DocketNumber: AC 21759
Citation Numbers: 71 Conn. App. 1
Judges: Foti
Filed Date: 7/9/2002
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 9/8/2022
Opinion
The defendants in these consolidated criminal cases appeal following the trial court’s denial of their motion to dismiss the charges against them.
The following facts underlie the claim before us. In July, 1999, counsel from the office of the attorney general, on behalf of the commissioner of environmental protection (commissioner), instituted a civil action against the defendants and several other parties. The commissioner alleged that the defendants had violated various solid waste management and water pollution laws. In September, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment in the commissioner’s favor and, inter alia, ordered the defendants to complete specific remedial measures, enjoined the defendants from engaging in certain conduct and required the defendants to obtain regulatory approval before conducting certain activities. The court also imposed a $1,380,900 civil penalty under General Statutes § 22a-226 for solid waste viola
In November, 1999, the state charged the defendants with criminal violations of several of the state’s environmental laws.
We first set forth our standard of review. “Our standard of review of a trial court’s . . . conclusions of law in connection with a motion to dismiss is well settled. . . . [W]here the legal conclusions of the court
It is well settled that a defendant may face both criminal and civil sanctions for the same conduct. The double jeopardy clause “protects only against the imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the same offense . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99, 118 S. Ct. 488, 139 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1997). The issue before us is whether the sanctions available under § 22a-226 are civil or criminal in nature. If they fall into the latter category, the continued prosecution would violate the defendants’ double jeopardy rights.
This court, in State v. Duke, 48 Conn. App. 71, 708 A.2d 583, cert. denied, 244 Conn. 911, 713 A.2d 829 (1998), applied a two part analysis to determine if a sanction is criminal or civil in nature for purposes of double jeopardy. The first part of the analysis focuses on whether the sanction, by its nature, is punitive or remedial. Among the factors to consider in this analysis are whether “(1) it involves an affirmative disability or restraint, (2) it has historically been regarded as a punishment, (3) it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, (4) its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment, i.e., retribution and deterrence, (5) the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, (6) an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and (7) it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.” Id., 75.
The second part of the analysis comes into play if the legislature has in some way indicated its intention
We conclude, as did the trial court, that § 22a-226 is civil in nature and that the sanctions applicable under the statute serve predominantly remedial and compensatory interests. The statute permits the imposition of both monetary and remedial sanctions. These types of sanctions have not historically been regarded as punishment for criminal acts. The maximum monetary sanctions available under the statute, up to $25,000 per day, do not appear to be either retributive or excessive in light of the environmental concerns implicated under the statute. The statute permits the court to treat each day’s continuance of offending conduct as a separate and distinct offense, thereby permitting the ultimate award of monetary damages to be commensurate with the duration and impact of the offensive conduct. The statute does not provide for affirmative disability or restraint. Further, sanctions under the statute are not applicable only upon a finding of scienter. The statute applies to “[a]ny person who violates” an applicable solid waste law, regulation, permit or order to which it applies.
The defendants point out that the conduct to which § 22a-226 applies may also be criminal. In this case, the same conduct formed the basis for the criminal charges under General Statutes § 22a-226a. This “same conduct” consideration, however, is not dispositive and does not render criminal the sanction provided by the statute. See Hudson v. United States, supra, 522 U.S. 105. Further, the defendants argue that the sanctions impose
Despite the fact that the statute’s monetary penalties undoubtedly achieve a deterrent purpose, we nonetheless conclude that this effect does not cause us to view the statute as imposing a criminal sanction. Deterrence is a traditional goal of criminal punishment, but deterrence may serve civil goals and does so in this case. As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, “all civil penalties have some deterrent effect. ... If a sanction must be ‘solely’ remedial (i.e., entirely nondeterrent) to avoid implicating the Double Jeopardy Clause, then no civil penalties are beyond the scope of the Clause.” (Citations omitted.) Hudson v. United States, supra, 522 U.S. 102. In an effort to enjoin violations of the solid waste management laws, to remedy any environmental destruction occasioned by such violations and to “prevent, control or abate pollution,” the imposition of the fines permitted by § 22a-226 serves legitimate remedial goals closely related to the environmental concerns protected by the statute. We do not find the sanctions available under the statute to be excessive in light of this alternate purpose of remediation costs and achieving deterrence.
Turning to the second part of our analysis, we conclude that the legislature’s intent as to this statute’s
The denial of the motion to dismiss is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
The four defendants involved in this appeal are Joseph J. Farricielli; Hamden Salvage, Inc.; Tire Salvage, Inc.; and Hamden Sand and Stone, Inc. Our use of the term defendants in this opinion refers to these four defendants.
The zoning enforcement officer for the town of Hamden (town) also was a plaintiff in the civil action against the defendants. The town brought an action against the defendants for violations of its regulations. The court awarded the town, in addition to other equitable relief, statutory fines and penalties totaling $1,416,910.
Specifically, the state charged that the defendants had violated General Statutes §§ 22a-208a, 22a-208c, 22a-225, 22a-226a, 22a-427, 22a-430 and 22a-438 (b).
We compare this language with that of General Statutes § 22a-226a, which imposes criminal liability on “[ajny person who knowingly violates” an applicable law, regulation, permit or order. (Emphasis added.)