DocketNumber: 4972
Citation Numbers: 12 Conn. App. 651
Judges: Stoughton
Filed Date: 11/24/1987
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 9/8/2022
The plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of the trial court in favor of the defendants. The plaintiffs claim that the court erred (1) in excluding the testimony of direct and rebuttal witnesses, (2) in finding there was insufficient evidence that the named defendant breached a noncompetition agreement, and (3) in finding there was insufficient evidence that the defendants tortiously interfered with the contractual rights of the plaintiffs. We find error.
The principal factual question in dispute at trial was whether Georgianna or her husband managed Quest. After hearing the testimony, the court found that the defendant Clement Passariello was not the manager of Quest and that he was not engaging in the gym business in violation of his noncompetition agreement. Judgment was rendered for the defendants on all counts.
The plaintiffs’ principal claim of error is that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of two of their witnesses whose names were not disclosed prior to trial. The record indicates that the defendants attempted to obtain the names of the plaintiffs’ witnesses through interrogatories pursuant to Practice Book § 222. The plaintiffs agreed, without a court order, to provide the names of their witnesses in lieu of complying with dis
The plaintiffs’ first claim is that the trial court erred in excluding the direct testimony of detective Ted Forbes. We agree with this claim.
Six months after the trial began,
The parties reached an informal oral agreement which required that the plaintiffs provide the defendants with the names of their witnesses ahead of time. Both parties concede that the agreement was ambiguous. The defendants contend that the agreement required disclosure before trial. By contrast, the plaintiffs contend that as long as they disclosed the identity of a witness before the witness was called to testify, they would be in compliance with the agreement.
The purpose for requiring a written stipulation; Practice Book § 249;
The plaintiffs also claim that the court erred in excluding the rebuttal testimony of Jody Grigier. We agree with this claim.
Grigier was referred to by name several times during the testimony of the defendant Georgianna Passariello. Grigier was also mentioned in the testimony of several other witnesses. When the plaintiffs called Grigier to rebut the earlier testimony, the court refused to hear her testimony because her name did not appear on the witness list.
“Although a plaintiffs rebuttal testimony is ordinarily limited, within the discretion of the court, to such purposes as refuting the defendant’s evidence and impeaching or rehabilitating witnesses; State v. Peary, 176 Conn. 170, 174-75, 405 A.2d 626 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 966, 99 S. Ct. 2417, 60 L. Ed. 2d 1072 (1979); Reboni v. Case Bros., Inc., 137 Conn. 501, 508, 78 A.2d 887 (1951); DiMaio v. Panico, 115 Conn. 295, 298, 161 A. 238 (1932); Tait & LaPlante, Handbook of Conn. Evidence § 3.2; Holden & Daly, Connecticut Evidence § 11; we are unaware of any authority which permits the court to bar in advance the plaintiff from even bringing the rebuttal witness to the stand in order to offer the evidence. See Gervais v. Foehrenbach, 149 Conn. 461, 463, 181 A.2d 253 (1962).” DeMartin v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 4 Conn. App. 387, 392-93, 494 A.2d 1222 (1985). As we concluded in DeMartin, the proper procedure is to rule on the admissibility of the rebuttal testimony, not on whether a rebuttal witness was disclosed in pretrial discovery.
To require that a party disclose rebuttal witnesses before trial would place efficiency before logic. It is simply not possible for a litigant to anticipate all of the opposing evidence that will be elicited at trial. Thus,
These errors are dispositive of the appeal. The plaintiffs’ other claims of error raise evidentiary questions which we cannot reach because further evidence must be heard by the court.
There is error, the judgment is set aside and the case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
After several days of testimony, there was a lapse in the proceedings for six months. On the Friday before resuming, the plaintiffs called the defendants to inform them that they intended to call Forbes as a witness on Monday. The court concluded that Forbes’ testimony was inadmissible because his name did not appear on the plaintiffs’ original witness list.
“{Practice Book] Sec. 249. stipulations regarding discovery and DEPOSITION PROCEDURE
“Unless the court orders otherwise, the parties may by written stipulation (1) provide that depositions may be taken before any person, at any time or place, upon any notice, and in any manner, and when so taken may be used as other depositions, and (2) modify the procedures provided by this chapter for other methods of discovery.”