DocketNumber: 6328
Citation Numbers: 19 Conn. App. 505
Judges: Spallone
Filed Date: 8/29/1989
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 9/8/2022
The plaintiff, James J. Sotire, Sr., appeals from the judgment for the defendants rendered in his action for a writ of mandamus and for injunctive and other equitable relief. The plaintiff claims that the trial court erred (1) in refusing to exercise jurisdiction over a certain individual, and (2) in holding that no procedural due process right of the plaintiff had been violated. We find no error.
The plaintiff has served as the building official and zoning enforcement officer of the city of Stamford since 1966. During 1983 and 1984, the Holiday Inn’s Crown Plaza was under construction in Stamford. The plaintiff’s office was responsible for performing the inspections necessary to ensure that all construction complied with state building codes. If building code requirements were met, the plaintiff’s office would issue a certificate of occupancy. The plaintiff had the power to seek suspension of the hotel’s operations for any violation of the city’s municipal codes or ordinances.
On January 3, 1984, the plaintiff made a telephone call to John Healey, the Holiday Inn’s engineer, who was in charge of internal operations such as heating and air conditioning for the soon-to-be opened hotel. During his conversation with Healey, the plaintiff strongly recommended that the Holiday Inn award its garbage and refuse handling contract to a company owned by a friend of the plaintiff. Healey tape-recorded the conversation. By the time the telephone conversation took place, the Holiday Inn had already solicited bids for garbage and refuse service from various refuse
A Holiday Inn staff member delivered a tape of the conversation between the plaintiff and Healey to the Stamford police department’s special investigations unit. The police subsequently conducted an investigation, but the plaintiff was never charged with any crime.
The Stamford Advocate, a local newspaper, also received a copy of the tape and, on or about September 20, 1985, an Advocate reporter brought the matter to the attention of Thom Serranni, mayor of the city of Stamford. Upon hearing the tape, Serranni filed a written complaint with the defendant board of ethics of the city of Stamford (board)
The board provided the plaintiff with written notice of its inquiry, heard testimony from the plaintiff and others at public hearings, offered to subpoena witnesses on the plaintiff’s behalf, accepted all exhibits and evidence offered by the plaintiff, and placed no limit on the scope of the plaintiff’s counsel’s examination and
Shortly after the board had begun its inquiry, the plaintiff, by complaint dated December 9, 1985, commenced an action against the city of Stamford, the board, and the individual members of the board, seeking to enjoin the defendants from further investigating, conducting hearings on, or rendering a decision on any charge that the plaintiff had violated the city code of ethics. The plaintiff claimed that the board was conducting hearings in violation of his right to due process in that, inter alia, the board had failed to give him adequate notice of the proceedings, had failed to promulgate rules and regulations as required by the code, and had failed to record the proceedings. The plaintiff further claimed that the board had prejudged the matter and thus was not an impartial decision maker. Finally, the plaintiff claimed that if the board found him to be in violation of the code, he would be subject to demotion or discharge under § 740 (2) of the Stamford charter. In order to avoid immediate and irreparable harm to his constitutional rights, his reputation in the community and his livelihood, the plaintiff
On or about April 1, 1986, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint
By memorandum of decision dated July 20,1987, the trial court, McGrath, J., found the issues for the defendants, and judgment entered accordingly on August 4,
The plaintiff’s first claim of error is that the trial court erred in failing to exercise jurisdiction over O’Brien. In its memorandum of decision, the trial court stated: “The final issues raised by the plaintiff address the impropriety of the actions of John O’Brien. It is noted that Mr. O’Brien is not a named defendant and this court lacks jurisdiction to address these claims.” It is apparently this ruling that the plaintiff challenges on appeal. The record does not reveal, however, what claims were before the trial court when it so ruled or what the basis for the ruling was, and the plaintiff has failed either to obtain an articulation pursuant to Practice Book § 4051 or to refer us to the relevant portions of the transcript; see Practice Book § 4065 (d); or official court file; see Practice Book § 4074. It is the appellant’s responsibility to ensure that an adequate record is presented for review. Practice Book § 4061; J. M. Lynne Co. v. Geraghty, 204 Conn. 361, 376, 528 A.2d 786 (1987). The plaintiff has failed to discharge that responsibility. Under such circumstances, we decline to review the plaintiff’s claim.
The plaintiff’s second claim is that the trial court erred in holding that he was not deprived of his rights
The plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the board had determined that he had violated the code by engaging in the telephone conversation with Healey; that it had done so only after failing to provide appropriate procedural safeguards, in violation of his state and federal constitutional rights to due process; that, as a result, the plaintiff’s livelihood was endangered and his reputation injured; and that, unless his requests for relief in the form of a permanent injunction and writs of mandamus were granted, he would suffer immediate and irreparable harm “to his constitutional rights, his rights under the laws, statutes and ordinances of the United States, State of Connecticut and City of Stamford, his reputation in the community, and his livelihood . . . .” The trial court correctly concluded that the plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief was moot insofar as it related to activity on the part of the board, which had already completed its investigation and rendered its decision. Moreover, to the extent that the request for injunctive relief can be construed as a request that the defendant city be enjoined from tak
With regard to the plaintiffs requests for writs of mandamus, the trial court properly concluded that, under the circumstances, the writs should not issue. The plaintiff requested writs of mandamus for the following purposes: (1) to order the defendants to promulgate rules and regulations, as required by § 12.B of the code of ethics; (2) to order the defendants to prescribe a form for written complaints, as required by § 12.C.2.a. of the code; and (3) to order the defendants to create and maintain a handbook clearly explaining, with practical examples, the rights and responsibilities of officers and employees of the city of Stamford, as required by § 12.C.4. of the code. “Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, available in limited circumstances for limited purposes. Beccia v. Waterbury, 185 Conn. 445, 453, 441 A.2d 131 (1981).” Golab v. New Britain, supra, 19. The issuance of the writ rests in the discretion of the court, and that discretion will be exercised in favor of issuing the writ only where the plaintiff has a clear legal right to have done that which he seeks. Id. “The writ is proper only when ‘(1) the law imposes on the.
We uphold the judgment of the trial court on the ground that the plaintiff was not entitled to any of the relief requested.
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
The board, a volunteer lay board consisting of five resident electors of the city of Stamford, has the responsibility for investigating and conducting hearings in matters referred to it that arise under the code of ethics.
Section 4 of the code provides in pertinent part: ‘‘No officer or employee shall engage in any business or transaction or have a financial or personal interest, directly or indirectly, which is in conflict with or incompatible with the proper discharge of his official duties or would tend to influence or impair his independence of judgment and action in the performance of his official duties.”
Although the parties had stipulated that the action brought by the plaintiff in December, 1985, would be withdrawn, the plaintiff did not withdraw it.
Specifically, the plaintiff alleged in the amended complaint that the board had “ignored, disregarded and violated the Code in one or more of the following respects:
“(a) In that it failed to promulgate rules and regulations of procedure after a public hearing as required by Section 12B of the Code;
“(b) In that it initiated action against the plaintiff prior to receiving a written complaint on a ‘form prescribed by the Board’ as required by Section 12C2a of the Code;
“(c) In that it initiated action against the plaintiff prior to receiving a written complaint signed under penalty of false statement as required by Section 12C2a of the Code;
“(d) In that it failed to allow the plaintiff to be represented by counsel during all phases of the proceedings as required by Section 12C2a of the Code;
“(e) In that it failed to take oral testimony under oath at the public hearings as required by Section 12C2b of the Code;
“(q In that it failed to record and transcribe all public hearings as required by Section 12C2b of the Code;
“(g) In that it failed to create and maintain a handbook clearly explaining rights and responsibilities of municipal officers and employees under the Code as required by Section 12C4 of the Code.”
The plaintiff also alleged that he had been “deprived of his federally guaranteed rights provided in Title 42, Sections 1983 and 1985, of the United States Code” and, without elaboration, that he had also been “deprived of his rights under the laws, statutes and ordinances of the State of Connecticut and City of Stamford.”