DocketNumber: No. CV02-0462113
Citation Numbers: 2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 14370
Judges: ARNOLD, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 11/12/2002
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
The defendant argues that the First Count is insufficient as a matter of law because it fails to allege a violation of an important public policy. The Second Count is allegedly insufficient because it fails to allege a violation of important public policy or that VRI acted with a "sinister motive." The defendant argues that the Fourth Count fails because it is based on an employer-employee relationship. The Fifth Count, it is argued fails because the plaintiff has not alleged "extreme or outrageous" conduct by the defendant. Lastly, the defendant argues that the Sixth Count is insufficient as a matter of law because it does not allege unreasonable conduct in the termination process by the defendant.
The plaintiff has filed an objection to the motion to strike. However, the plaintiff has limited its objection only to that portion of the defendant's motion to strike which seeks the striking of the Fifth Count and the Sixth Count of the plaintiffs complaint. In reviewing the plaintiffs objections, the court cannot ascertain whether, in fact, the plaintiff has abandoned any objection to the striking of the First, Second and Fourth Counts. Therefore the court will review each of the defendant's arguments as to all counts to which the motion to strike is directed. CT Page 14371
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Mingachos v. CBS, Inc.,
A motion to strike "admits all facts well pleaded; it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings" (Emphasis omitted.) Id. "A motion to strike is properly granted where a plaintiffs complaint alleges legal conclusions unsupported by facts." Id. "In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint." Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority,
Upon deciding a motion to strike, the trial court must construe the "plaintiffs complaint in [a] manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency." Bouchard v. People's Bank,
In the First Count the plaintiff alleges that the defendant wrongfully discharged him from employment, causing him to lose wages and benefits and to suffer humiliation, embarrassment and mental anguish. "[T]he right to recover in tort for wrongful discharge extends only to employees at will." Tomlinson v. Board of Education,
In his complaint the plaintiff alleges that he was hired by the defendant as a "shipper" on or about August 7, 1999 and performed his duties until his discharge from this position, on January 23, 2001. He does not allege that the terms of his employment were that he was to be employed for a definite period of time. Accordingly, he is deemed to be an employee at will. Morris v. Hartford Courant Co.,
Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Food, Inc.,
In interpreting this exception, the courts have taken a narrow view. "We note our adherence to the principle that the public policy exception to the general rule allowing unfettered termination of an at-will employment relationship is a narrow one. . . . We are mindful that courts should not lightly intervene to impair the exercise of managerial discretion or to foment unwarranted litigation." Burnham v. Karl Geib, P.C.,
In Atkins v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co.,
There is a growing receptivity to recognize as actionable tort claims for wrongful discharge by an employer arising out of termination for an employee's refusal to commit perjury, for filing a workers' compensation claim, for engaging in union activity or for serving on a jury. Sheetsv. Teddy's Frosted Food Co., supra at 476-77. The court in Sheets determined that a cause of action for wrongful discharge will lie when the former employee can demonstrate an improper reason for the discharge, "a reason whose impropriety is derived from some important CT Page 14373 violation of public policy." Id., 475. Sheets warns, however, that courts should proceed cautiously in their consideration of whether a public policy violation exists. Id., 477; Thibodeau v. Design Group OneArchitects, LLC, supra, at 5 78-79.
"The issue then becomes the familiar common-law problem of deciding where and how to draw the line between claims that genuinely involve the mandates of public policy and are actionable, and ordinary disputes between employee and employer that are not. We are mindful that courts should not lightly intervene to impair the exercise of managerial discretion or to foment unwarranted litigation." Sheets v. Teddy'sFrosted Food Co., supra at 478. Later cases test and define the limits of an important violation of public policy. Because of the vagueness that inheres in the concept of public policy; Morris v. Hartford Courant Co., supra at 680; the court must make an analysis of employee claims in such cases. Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., supra at 588-89.
In Morris, the defendant employer cited misappropriation of company funds as its reason for the plaintiff employee's termination. The plaintiff had brought an action in tort for wrongful discharge, claiming that his employer's false accusations of criminal conduct violated public policy. Our Supreme Court determined that the plaintiffs claim of wrongful discharge did not fall within the narrow Sheets exception to the terminable at-will rule because the plaintiff had not identified any public policy that was "affronted by his termination." Id., 680. The plaintiff failed to allege a violation of any explicit statutory or constitutional provision. Id. Moreover, the plaintiff did not allege the contravention of any judicially conceived notion of public policy. Id. Our Supreme Court, therefore, held that an accusation of criminal conduct does not derive from an important violation of public policy and denied the plaintiffs requested relief. Id.
In the present case the plaintiff alleges that he was discharged by his employer the defendant after being accused of committing a larceny. InMorris the Supreme Court ruled that a "false but negligently made accusation of criminal conduct" does not violate public policy. Therefore the motion to strike the First Count is granted.
In the Second Count, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court agrees with the defendant, which argues that this is inconsistent. The First Count alleges a cause of action for wrongful discharge, available only to employees at will. The Second Count alleges an implied contract between the parties requiring that the plaintiff could not be discharged without "good cause." However, under either set of circumstances the Second Count CT Page 14374 fails.
The plaintiff has not alleged any facts or agreement between the parties to indicate the existence of an implied contract. Thus, the court determines again, that the plaintiff is an employee at will. "[A]bsent a showing that the discharge involves an impropriety which contravenes an important public policy, an [at will] employee may not challenge a dismissal based upon an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing."Carbone v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
Additionally, the plaintiff has not alleged any bad faith, dishonest purpose, constructive or actual fraud, or sinister motives by the defendant. Habetz v. Condon,
As to the Fourth Count of the complaint alleging a violation of CUTPA, it too must be stricken. A CUTPA claimant must have a consumer relationship with the party who is allegedly engaging in "unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices." General Statutes §
In the Fifth Count, the plaintiff Mendez alleges that the defendant VRI intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon him, causing him to lose wages and benefits, and to suffer humiliation, embarrassment and mental anguish.
The legal standard for intentional infliction of emotional distress is well settled and set forth in Appleton v. Board of Education, CT Page 14375
"Whether a defendant's conduct is sufficient to satisfy the requirement that it be extreme and outrageous is initially a question for the court to determine." Id.; Bell v. Board of Education,
The plaintiff has not alleged conduct by the defendant that meets the CT Page 14376 standards for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The actions he alleges in his complaint are his termination and the defendant's report of a larceny to the police. Pursuant to the holdings in Appletonv. Board of Education, supra,
The Sixth Count alleges that the defendant negligently inflicted emotional distress upon the plaintiff. In the employment context an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress may be based only on the employer's unreasonable conduct in the termination process.Perodeau v. City of Hartford, supra,
The plaintiff has not, as the plaintiff argues, alleged any circumstances or facts dealing directly with the manner of his termination. Accordingly, the Sixth Count is hereby ordered stricken.
In summary, the defendant's motion to strike the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Counts of the plaintiffs complaint is hereby granted as to each of these counts.
The Court
by ___________________ Arnold, J. CT Page 14377
Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc. , 179 Conn. 471 ( 1980 )
Alarm Applications Co. v. Simsbury Volunteer Fire Co. , 179 Conn. 541 ( 1980 )
Madani v. Kendall Ford, Inc. , 312 Or. 198 ( 1991 )
Cavallo v. Derby Savings Bank , 188 Conn. 281 ( 1982 )
Fisher v. Jackson , 142 Conn. 734 ( 1955 )