fifteen consecutive months, or at least fifteen months
during the twenty-two months, immediately preceding the filing of such
petition’’); General Statutes § 46b-129 (k) (1) (A) (requiring motion for review
of permanency plan to be filed with court ‘‘[n]ine months after placement
of the child . . . in the care and custody’’ of petitioner); see generally In
re Darien S., 82 Conn. App. 169, 174–76, 842 A.2d 1177 (2003) (reviewing
history of federal permanency plans for children who have been removed
from parents and observing that ‘‘our legislature passed several pieces of
legislation to keep the state in compliance with federal law and thereby to
continue to receive federal funds’’), cert. denied, 269 Conn. 904, 852 A.2d
733 (2004). Notably, each component of this statutory scheme providing for
permanency planning, including reunification services with parents, requires
notice to parents and an opportunity to be heard. See, e.g., General Statutes
§ 17a-15 (c) (parents aggrieved by plan of treatment services, temporary or
permanent placement, including reunification services with parent, entitled
to administrative hearing, which outcome can be appealed to Superior
Court).
12
‘‘Appellate review of a trial court’s findings of fact is governed by the
clearly erroneous standard of review. . . . A finding of fact is clearly errone-
ous when there is no evidence in the record to support it . . . or when
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jacob W., 330
Conn. 744, 770, 200 A.3d 1091 (2019).
13
Szantyr testified that Azra ‘‘was very scared’’ after the respondent threw
her at Szantyr.
14
For that reason, when an appellate court concludes that the trial court
properly found that one of those independent bases was proven, the appellate
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to thereafter consider a claim of error
with respect to the alternative basis under § 17a-112 (j) (1). Appellate review
of that alternative basis is a ‘‘moot issue’’ because any decision thereon
‘‘cannot benefit the respondent meaningfully.’’ In re Jorden R., supra, 293
Conn. 557; see also id., 554 (appellate courts ‘‘should not address a moot
issue substantively’’).
15
Five weeks after the respondent filed her principal appellate brief with
this court, the petitioner filed her appellate brief, in which she argued that
the respondent’s claim is moot due to her failure to properly challenge both
findings made by the trial court pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (1). The respondent
did not file a reply brief with this court. See Practice Book § 67-5A.