Strauss v. Strauss

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TAMI G. STRAUSS v. MARK E. STRAUSS
(AC 44693)
Bright, C. J., and Elgo and Suarez, Js.
Syllabus
The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dis-
solved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court
denying his postjudgment motion to vacate a series of orders finding
him in contempt for his failure to comply with the parties’ separation
agreement, which had been incorporated into the judgment of dissolu-
tion. The plaintiff filed two motions for contempt in 2014, alleging that
the defendant failed to comply with the court’s orders that had been
issued in response to her fifteen prior motions for contempt. The defen-
dant failed to appear for a hearing on the 2014 motions, and the court
found him in contempt for his failure to provide to the plaintiff his life
insurance information, to pay child support, to contribute to certain
required expenses and to pay her attorney’s fees. At a subsequent hear-
ing, the court incarcerated the defendant for one week for his failure
to purge the contempt. After a third hearing in 2014, the court found
that the defendant was still in contempt and issued additional orders,
from which the defendant neither appealed nor filed a motion to reargue.
In 2019, the plaintiff filed another motion for contempt. In 2020, the
defendant filed a motion to vacate the 2014 contempt orders, arguing
that the orders were issued, and he was incarcerated, in violation of
his constitutional rights because he was absent from the initial 2014
hearing due to a serious heart condition. The court denied the motion
to vacate, concluding that it lacked the authority to overturn a judgment
of contempt rendered five years previously when the defendant alleged
the court committed error in its judgment. Thereafter, the court denied
the defendant’s motion to stay the trial court proceedings during the
pendency of this appeal. Held:
1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court incorrectly
concluded that it did not have the authority to vacate the 2014 contempt
orders, which was based on his claim that a court retains inherent
equitable authority to vacate a contempt order beyond the four month
deadline imposed by the applicable statute (§ 52-212a) and rule of prac-
tice (§ 17-4 (a)): although trial courts have limited continuing authority
to vacate an order of civil contempt on the ground that the contemnor
purged the contempt, nothing in the case law relied on by the defendant
suggested that courts have continuing authority to vacate a civil con-
tempt finding on any other basis, and the defendant did not seek to
vacate the 2014 contempt orders because he purged the contempt but,
rather, because the court improperly found him in contempt; moreover,
although trial courts have continuing authority to effectuate prior judg-
ments, courts are not permitted to substantively modify or correct prior
judgments, and, in this case, the defendant’s motion to vacate did not
seek to vindicate the 2014 orders but, rather, to vitiate them.
2. This court declined to review the defendant’s claim that the trial court
improperly denied his motion to stay the proceedings during the pen-
dency of this appeal; the defendant’s claim was not properly before this
court because the defendant failed to file a motion for review of the
trial court’s decision pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 66-
6), and, although the defendant characterized his motion to stay not as
a request for an appellate stay but, instead, as a request that the court
continue a hearing on the 2019 motion for contempt until the conclusion
of this appeal, this characterization was belied by the relief sought in
his motion to stay and the claims raised in his principal appellate brief
challenging the court’s actions regarding the appellate stay.
Argued November 7, 2022—officially released June 27, 2023
Procedural History
Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
trict of Danbury, where the court, Hon. Sidney Axelrod,
judge trial referee, rendered judgment dissolving the
marriage and granting certain other relief in accordance
with the parties’ separation agreement; thereafter, the
court, Winslow, J., found the defendant in contempt;
subsequently, the court, Hon. Heidi G. Winslow, judge
trial referee, denied the defendant’s motion to open
and vacate the court’s findings of contempt, and the
defendant appealed to this court; thereafter, the court,
Nascimento, J., denied the defendant’s motion to stay
the proceedings, and the defendant filed an amended
appeal. Affirmed.
James P. Sexton, with whom were Thomas D. Colin,
and, on the brief, Megan L. Wade, for the appellant
(defendant).
Alexander Copp, with whom was Rachel A. Pencu,
for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion
ELGO, J. The defendant, Mark E. Strauss, appeals
from the judgment of the trial court denying his post-
judgment motion to vacate a series of orders finding him
in contempt for his failure to comply with a separation
agreement that he entered into with the plaintiff, Tami
G. Strauss, in connection with the underlying judgment
dissolving their marriage. On appeal, the defendant
claims that the court improperly (1) concluded that it
lacked authority to vacate its prior contempt orders,
and (2) denied his motion to stay the trial court proceed-
ings during the pendency of this appeal. We affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
The following undisputed facts and procedural his-
tory are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. In
September, 2006, the court dissolved the marriage of
the parties. The court incorporated into the judgment
of dissolution the parties’ comprehensive separation
agreement (agreement). With respect to the parties’
daughter, who was born in 2000, the agreement required
that the defendant pay to the plaintiff weekly child
support and to contribute a percentage of expenses,
including day care, summer camp, insurance, and unre-
imbursed medical expenses. The agreement also
required the defendant to maintain life insurance, nam-
ing the plaintiff as trustee and their daughter as the
beneficiary, and to furnish proof of this insurance to
the plaintiff at her request, no more than twice annually.
Between 2007 and 2011, the parties engaged in a
protracted contest regarding their obligations pursuant
to the agreement, which resulted in more than 100
docket entries. During that time period, the plaintiff
filed at least fifteen motions for contempt requesting
that the defendant comply with his obligations pursuant
to the agreement. The court granted relief with respect
to at least five of the plaintiff’s motions for contempt
and ordered, inter alia, that the defendant provide to the
plaintiff (1) past due child support, day care expenses,
camp expenses, health insurance premiums, unreim-
bursed medical expenses, (2) proof of life insurance,
and (3) attorney’s fees incurred in the prosecution of
the motions. The case then was dormant for three years.
On April 9, 2014, the plaintiff filed another motion
for contempt in which she outlined the extensive proce-
dural history of the case and contended that the defen-
dant had failed to comply with the court’s prior orders
issued in response to her fifteen prior motions for con-
tempt. As for relief, the plaintiff requested that the court
order the defendant to pay her $112,573.53, which
amount represented past due child support, day care
expenses, camp expenses, health insurance premiums,
unreimbursed medical expenses, and attorney’s fees.
The plaintiff also requested that the defendant be
ordered to provide her with proof of life insurance, and
that the defendant be incarcerated until he complied
with the court’s orders.
On June 30, 2014, the court held a hearing on the
plaintiff’s motion for contempt. At the hearing, the
defendant requested a brief continuance so that he
could retain counsel,1 and so that he could produce an
updated financial affidavit because his financial situa-
tion was, in his view, ‘‘particularly complex . . . .’’ The
court orally granted the defendant’s request and contin-
ued the hearing on the motion for contempt to August
4, 2014. Also on June 30, 2014, the court issued an
order requiring the defendant to pay child support by
immediate wage withholding, produce certain financial
documents to the plaintiff, and provide an updated
financial affidavit by July 14, 2014. On July 25, 2014,
the plaintiff filed another motion for contempt on the
ground that the defendant failed to provide anything to
the plaintiff in violation of the court’s June 30, 2014
order. After several continuances at the request of the
defendant, the court scheduled the hearing on the plain-
tiff’s April 9 and July 25, 2014 motions for contempt
for September 2, 2014, at 9:30 a.m.
Only the plaintiff and her counsel appeared at the
September 2, 2014 hearing.2 At the hearing, the plaintiff
testified that the defendant had failed to comply with
the terms of the agreement and the court’s previous
contempt orders. The plaintiff also testified that the
defendant did not provide any documents in response
to the court’s June 30, 2014 order. On the same date,
the court issued a written order finding the defendant
in contempt for his failure to provide to the plaintiff
his life insurance information, to pay child support, to
contribute the required childcare expenses, and to pay
her attorney’s fees. The court ordered the defendant to
be incarcerated, but it stayed the order for three weeks,
until September 22, 2014, to provide the defendant an
opportunity to purge the full amount that he owed to
the plaintiff, $145,578.36.
On September 22, 2014, both parties appeared for a
hearing to determine whether the defendant had purged
the contempt. The defendant explained that he was
unable to attend the September 2, 2014 hearing and
offered to present medical documents supporting his
absence. The court said it would ‘‘make a note of it,’’
incarcerated the defendant because he failed to satisfy
the purge amount, set his bond at $10,000, and contin-
ued the matter for one week.
On September 29, 2014, after the defendant had been
incarcerated for one week, the parties appeared for
another hearing. The defendant requested that the court
lift the bond so that he could be released from incarcera-
tion and have time to speak to an attorney and to negoti-
ate a payment schedule to settle his outstanding arrear-
age. The court did not modify its finding of contempt,
but it lifted the bond and continued the matter for fifteen
days to permit the defendant an opportunity to provide
proof of life insurance, to make arrangements to pay
the plaintiff, and to obtain an attorney. The court
warned the defendant that he should make his best
efforts to resolve this matter or else he would be at
risk of being incarcerated again.3
On October 14, 2014, the parties again appeared
before the court. At the hearing, the defendant provided
to the plaintiff $1000 as a contribution toward the
arrearage and presented satisfactory proof that he main-
tained life insurance. The defendant explained that,
despite his poor financial circumstances, he actively
was seeking employment and offered to prospectively
pay the plaintiff $1000 per month to satisfy the arrear-
age. The defendant also entered into evidence a letter
authored by his physician, which explained his cardio-
vascular condition. See footnote 2 of this opinion. At
the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that the
defendant was still in contempt due to his inadequate
efforts to contribute toward the substantial arrearage
that he owed to the plaintiff. The court additionally
ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff $1248.20 per
month. The defendant did not file an appeal from or a
motion to reargue the court’s September 2, 22, and 29,
and October 14, 2014 contempt orders (collectively,
2014 contempt orders).
Approximately five years later, on September 13,
2019, the plaintiff filed another motion for contempt
contending that the defendant had failed and refused
to remit the $1248.20 monthly payments to her. The
plaintiff represented that the outstanding amount
totaled $222,205.71, which accounted for sporadic pay-
ments made by the defendant. On January 22, 2020,
the defendant filed an opposition contending that the
plaintiff could not prove that he wilfully violated any
of the court’s orders.
On January 22, 2020, the defendant filed a motion to
vacate the court’s 2014 contempt orders. The defendant
argued that the 2014 contempt orders were issued, and
he was incarcerated for one week, in violation of his
constitutional rights because he was absent from the
September 2, 2014 hearing due to a serious heart condi-
tion.
On January 22, 2020, the court heard arguments on
the defendant’s motion to vacate.4 The plaintiff’s coun-
sel argued that the court should deny the motion to
vacate because the court lacked the authority to vacate
the 2014 contempt orders on the basis that those orders
were entered more than five years ago, well beyond
the four month time limitation for opening or setting
aside a judgment pursuant to General Statutes § 52-
212a.5 In response, the defendant’s counsel argued that
the court had authority to consider the defendant’s
motion to vacate because the 2014 contempt orders
were ‘‘fundamentally flawed’’ and ‘‘constitutionally
infirm . . . .’’ The defendant’s counsel also argued that
the court has inherent authority to correct its judgments
at any point in time. The court orally denied the motion
to vacate, stating that, even if the contempt orders
improperly were entered, there was ‘‘no basis in law,
fact or procedure for a motion to vacate five years after
the fact.’’
On February 11, 2020, the defendant filed a motion
to reargue the court’s decision denying his motion to
vacate. The defendant argued that the court has inher-
ent authority to vacate the 2014 contempt orders as
part of its power to vindicate prior judgments. The
plaintiff filed an objection, arguing that the court should
deny the motion to reargue because there was no basis
to vacate the 2014 contempt orders five years after they
were entered. After a hearing, on September 28, 2020,
the court granted the defendant’s motion to reargue
and vacated its January 22, 2020 order denying the
defendant’s motion to vacate. The court stated that,
‘‘[u]pon reconsideration, the court agrees with the
defendant that the court does have jurisdiction and
continuing inherent authority to modify or vacate prior
findings and rulings entered to enforce the court’s judg-
ments.’’ Accordingly, the court scheduled an evidentiary
hearing on the defendant’s motion to vacate for October
27, 2020, which was continued to May 26, 2021.
Prior to that scheduled hearing, the court issued a
memorandum of decision, dated April 28, 2021, in which
it denied the defendant’s motion to vacate.6 The court
concluded that it lacked the ‘‘authority to overturn and
rehear a judgment of contempt rendered five years pre-
viously when the contemnor alleges the court commit-
ted error in the judgment.’’ The court reasoned that
the remedy for the defendant to challenge the 2014
contempt orders was to file an appeal, a motion to
reargue, or a timely motion to open those orders in
2014. The court further held that, although there are
statutes that permit the opening and modification of
judgments in the ‘‘family law arena’’—General Statutes
§§ 46b-56, 46b-63, 46b-65, 46b-84, and 46b-86—none of
these apply to a contempt order. This appeal followed.
During the pendency of this appeal, on February 24,
2022, the defendant filed with the trial court a motion
to stay, pursuant to Practice Book § 61-11, in which
he requested that the court either ‘‘[1] clarify that an
automatic stay precludes the plaintiff or the court from
[taking] any action on the plaintiff’s September 13, 2019
motion for contempt, which seeks enforcement of [the]
2014 contempt orders, or, alternatively, to [2] order that
any action regarding the plaintiff’s September 13, 2019
motion for contempt be stayed during the pendency of
the defendant’s appeal.’’7 On April 27, 2022, the plaintiff
filed a memorandum of law in opposition contending
that there is no appellate stay in effect and, alternatively,
that there was no basis for the imposition of a discre-
tionary appellate stay.
On May 17, 2022, the trial court, after hearing argu-
ments from both parties, orally denied the defendant’s
motion to stay. The court reasoned that an automatic
stay did not apply because Practice Book § 61-11 (c)
exempts family matters from the automatic appellate
stay. The court also held that a discretionary appellate
stay was not appropriate because it was not sufficiently
likely that the defendant would prevail in this appeal.
The defendant filed an amended appeal to challenge this
order. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
I
The defendant first claims that the court improperly
concluded that it lacked authority to vacate the 2014
contempt orders. Specifically, the defendant argues
that, although § 52-212a and Practice Book § 17-4 (a)
require that a motion to vacate be filed within four
months after the notice of the judgment it seeks to
vacate was sent, a court retains inherent equitable
authority to vacate a contempt order beyond this four
month deadline. He contends that a trial court retains
authority, in perpetuity, to vacate a judgment of con-
tempt on the ground that the contemnor improperly
was found in contempt. We disagree.
We begin with the standard of review and relevant
legal principles. Whether the trial court had the author-
ity to vacate a judgment is a question of law over which
we exercise plenary review. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
v. Treglia, 156 Conn. App. 1, 9, 111 A.3d 524 (2015);
East Haven Builders Supply, Inc. v. Fanton, 80 Conn.
App. 734, 737, 837 A.2d 866 (2004).
‘‘Generally, courts recognize a compelling interest in
the finality of judgments which should not lightly be
disregarded. Finality of litigation is essential so that
parties may rely on judgments in ordering their private
affairs and so that the moral force of court judgments
will not be undermined. The law favors finality of judg-
ments . . . . This court has emphasized that due con-
sideration of the finality of judgments is important and
that judgments should only be set aside or opened for
a strong and compelling reason. . . . It is in the interest
of the public as well as that of the parties [that] there
must be fixed a time after the expiration of which the
controversy is to be regarded as settled and the parties
freed of obligation to act further in the matter by virtue
of having been summoned into or having appeared in
the case. . . . Without such a rule, no judgment could
be relied on.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Ruiz v. Victory Properties, LLC, 180
Conn. App. 818, 828, 184 A.3d 1254 (2018).
‘‘Although it is undisputed that courts of general juris-
diction have the inherent power to open, correct, or
modify their own judgments, the duration of this power
is restricted by statute and rule of practice.’’ (Emphasis
added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 829. In
particular, both § 52-212a and Practice Book § 17-4 con-
strain ‘‘the trial court’s general authority to grant relief
from a final judgment’’ by mandating that a motion to
open or to set aside must be filed within four months
following the date on which the notice of judgment was
sent. See id.; see also D2E Holdings, LLC v. Corp. for
Urban Home Ownership of New Haven, 212 Conn. App.
694, 718, 277 A.3d 261, cert. denied, 345 Conn. 904, 282
A.3d 981 (2022). Section 52-212a provides in relevant
part: ‘‘Unless otherwise provided by law and except in
such cases in which the court has continuing jurisdic-
tion, a civil judgment or decree rendered in the Superior
Court may not be opened or set aside unless a motion
to open or set aside is filed within four months following
the date on which the notice of judgment or decree was
sent. . . .’’ Likewise, Practice Book § 17-4 (a) provides:
‘‘Unless otherwise provided by law and except in such
cases in which the court has continuing jurisdiction,
any civil judgment or decree rendered in the Superior
Court may not be opened or set aside unless a motion
to open or set aside is filed within four months suc-
ceeding the date on which notice was sent. The parties
may waive the provisions of this subsection or other-
wise submit to the jurisdiction of the court.’’8
In the present case, the defendant filed his motion
to vacate in January, 2020, more than five years after the
2014 contempt orders he sought to vacate. Recognizing
that his motion to vacate was filed far beyond the four
month limitation, the defendant argues that a trial court
retains authority to vacate a judgment beyond the four
month limitation on two different grounds.9 First, he
contends that a trial court retains authority to vacate
a contempt order at any point in time. Second, he argues
that a trial court has inherent equitable authority to
vacate a contempt order so as to vindicate an underlying
dissolution decree.
With respect to his first argument, the defendant
relies exclusively on a quotation from Eric S. v. Tiffany
S., 143 Conn. App. 1, 9, 68 A.3d 139 (2013), in which
this court stated: ‘‘After a finding of civil contempt, the
court retains jurisdiction to vacate the finding or to give
the contemnor the opportunity to purge the contempt
by later compliance with a court order.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Id., quoting Monsam v. Dearing-
ton, 82 Conn. App. 451, 456–57, 844 A.2d 927 (2004).
We do not read this quotation, in isolation, as extending
a court’s continuing authority to vacate a contempt
order, in perpetuity, on the basis that the contemnor
contends they improperly were found in contempt.
Instead, reading Eric S. and Monsam together, this
quotation properly is understood as affording a trial
court limited continuing authority to vacate an order
of civil contempt on the specific ground that the con-
temnor has purged the contempt.
In both Eric S. and Monsam, this court articulated
the distinction between criminal contempt and civil
contempt. As for civil contempt, this court held that a
contemnor has the opportunity to purge the contempt
by later compliance with a trial court’s order and, conse-
quently, the trial court retains continuing authority to
vacate a judgment of civil contempt on that basis
because ‘‘[c]ivil contempt is designed to compel future
compliance’’ and a trial court has the power to incarcer-
ate contemnors in civil contempt cases until they purge
themselves. Eric S. v. Tiffany S., supra, 143 Conn. App.
9–11; Monsam v. Dearington, supra, 82 Conn. App.
456–57. On the other hand, criminal contempt is puni-
tive in nature and the contemnor has no opportunity
to purge the contempt and, thus, a trial court has no
continuing authority to vacate a sentence imposed as
a result of a criminal contempt. Eric S. v. Tiffany S.,
supra, 10–11; Monsam v. Dearington, supra, 458–59.
Accordingly, the applicable rule drawn from Eric S. and
Monsam is that a trial court retains limited continuing
authority to vacate a civil contempt finding if the con-
temnor purges the contempt. Nothing in these cases
suggests that the court has continuing authority to
vacate a civil contempt finding on any other basis.
It is logical that a trial court would retain limited
continuing authority to vacate a contempt order to per-
mit the contemnor the opportunity to purge the con-
tempt because a purge of contempt does not automati-
cally vacate a contempt order. ‘‘[A] finding of contempt
is not necessarily vacated because the violator has
purged himself. On the contrary, a contempt finding has
collateral consequences, even when no longer active,
unless or until it is vacated or rendered invalid.’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v. Clark, 113
Conn. App. 611, 619, 967 A.2d 1222 (2009); see also
Kendall v. Pilkington, 253 Conn. 264, 278 n.7, 750 A.2d
1090 (2000). ‘‘Although it could do so, a court is not
required, however, to vacate its judgment after a con-
temnor has purged himself or herself of the contemptu-
ous acts.’’ Hall v. Hall, 182 Conn. App. 736, 755 n.11,
191 A.3d 182 (2018), aff’d, 335 Conn. 377, 238 A.3d
687 (2020).
Here, the defendant, in his motion to vacate, did not
seek to vacate the 2014 contempt orders because he
had purged his contempt but, rather, because the court
improperly found him in contempt. Therefore, the
defendant’s motion did not fall within the court’s contin-
uing authority to vacate a contempt order pursuant to
Eric S. and Monsam. The defendant has provided us
with no authority, and we have found none, extending
a court’s continuing authority to vacate a contempt
order in perpetuity on the basis that the contemnor
contends that he improperly was found in contempt.
This court, in fact, has previously held to the contrary.
See, e.g., CFM of Connecticut, Inc. v. Chowdhury, 38
Conn. App. 745, 749, 662 A.2d 1340 (1995) (trial court
lacked authority to vacate sanctions order stemming
from motion for contempt three years after finding of
contempt because parties did not waive provisions of
§ 52-212a or otherwise submit to jurisdiction of trial
court), aff’d, 239 Conn. 375, 685 A.2d 1108 (1996). In
light of the compelling interest in the finality of judg-
ments; Ruiz v. Victory Properties, LLC, supra, 180
Conn. App. 828; we decline to extend the court’s limited
continuing authority to vacate a contempt finding in
perpetuity on the basis that the contempt finding was
improper. Consequently, we disagree with the defen-
dant’s first argument.
With respect to his second argument, the defendant
is correct that a trial court has continuing authority
to effectuate its prior judgments. ‘‘[T]he trial court’s
continuing jurisdiction to effectuate its prior judgments,
either by summarily ordering compliance with a clear
judgment or by interpreting an ambiguous judgment
and entering orders to effectuate the judgment as inter-
preted, is grounded in its inherent powers, and is not
limited to cases wherein the noncompliant party is in
contempt, family cases, cases involving injunctions, or
cases wherein the parties have agreed to continuing
jurisdiction.’’ AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. Plan &
Zoning Commission, 260 Conn. 232, 246, 796 A.2d 1164(2002). ‘‘Although ordinarily our trial courts lack juris-
diction to act in a case after the passage of four months
. . . there are exceptions. One exception arises when
the exercise of jurisdiction is necessary to effectuate
prior judgments or otherwise enforceable orders.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Veneziano v. Vene-
ziano, 205 Conn. App. 718, 728, 259 A.3d 28 (2021); see
also Tracey v. Miami Beach Assn., 216 Conn. App.
379, 397, 288 A.3d 629 (2022) (trial court has equitable
powers to fashion whatever orders are required to pro-
tect integrity of earlier judgment), cert. denied, 346
Conn. 919, 291 A.3d 1040 (2023).
Conversely, a trial court’s continuing authority to
effectuate its judgments beyond the four month period
does not permit it to substantively modify or correct
its prior judgments. See, e.g., Almeida v. Almeida, 190
Conn. App. 760, 765, 213 A.3d 28 (2019). ‘‘This court has
explained the difference between postjudgment orders
that modify a judgment rather than effectuate it. A modi-
fication is [a] change; an alteration or amendment which
introduces new elements into the details, or cancels
some of them, but leaves the general purpose and effect
of the subject-matter intact. . . . In contrast, an order
effectuating an existing judgment allows the court to
protect the integrity of its original ruling by ensuring
the parties’ timely compliance therewith.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Walzer v. Walzer, 209 Conn.
App. 604, 615, 268 A.3d 1187, cert. denied, 342 Conn.
907, 270 A.3d 693 (2022); see also Cunningham v. Cun-
ningham, 204 Conn. App. 366, 374, 254 A.3d 330 (2021).
In the present case, the defendant’s motion to vacate
did not seek to effectuate, vindicate, or protect the
integrity of the 2014 contempt orders. To the contrary,
the defendant’s motion to vacate sought to do the com-
plete opposite, namely, to vitiate the 2014 contempt
orders. Therefore, the trial court did not have continu-
ing authority to grant the motion to vacate because it
represented an attempt to void, not to effectuate, the
substantive terms of the 2014 contempt orders. We
reject the defendant’s second argument on this basis.
In sum, if the defendant wanted to challenge the
court’s 2014 contempt orders, his remedy was to file a
timely appeal, a timely motion to reargue, or a motion
to open or vacate within the four months following the
2014 contempt orders. The defendant having forgone
those options, the trial court lacked the authority to
vacate those orders on the ground that it had five years
earlier improperly found the defendant in contempt.
We therefore conclude that the court properly denied
the defendant’s motion to vacate.
II
The defendant also claims that the trial court improp-
erly denied his motion to stay the trial court proceedings
during the pendency of this appeal. Specifically, the
defendant argues that the court improperly concluded
that there was no automatic appellate stay in effect
pursuant to Practice Book § 61-11 and, alternatively,
that the court improperly declined to impose a discre-
tionary appellate stay. In response, the plaintiff con-
tends that this court should decline to review this claim
because a claim regarding an appellate stay cannot be
raised on direct appeal.10 We agree with the plaintiff and,
accordingly, decline to review the defendant’s claim.
‘‘Pursuant to Practice Book § 61-14, [t]he sole remedy
of any party desiring the court to review an order con-
cerning a stay of execution shall be by motion for review
under Section 66-6. Issues regarding a stay of execution
cannot be raised on direct appeal.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Doe v. Bemer, 215 Conn. App. 504, 528,
283 A.3d 1074 (2022). ‘‘Practice Book § 66-6 requires
that [m]otions for review . . . be filed within ten days
from the issuance of notice of the order sought to be
reviewed. . . . If a party does not file a motion for
review, that party is precluded from challenging the
court’s stay order by means of a direct appeal.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) De Almeida-Kennedy v. Ken-
nedy, 207 Conn. App. 244, 258, 262 A.3d 872 (2021).
As outlined previously, on February 24, 2022, the
defendant filed with the trial court a motion to stay
pursuant to Practice Book § 61-11, in which he
requested that the trial court either ‘‘[1] clarify that an
automatic stay precludes the plaintiff or the court from
[taking] any action on the plaintiff’s September 13, 2019
motion for contempt, which seeks enforcement of [the]
2014 contempt orders, or, alternatively, to [2] order that
any action regarding the plaintiff’s September 13, 2019
motion for contempt be stayed during the pendency of
the defendant’s appeal.’’ On May 17, 2022, the trial court,
after hearing arguments from both parties, orally denied
the defendant’s motion to stay. The defendant filed an
amended appeal to challenge this order, but he did not
file a motion for review with respect to the court’s
denial of his motion to stay.
Applying the foregoing principles, we conclude that
the defendant improperly presented this issue for reso-
lution on direct appeal because he failed to file a motion
for review of the trial court’s decision denying his
motion to stay. See, e.g., U.S. Bank, National Assn. v.
Bennett, 195 Conn. App. 96, 110 n.4, 223 A.3d 381 (2019);
Lawrence v. Cords, 165 Conn. App. 473, 479–80, 139
A.3d 778, cert. denied, 322 Conn. 907, 140 A.3d 221(2016); Clark v. Clark, 150 Conn. App. 551, 576, 91 A.3d
944 (2014). In his appellate reply brief, the defendant
characterizes his motion to stay not as a request for an
appellate stay but, instead, as a request that the court
continue a hearing on the plaintiff’s September 13, 2019
motion for contempt until after this appeal concluded.
This characterization is belied by the relief sought in his
motion to stay and the appellate claims in his principal
appellate brief challenging the court’s actions regarding
the appellate stay. We therefore decline to review his
claim.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
1
Although it is not clear from the trial court file, the defendant was
represented by counsel from the outset of this dissolution action through
April, 2009. The defendant then proceeded as a self-represented party from
April, 2009, through May, 2015, when he again retained counsel.
2
According to a memorandum to the trial court file authored by a tempo-
rary assistant clerk, the defendant called to inform the caseflow coordinator
on the morning of the September 2, 2014 hearing that he would not be
in attendance because he suffered a cardiovascular event that required
emergency medical treatment. At 9:32 a.m., the caseflow coordinator con-
veyed the defendant’s message to the clerk via email, however, the clerk
did not read the email until noon during a recess. The clerk then informed
the court of the defendant’s message, but the matter already had been heard
and the orders already had been issued.
At a hearing on October 14, 2014, the defendant entered into evidence a
letter authored by the defendant’s physician, Robert Labarre, of Cardiology
Physicians of Fairfield County, LLC, addressing the defendant’s cardiovascu-
lar condition. The letter explained that, on August 5, 2014, the defendant
was sent from his oral surgeon’s office to Stamford Hospital because he
had very low blood pressure, and was near syncope, sweaty, and feeling
dizzy. On the morning of September 2, 2014, the defendant called his physi-
cian before admitting himself to Stamford Hospital because he was suffering
from similar conditions to those he experienced on August 5, 2014. The
defendant then proceeded to the Cardiology Physicians of Fairfield County,
LLC, where an echocardiogram revealed a severe left ventricular outflow
obstruction, and that his blood pressure was significantly elevated. The
defendant was discharged with instructions to take prescribed medication,
go home, rest, and not to drive.
3
Particularly, the court stated: ‘‘By the way, I have a relative who has [a
medical] condition very similar to the health description that you gave me
last time, so, I’m aware of what can or cannot be done with regard to your
health issue. It’s one of the reasons I had no hesitation about incarcerating
be here on October 14 without fail.’’ Although the propriety of this comment
is not at issue in this appeal, we emphasize that ‘‘attitudes garnered from
personal life experience cannot serve as a substitute for properly admitted
evidence . . . .’’ Schimenti v. Schimenti, 181 Conn. App. 385, 402, 186 A.3d
739 (2018).
4
The hearing initially was intended to be only for the plaintiff’s September
13, 2019 motion for contempt; nevertheless, the parties agreed that the court
should first decide the defendant’s motion to vacate.
5
We note that § 52-212a was amended effective June 28, 2021, after the
events at issue in this appeal; see Public Acts 2021, No. 21-104, § 44; those
amendments, however, have no bearing on the merits of this appeal. In the
interest of simplicity, we refer to the current revision of the statute.
6
We note that this April 28, 2021 order was the result of an uncommon
sequence of events. Although Judge Winslow issued the 2014 contempt
orders, Judge Truglia made the initial rulings on the defendant’s motion to
vacate, including the initial denial of that motion, the vacatur of that denial,
and the scheduling of an evidentiary hearing on the motion. Then, it was
Judge Winslow who issued the April 28, 2021 decision denying the motion
to vacate prior to the hearing ordered by Judge Truglia. In response to a
motion for articulation filed by the plaintiff during the pendency of this
appeal, Judge Winslow explained, ‘‘[b]ecause it was a contempt order by
Judge Winslow in 2014, that the defendant wished to vacate, Judge Truglia
decided, with the concurrence of Judge Winslow, that the latter was the
appropriate judge to consider the defendant’s motion to vacate . . . . Judge
Winslow reviewed the file. Judge Winslow approached Judge Truglia to
inquire whether he felt his reversal of his initial decision on the motion to
vacate was in any way binding on Judge Winslow, and whether an evidentiary
hearing was mandatory or necessary if Judge Winslow made a contrary
finding. Judge Truglia responded that Judge Winslow was not in any way
bound by his decision and there were no restrictions whatsoever.’’ On August
16, 2021, the defendant filed an expedited motion for supervision seeking
to have Judge Winslow removed from the case, which this court denied.
Nevertheless, the defendant does not raise a legal claim on appeal challeng-
ing the manner in which Judge Winslow exercised control over the proceed-
ings on the motion to vacate.
7
Previously, on November 24, 2021, the defendant filed a motion to stay
requesting that the trial court stay the proceedings before it on the plaintiff’s
September 13, 2019 motion for contempt pending the resolution of his appeal
from the court’s denial of his motion to vacate. The parties fully briefed
this motion, and it was scheduled to be heard on May 17, 2022. No action
was taken on the defendant’s November 24, 2021 motion to stay because
he later filed the February 24, 2022 motion to stay, which amended and
superseded the November 24, 2021 motion to stay.
8
Both § 52-212a and Practice Book § 17-4 (a), as well as the case law
applying those provisions, characterize the issue as involving the trial court’s
‘‘jurisdiction.’’ Nevertheless, our Supreme Court has made clear that the
four month rule pursuant to § 52-212a and Practice Book § 17-4 (a) ‘‘operates
as a constraint, not on the trial court’s jurisdictional authority, but on its
substantive authority to adjudicate the merits of the case before it.’’ Kim
v. Magnotta, 249 Conn. 94, 104, 733 A.2d 809 (1999); see also Wolfork v.
Yale Medical Group, 335 Conn. 448, 465–66, 239 A.3d 272 (2020) (recognizing
‘‘subtle, but critical, distinction’’ between trial court’s authority and subject
matter jurisdiction).
9
‘‘It is [also] well established that [a] judgment rendered may be opened
after the four month limitation . . . if it is shown that the judgment was
obtained by fraud, in the absence of actual consent, or because of mutual
mistake.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Bemer, 215 Conn. App.
504, 514, 283 A.3d 1074 (2022). The defendant does not rely on these other
exceptions to the four month limitation.
10
On September 16, 2022, the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss this aspect
of the defendant’s appeal on the same ground. On October 5, 2022, this
court deferred decision on the plaintiff’s motion to the panel considering
the merits of the appeal. We now address the issue raised in the plaintiff’s
motion to dismiss, namely, whether the defendant improperly presented
this claim for resolution on direct appeal because he failed to file a motion
for review of the trial court’s decision denying his motion to stay.