TLOA of CT, LLC v. Taipe

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TLOA OF CT, LLC v. MARCELINO
TAIPE ET AL.
(AC 45844)
Alvord, Prescott and Clark, Js.
Syllabus
The plaintiff assignee of a municipal tax lien on certain real property in the
city of Bridgeport owned by the defendant sought to foreclose the lien.
At the time the defendant purchased the property in January, 2016, there
were unpaid taxes assessed on the property from 2015. In April, 2017,
the city filed the certificate of lien on the land records for the 2015
taxes owed on the property and subsequently assigned the tax lien to
the plaintiff’s predecessor in interest, which assigned the lien to the
plaintiff. The defendant paid his property taxes as he received bills from
the city. The first property tax bill he received was sent by the city to
the defendant in July, 2017, at which time the city had already recorded
and assigned to the plaintiff’s predecessor in interest the tax lien, which
remained due and owing on the property. The defendant never made
any payments to the plaintiff in connection with the assigned lien. In
May, 2020, the plaintiff commenced this action seeking to foreclose on
the tax lien. In his answer, the defendant asserted that, under the applica-
ble statute (§ 12-144b), the city was required to apply the amounts that
he had paid from 2017 to 2020 first to the oldest outstanding taxes owed
on the property, which he claimed were the taxes owed on the 2015
tax lien, by transferring those amounts to the plaintiff before applying
any such amounts to the taxes that were due and owing to the city. The
parties each filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted
the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to liability only and
denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that
the plaintiff had established its prima facie case for foreclosure of a tax
lien and that the defendant’s asserted special defense of setoff was not
viable. On the defendant’s appeal to this court from the trial court’s
judgment of foreclosure by sale, held that the trial court properly granted
the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied the defendant’s
motion for summary judgment: contrary to the defendant’s argument,
the tax lien in question, once assigned, was no longer a debt owed to
the city and, under such circumstances, the city had no legal obligation
to forward to the plaintiff any tax payments that it received from the
defendant, as § 12-144b makes no reference to third-party assignees of
tax liens, and, had the legislature intended to require municipalities to
do so, it easily could have accomplished that goal by using language
making it clear that municipalities must transfer payments they receive
or recover to third-party holders of previously assigned tax liens; more-
over, when § 12-144b is viewed in relation to the statute concerning
third-party assignees (§ 12-195h), and in the absence of any language
whatsoever within § 12-144b referencing third-party holders of assigned
tax liens, it cannot reasonably be inferred, solely from the language in
§ 12-144b requiring municipalities to ‘‘apply’’ tax payments that they
receive or recover to ‘‘outstanding secured taxes,’’ that the legislature
intended to require municipalities to act, in effect, as loan servicers for
third-party holders of municipal tax liens.
Argued May 9—officially released July 25, 2023
Procedural History
Action to foreclose a tax lien on certain real property
owned by the named defendant, and for other relief,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district
of Fairfield, where the court, Spader, J., granted the
plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to liability
only and denied the named defendant’s motion for sum-
mary judgment; thereafter, the court, Cirello, J., ren-
dered a judgment of foreclosure by sale, from which
the named defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Thomas L. Kanasky, Jr., for the appellant (named
defendant).
Gary J. Greene, with whom, on the brief, was Sean
V. Patel, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion
CLARK, J. In this foreclosure action, the defendant
Marcelino Taipe1 appeals from the judgment of foreclo-
sure by sale rendered by the trial court in favor of the
plaintiff, TLOA of CT, LLC. On appeal, the defendant
claims that the court erred in granting the plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment as to liability only and
denying his motion for summary judgment. In particu-
lar, the defendant contends that the court improperly
concluded that the city of Bridgeport (city) complied
with General Statutes § 12-144b when it applied the
defendant’s tax payments to his current taxes owed to
the city, rather than to the tax lien at issue in this appeal,
which the city had already assigned to the plaintiff’s
predecessor in interest prior to receiving the payments
at issue. We affirm the judgment of the court.
The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to our resolution of this appeal. On January 21,
2016, the defendant purchased the property located at
85 Gem Avenue in Bridgeport (property). At the time
of the purchase, there were unpaid taxes assessed on
the property from 2015. The court found that the city
likely sent the 2015 tax bill to one of the previous owners
of the property and that the defendant likely never
received a 2015 tax bill from the city.
On April 5, 2017, the city filed a certificate of lien on
the land records for the 2015 taxes owed on the property
(tax lien). The city subsequently assigned the tax lien
to TLOA Acquisitions, LLC-Series 2 on May 17, 2017,
and recorded the assignment on May 18, 2017. TLOA
Acquisitions, LLC-Series 2 thereafter assigned the tax
lien to the plaintiff on October 27, 2017. That assignment
was recorded on the city’s land records on December
11, 2017.
The defendant, after purchasing the property, paid
his property taxes as he received bills from the city.
The first property tax bill he received, which was for
the 2016 grand list, was sent by the city to the defendant
in July, 2017. As a result, by the time the defendant
received his first tax bill in July, 2017, the city had
already recorded and assigned to the plaintiff’s prede-
cessor in interest the tax lien, which remained due and
owing on the property. The defendant has not made
any payments to the plaintiff in connection with the
assigned lien.
On May 13, 2020, the plaintiff commenced this action
seeking to foreclose on the tax lien. On November 18,
2021, the defendant filed his answer and a special
defense. The defendant asserted that he was entitled
to a right of setoff pursuant to General Statutes § 52-
139 for municipal real estate tax payments that he made
to the city from 2017 to 2020.2 Specifically, he argued
that § 12-144b required the city to apply the amounts
that he had paid for those tax years first to the oldest
outstanding taxes owed on the property, which he
claimed were the taxes owed on the tax lien. Even
though the city had already assigned the tax lien to the
plaintiff by the time the defendant made those pay-
ments, the defendant nonetheless claimed that § 12-
144b required the city to ‘‘apply’’ his payments to the
taxes owed under that lien by transferring those
amounts to the plaintiff before applying any such
amounts to the taxes that were due and owing to the
city.
On December 2, 2021, the plaintiff filed a motion for
summary judgment as to liability. On January 7, 2022,
the defendant filed an opposition to the plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment and his own motion for
summary judgment. In his motion for summary judg-
ment, the defendant claimed that he was ‘‘entitled to
summary judgment on his special defense of setoff for
subsequent tax payments made to the [city’s] tax collec-
tor, which should have been applied to and paid off the
tax lien being foreclosed by the plaintiff’’ in accordance
with § 12-144b.
On May 11, 2022, the court, Spader, J., granted the
plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to liability
only and denied the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment. The court concluded that the plaintiff had
established its prima facie case for foreclosure of a tax
lien and that neither of the defendant’s asserted special
defenses were viable. The court also denied the defen-
dant’s motion for summary judgment, stating that,
although it ‘‘disagree[d] that payments ha[d] been mis-
applied by the city . . . the only way those payments
could cause a setoff herein is if there was an overpay-
ment being held by the city that should resolve this
debt.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) Having concluded that the
defendant’s special defense of setoff failed as a matter
of law, and that no genuine issue of material fact existed
with respect to the defendant’s liability on the assigned
tax lien, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment as to liability only and denied the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
On May 13, 2022, the plaintiff filed a motion for judg-
ment of strict foreclosure. On September 7, 2022, the
court, Cirello, J., rendered a judgment of foreclosure
by sale and set the sale date for December 10, 2022.3
The defendant timely appealed. Additional facts and
procedural history will be set forth as necessary.
On appeal, the defendant claims that the court ‘‘erred
in denying the defendant’s motion for summary judg-
ment on his claim of setoff in holding that’’ § 12-144b
does not apply ‘‘to assigned tax liens.’’ Although the
defendant labeled his defense before the trial court as
one of setoff, the substance of the allegations in his
special defense sound in a defense of payment.4 In
asserting that the city misapplied his tax payments, the
defendant argues that the payments he made to the city
should have been applied to the tax lien held by the
plaintiff, extinguishing it, and thereby precluding this
foreclosure action. In disposing of the defendant’s argu-
ment, the court determined that the city had properly
applied his tax payments. On appeal, the defendant
claims that the court misconstrued and misapplied
§ 12-144b.
The plaintiff contends in its appellee brief that the
issue of payment was not properly presented to the
trial court and preserved for appeal and that this court
should therefore limit its analysis to whether the court
properly concluded that there was no genuine issue of
material fact with respect to the defendant’s special
defense of setoff. We conclude that the arguments the
defendant asserts on appeal were sufficiently raised and
addressed below and that limiting our review strictly
to the defense of setoff would be to exalt form over
substance.5 See Fitzsimons v. Fitzsimons, 116 Conn.
App. 449, 455 n.5, 975 A.2d 729 (2009) (‘‘[u]nder these
circumstances and lacking any claim, much less analy-
sis, of prejudice by the [plaintiff], we will not exalt form
over substance’’). Nevertheless, for the reasons that
follow, we conclude that the court properly granted the
plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied
the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
We begin by setting forth our standard of review.
‘‘The scope of our review of the trial court’s decision
to grant [a] motion for summary judgment is plenary.
. . . Practice Book [§ 17-49] provides that summary
judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. . . . The party seeking summary judgment has the
burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue
[of] material facts which, under applicable principles
of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter
of law . . . . A material fact . . . [is] a fact which will
make a difference in the result of the case.’’ (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Shoreline
Shellfish, LLC v. Branford, 336 Conn. 403, 410, 246 A.3d
470 (2020).
Because the defendant’s claim on appeal rests, in
part, on the meaning and application of § 12-144b, a
question of statutory interpretation is also presented.
‘‘When we are called upon to construe a statute that is
implicated by a summary judgment motion, our review
is plenary.’’ Doe v. West Hartford, 328 Conn. 172, 181,
177 A.3d 1128 (2018). ‘‘When construing a statute, [o]ur
fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to
the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In other
words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner,
the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the
facts of [the] case, including the question of whether
the language actually does apply. . . . In seeking to
determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs
us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its
relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such
text and considering such relationship, the meaning of
such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield
absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of
the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cerame v. Lamont,
346 Conn. 422, 426, 291 A.3d 601 (2023). ‘‘Importantly,
ambiguity exists only if the statutory language at issue
is susceptible to more than one plausible interpretation.
. . . In other words, statutory language does not
become ambiguous merely because the parties contend
for different meanings.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Connecticut Housing Finance Authority v. Alf-
aro, 328 Conn. 134, 142, 176 A.3d 1146 (2018).
We now turn to the merits of the defendant’s claim
on appeal. Our rules of practice clearly delineate what
a plaintiff must prove when seeking to foreclose on a
municipal tax lien. Practice Book § 10-70 (a) provides:
‘‘In any action to foreclose a municipal tax or assess-
ment lien the plaintiff need only allege and prove: (1)
the ownership of the liened premises on the date when
the same went into the tax list, or when said assessment
was made; (2) that thereafter a tax in the amount speci-
fied in the list, or such assessment in the amount made,
was duly and properly assessed upon the property and
became due and payable; (3) (to be used only in cases
where the lien has been continued by certificate) that
thereafter a certificate of lien for the amount thereof
was duly and properly filed and recorded in the land
records of the said town on the date stated; (4) that
no part of the same has been paid; and (5) other encum-
brances as required by the preceding section.’’ (Empha-
sis added).
The defendant argues that the plaintiff was not enti-
tled to summary judgment because, in his view, even
though the city already had assigned the tax lien to a
third-party assignee prior to the time he made any tax
payments to the city, § 12-144b required the city to
transfer his payments to the plaintiff, as the successor
to the original assignee, in satisfaction of his obligations
under the lien before applying any amounts to taxes
owed to the city for subsequent tax years. The defen-
dant notes that § 12-144b requires a municipality to
apply all tax payments first to any ‘‘outstanding unse-
cured taxes . . . paying the oldest such tax first,’’ and
then to any ‘‘outstanding secured taxes . . . paying the
oldest such tax first.’’ The defendant contends that,
because General Statutes § 12-1726 creates a statutory
lien over all municipal taxes owed for real property
from the date of assessment, and there was no evidence
that he owed personal property taxes, there were no
‘‘unsecured taxes’’ owed on the property at the time of
his payments. He further contends that, because the
2015 tax was the oldest secured tax owed on the prop-
erty when he made his payments and § 12-144b required
the city to ‘‘apply’’ his tax payments first to the oldest
outstanding secured tax, the city was required to apply
his payments to the previously assigned tax lien before
applying those amounts to real property taxes that he
owed to the city for subsequent tax years by transferring
to the plaintiff the amount owed on the tax lien.
The plaintiff counters that § 12-144b imposes no obli-
gation on a municipality to transfer tax payments to a
holder of an assigned tax lien before applying such
payments to taxes that are due and owing to a munici-
pality. The plaintiff also argues that the defendant’s
claim rests upon an incorrect construction of § 12-144b.
Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the taxes that were
due and owing to the city at the time the defendant
made his payments constituted ‘‘unsecured taxes’’ and
that § 12-144b required the city to apply those payments
to such amounts before applying any amounts to
‘‘secured taxes,’’ which it contends are limited to those
taxes for which a lien has been recorded on the land
records.
We need not decide whether, as the defendant con-
tends, all real property taxes are ‘‘secured taxes’’ for
purposes of § 12-144b or, instead, as the plaintiff con-
tends, real property taxes are ‘‘secured taxes’’ for pur-
poses of that statute only if a lien for such amount is
recorded on the land records, because we agree with
the plaintiff that the tax lien in question, once assigned,
was no longer a debt owed to the city and that, under
such circumstances, the city had no legal obligation to
forward to the plaintiff any tax payments that it received
from the defendant.
We begin with the language of § 12-144b. That statute
provides in relevant part that, ‘‘[e]xcept as otherwise
provided by the general statutes, all payments made to
or recovered by the municipality shall be applied (1)
first, for any outstanding unsecured taxes, to expenses
concerning such unsecured taxes, including attorney’s
fees, collection expenses, collector’s fees and other
expenses and charges related to all delinquencies owed
by the party liable therefor before the interest accrued,
then to the principal of such outstanding unsecured
taxes, paying the oldest such tax first, and (2) for any
outstanding secured taxes, first to expenses concerning
such secured taxes, including attorney’s fees, collection
expenses, collector’s fees and other expenses and
charges related to all delinquencies owed by the party
liable therefor before the interest accrued, then to the
principal of such outstanding secured taxes, paying the
oldest such tax first. . . .’’ General Statutes § 12-144b.
On the basis of the clear language of the statute,
when a municipality receives or recovers a tax payment,
it must first apply such payments to ‘‘outstanding unse-
cured taxes,’’ beginning with the oldest such tax. Once
a municipality has applied such payments to any out-
standing unsecured taxes and fees associated with
those taxes, in the order set out in the statute, a munici-
pality must then apply payments to any outstanding
secured taxes, beginning with the oldest such tax, again
following the order set out in the statute.
The defendant contends that § 12-144b imposes upon
a municipality an obligation to ‘‘apply’’ tax payments it
receives or recovers to a tax lien that a municipality
previously assigned to a third party by transferring such
amounts to the current holder of the tax lien. Section
12-144b, however, makes no reference to third-party
assignees of tax liens. Had the legislature intended to
require municipalities to undertake the burdensome
and administratively difficult responsibilities that the
defendant’s interpretation would create,7 it easily could
have accomplished that goal by using language making
it clear that municipalities must transfer payments they
receive or recover to third-party holders of previously
assigned tax liens. See Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc. v.
Commissioner of Revenue Services, 304 Conn. 204, 219,
38 A.3d 1183 (‘‘it is a well settled principle of statutory
construction that the legislature knows how to convey
its intent expressly’’), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 940, 133 S.
Ct. 425, 184 L. Ed. 2d 255 (2012). Indeed, the legislature
has demonstrated that it is more than capable of using
language directly addressing such liens. General Stat-
utes § 12-195h broadly regulates the manner in which
municipalities may assign tax liens, enumerates the
rights, powers and duties of third-party assignees seek-
ing to enforce or foreclose upon municipal tax liens,
and establishes extensive notice requirements govern-
ing collection efforts by third-party assignees. See, e.g.,
General Statutes § 12-195h (d) and (e)8; see also Ameri-
can Tax Funding, LLC v. First Eagle Corp., 196 Conn.
App. 298, 300, 229 A.3d 1218 (§ 12-195h ‘‘permits a
municipality to assign for consideration liens filed by
the tax collector’’), cert. denied, 335 Conn. 942, 237
A.3d 729 (2020). When viewed in relation to § 12-195h,
and in the absence of any language whatsoever within
§ 12-144b referencing third-party holders of assigned
tax liens, it cannot reasonably be inferred, solely from
the language in § 12-144b requiring municipalities to
‘‘apply’’ tax payments that they receive or recover to
‘‘outstanding secured taxes,’’ that the legislature
intended to require municipalities to act, in effect, as
loan servicers for third-party holders of municipal
tax liens.
In this case, it is undisputed that, by the time the
defendant made his first tax payment to the city, the
city already had assigned the tax lien. At that point, the
city was under no obligation to forward payments that
it received from the defendant to the plaintiff or any
subsequent assignee of the tax lien rather than applying
the defendant’s tax payments to taxes that the defen-
dant owed to the city. Accordingly, we conclude that
the court properly granted the plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment and denied the defendant’s motion
for summary judgment.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
1
The complaint also named as defendants the Water Pollution Control
Authority of the city of Bridgeport and the Aquarion Water Company. Neither
of these additional defendants is participating in the present appeal, and,
thus, all references to the defendant in this opinion are to Marcelino Taipe.
2
On December 15, 2021, the defendant filed a request for leave to amend
his answer and special defense in order to add an additional special defense.
That defense is not pertinent to this appeal.
3
The court found that the amount of debt was $15,498.63 and that the
fair market value of the property was $310,000.
4
‘‘Payment, such that a debt is no longer owed to a plaintiff, is a valid
defense to liability in a foreclosure action.’’ JPMorgan Chase Bank, National
Assn. v. Syed, 197 Conn. App. 129, 143, 231 A.3d 286 (2020). ‘‘[W]hether
payment was tendered is a question of fact appropriately decided by the
trier of fact.’’ Homecomings Financial Network, Inc. v. Starbala, 85 Conn.
App. 284, 289, 857 A.2d 366 (2004); see also Practice Book § 10-50.
5
Because we construe the defendant’s sole claim on appeal to be one of
payment, and not setoff, and because the defendant failed to brief the issue
of setoff in his principal appellate brief, we deem any claim regarding setoff
abandoned and decline to review it on appeal. ‘‘[W]e are not required to
review issues that have been improperly presented to this court through an
inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is
required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue
properly.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Burton v. Dept. of Environ-
mental Protection, 337 Conn. 781, 803, 256 A.3d 655 (2021); see also Mor-
rissey-Manter v. Saint Francis Hospital & Medical Center, 166 Conn. App.
510, 527, 142 A.3d 363 (‘‘appellate courts will treat as abandoned claims
that are not briefed adequately’’), cert. denied, 323 Conn. 924, 149 A.3d
982 (2016).
6
General Statutes § 12-172 provides in relevant part: ‘‘The interest of each
person in each item of real estate, which has been legally set in his assess-
ment list, shall be subject to a lien for that part of his taxes laid upon the
valuation of such interest, as found in such list when finally completed, as
such part may be increased by interest, fees and charges, and a lien for any
obligation to make a payment in lieu of any such taxes, as defined in section
12-171. Such lien, unless otherwise specially provided by law, shall exist
from the first day of October or other assessment date of the municipality
in the year previous to that in which such tax, or the first installment thereof,
became due until two years after such tax or first installment thereof became
due and, during its existence, shall take precedence of all transfers and
encumbrances in any manner affecting such interest in such item, or any
part of it. . . .’’
7
Although we conclude that the language of § 12-144b is conclusive with
respect to the defendant’s claim, we note that the defendant’s interpretation,
if accepted, would require a municipality, upon receipt of a tax payment,
(a) to determine whether it has assigned to a third party a tax lien that it
once held with respect to a given property; (b) to identify and locate the
current holder of any such lien; (c) to determine the amounts currently
owed on any such lien; and (d) to transfer to the current holder of the lien
all or a portion of the tax payments the municipality has received. Such an
interpretation would run afoul of the tenet of statutory construction requiring
us to interpret statutes in a manner that avoids bizarre or unworkable results.
See Wilkins v. Connecticut Childbirth & Women’s Center, 314 Conn. 709,
723, 104 A.3d 671 (2014) (‘‘[i]t is axiomatic that [w]e must interpret the
statute so that it does not lead to absurd or unworkable results’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
8
General Statutes § 12-195h provides in relevant part: ‘‘(d) The assignee,
or any subsequent assignee, shall provide written notice of an assignment,
not later than sixty days after the date of such assignment, to the owner
and any holder of a mortgage, on the real property that is the subject of
the assignment, provided such owner or holder is of record as of the date
of such assignment. Such notice shall include information sufficient to iden-
tify (1) the property that is subject to the lien and in which the holder has
an interest, (2) the name and addresses of the assignee, and (3) the amount
of unpaid taxes, interest and fees being assigned relative to the subject
property as of the date of the assignment.
‘‘(e) Not less than sixty days prior to commencing an action to foreclose
a lien under this section, the assignee shall provide a written notice, by
first-class mail, to the holders of all first or second security interests on the
property subject to the lien that were recorded before the date the assess-
ment the lien sought to be enforced became delinquent. Such notice shall
set forth: (1) The amount of unpaid debt owed to the assignee as of the
date of the notice; (2) the amount of any attorney’s fees and costs incurred
by the assignee in the enforcement of the lien as of the date of the notice;
(3) a statement of the assignee’s intention to foreclose the lien if the amounts
set forth pursuant to subdivisions (1) and (2) of this subsection are not paid
to the assignee on or before sixty days after the date the notice is provided;
(4) the assignee’s contact information, including, but not limited to, the
assignee’s name, mailing address, telephone number and electronic mail
address, if any; and (5) instructions concerning the acceptable means of
making a payment on the amounts owed to the assignee as set forth pursuant
to subdivisions (1) and (2) of this subsection. Any notice required under
this subsection shall be effective upon the date such notice is provided. . . .’’