DocketNumber: No. XO8 CV01 0185694
Citation Numbers: 2003 Conn. Super. Ct. 2011
Judges: ADAMS, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 2/3/2003
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
The fifth count alleges:
Cornerstone, motivated by a wish to intimidate plaintiff and prevent his prosecution of this action, filed suit against him claiming defamation, based solely on statements attempting to influence a forthcoming WCA board election. This S.L.A.P.P. suit violated C.U.T.P.A. by attacking a consumer's attempted protection of interests purchased from defendants.
Standard of Review
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaints . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Citation and internal quotation marks omitted.) Peter-Michael, Inc. v. Sea Shell Associates,
Discussion
Cornerstone contends that the allegations of the fifth count are insufficient to state a claim for relief as a matter of law. It claims that Royce has not alleged sufficient facts on which to base a CUTPA claim and that, since there is evidence to show that the defamation lawsuit commenced by Cornerstone against Royce is not a sham, it has a constitutionally protected right to prosecute the suit.
Resolution of this matter requires the court to consider what is known as the Noerr-Pennington doctrine which arises from three United States Supreme Court cases.1 In essence, the doctrine, which was initially developed in the context of federal antitrust law and now applies in many contexts, shields individuals and groups from liability for petitioning a government agency for redress. Keller v. Consolini,
The Connecticut Appellate Court recently adopted the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine and its sham exception in the context of determining liability of parties filing appeals to the courts. Keller v. Consolini, supra. In that case the Appellate Court noted that the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Suburban Restoration Co. v. ACMAT,
Even before, and certainly after Keller was decided by the Appellate Court, the law in Connecticut was quite clear that the filing of a single, non-sham lawsuit was not a basis for a CUTPA claim. Ancone v.Manafort Bros., Inc.,
In Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia PicturesIndustries, Inc.,
Cornerstone contends that Royce's fifth count fails to state a viable claim because the evidence shows that its defamation suit is not baseless. That evidence includes several fruitless efforts by Royce to have the suit dismissed or stricken. The defamation suit, CornerstoneFamily Services, Inc., David Royce, Superior Court, Complex Litigation Docket X08 CV01-0184443, is presently before this court on the complex litigation docket, and Cornerstone argues that this court should take judicial notice of the denials of Royce's motions and find that the defamation case is not an objectively baseless litigation.2 As tempting as this approach might be, it is not consistent with Connecticut law and procedures.
As stated above, a court, in ruling on a motion to strike, is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint. While a small handful of Superior Court decisions have determined it is appropriate in some circumstances to rule on a motion to strike based on judicially noticed facts, this court decides the better course of action is to decline that approach. See The Cadle Co. v. Gable, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex at Middletown, CV00-0091155 (July 31, 2001, Gilardi, J.); SandDollar Development Group v. Michael, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, SPNH 961048736 (February 18, 1997, Levin, J.) (
However, Cornerstone also contends that Royce's allegations alone do not state a cause of action because no where is it alleged that the defamation suit is objectively without merit or baseless. The allegations of the fifth count state that Cornerstone filed the suit with improper motives and that it was a classic S.L.A.P.P. suit [which the court understands is the acronym for strategic litigation against public participation, see Field v. Kearns,
Taggart D. Adams, J.
Superior Court Judge