DocketNumber: No. CV99 036 15 04
Citation Numbers: 2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 6223, 27 Conn. L. Rptr. 225
Judges: MOTTOLESE, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 5/25/2000
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
"Said principal shall be due and payable in quarter annual installments of $12,500.00 on the first days of January, April, July and October of each year commencing January 1, 1983. Each payment of principal, as herein provided, shall be accompanied by a payment of interest at the rate of ten (10%) percent per CT Page 6224 annum on the unpaid principal balance accruing as of the due date of each principal installment".
The note also obligated the mortgagor to pay all taxes and assessments on the mortgaged property" as well as to keep the premises insured for casualty loss.
Arguing that (A) applies, the plaintiff contends that the "time limited" in the mortgage for the full performance of the conditions thereof as set forth in that subsection is easily determined by dividing the original principal of the note by the number of calendar quarters needed to pay the full amount. viz: $12,500 x 4 = $50,000; 500,000 ÷ 50,000 = 10 years. Thus, the plaintiff concludes that the mortgage became invalid six years later. On the contrary, the defendant argues that (C) applies because the mortgage fails to specify when performance is to be completed since the mortgage obligates the maker to pay all taxes and assessments on the property indefinitely into the future. Thus, the defendant concludes that the mortgage is still valid because seventeen years have not yet run.
The relevant background facts are not in dispute. The mortgage was executed on December 28, 1979. The holder of the note, Frank Piccolo, died on September 19, 1981. The inventory of his probate estate listed the mortgage as an asset having a value of $100.00 "based on [the] value of the collateral". The plaintiff failed to make the first quarterly payment due January 1, 1983. On May 4, 1983 the holder of the mortgage commenced an action for foreclosure thereby triggering acceleration of the note. The action never went to judgment and it is uncertain as to whether it was ever returned to court.
The affidavits which accompany the motion make it clear that no payments were made at any time on account of the mortgage. The defendant admitted this fact at oral argument as well as formally in her interrogatory responses. Notwithstanding the above the defendant relies on subsection (1)(C).
The court rejects the defendant's interpretation of the statute. First, the court agrees with the plaintiff that the time limited in the mortgage for full performance while not stated explicitly in terms of a date, is easily determinable to be 10 years of quarterly payments, or 40 payments with the last payment to be made October 1, 1992. Webster's New World Dictionary, 2nd College Edition, 1979 at p. 820 defines the word "limited" as "confined within bounds . . . circumscribed in scope or extent". An unspecified but determinable maturity satisfies this statutory language. CT Page 6225
It is not insignificant that the legislature chose to use the word "limited" rather than "stated" or "specified". Words of a statute must be construed according to their commonly approved usage. G. S. §
The defendant's claim that the plaintiff had a continuing obligation to pay taxes and assessments indefinitely into the future, thereby rendering the mortgage subject to subsection (1)(C) is not nourished by common sense for two reasons. Lesser v. Lesser,
The defendant places great reliance on Judge Flynn's opinion in Smithv. Mideastern Mortgage and Investment Associates, Inc.,
Based on the above, the court finds that this mortgage is subject to the terms of subsection (1)(A) of §
This leads the court to the issue of whether any of the $500,000 recited in the note was actually loaned to the plaintiff. The uncontroverted affidavit of Carol Holmes establishes that the actual sum CT Page 6226 of money which Piccolo loaned to the plaintiff was $50,000 and no more. Whether the court should exercise its discretion to order repayment of the $50,000 to the defendant with interest to date depends upon several considerations. First, while §
BY THE COURT,
Mottolese, Judge