DocketNumber: 7751
Citation Numbers: 20 Conn. App. 452
Judges: Daly, Lavery
Filed Date: 1/9/1990
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 9/8/2022
The defendant is appealing from the judgment of conviction, after a trial to the court, of operating an improperly registered boat in violation of General Statutes § 15-144 (h). The defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the defendant’s boat had been used in Connecticut for more than sixty days in 1988. We find no error.
The following facts are relevant. The Stance is a forty-six foot yacht owned by Stance Maritime Limited,
Stance Maritime Limited is in the “marine trades business,” that is, it charters the Stance for a fee. The defendant had a charter arrangement with the corporation that entitled him to first refusal to charter the boat on weekends. Although he did not execute a separate, formal charter agreement with the corporation each time he chartered the boat, he did pay the daily charter fee.
During the summer of 1988, Ronald Wofford, a boating enforcement officer with the department of environmental protection, visited the Shennecosset Yacht Club on twelve days in June and seven days in July. On eighteen of those nineteen occasions Wofford noted in his log that the Stance was docked at the club. On October 8,1988, Wofford saw the defendant operating the Stance both at the Shennecosset Yacht Club and later that day at the Essex Marina. When the defendant docked at Essex, Wofford cited him for operating an unregistered vessel.
General Statutes § 15-144 (h) provides that “[a]ny person who operates or any owner who permits the operation of a vessel on the waters of this state which has not been numbered or registered in accordance with the provisions of this chapter . . . shall have committed a violation . . . .” General Statutes
To determine whether the defendant violated § 15-144 (h), it is necessary to determine whether the vessel he was operating, namely, the Stance, was registered as required by § 15-142 (b). At trial, the state and the defendant stipulated that on October 8,1988, the Stance was documented by the United States Coast Guard. The issue therefore turns on whether the Stance was used in Connecticut waters for more than sixty days in 1988 prior to the October 8 citation.
The defendant’s sole claim on appeal is that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the Stance had been used in Connecticut waters for more than sixty days in 1988. He argues that the only direct evidence was Wofford’s testimony that he noted the presence of the vessel at the Shennecosset Yacht Club on eighteen days during the summer of 1988 and on October 8, the day he issued the citation. The defendant further argues that the circumstantial evidence elicited at trial was insufficient to prove that the vessel was in Connecticut for an additional forty-two days. We disagree.
“Our standard of review on such an issue is well established and limited. The inquiry into whether the record evidence would support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt does not require a court to ask itself whether it believes that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Malines, 11 Conn.
The defendant testified that the Stance was first brought to Connecticut in May, 1988. Wofford cited the defendant for operating an unregistered vessel on October 8, 1988. If it is assumed that the vessel first entered Connecticut waters on May 31, 1988, the
“In reviewing claims concerning the sufficiency of the evidence, this court makes no distinction between the probative force of direct and circumstantial evidence. State v. Cates, [202 Conn. 615, 627, 522 A.2d 788 (1987)].” State v. Uretek, Inc., 207 Conn. 706, 715, 543 A.2d 709 (1988). In light of the evidence that the boat’s owners could readily store the boat at the Shennecosset Yacht Club between charters, the evidence that Wofford noted its presence in the yacht club on nineteen different occasions, the defendant’s testimony that the boat was moored there for certain indeterminate periods of time, and, most important, the lack of any evidence suggesting that the boat was kept elsewhere between charters, it was reasonable for the court to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the boat was moored, hence, “used”; General Statutes § 15-142 (a); in Connecticut waters for more than sixty days in 1988.
Given this finding, by October 8,1988, the boat was required to be registered in Connecticut. General Statutes § 15-142 (b). It was not. Immediately before issuing the citation on October 8, Wofford observed the
There is no error.
In this opinion Norcott, J., concurred.
See 26 U.S.C. § 1361.