DocketNumber: No. FA01 038 29 86 S
Citation Numbers: 30 Conn. L. Rptr. 701, 2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 15984
Judges: DEWEY, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 12/3/2001
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
By complaint dated April 19, 2001, the parties in this action began marriage dissolution proceedings. They have two minor children, Joshua and Zachary. The parties have resolved all significant issues including property division, child custody and visitation.
On October 4, 2001 the maternal grandmother, Marion Yourwith, filed a Motion to Intervene Pendente Lite. Relying on Connecticut General Statutes §
The defendant, with the plaintiff's consent and approval, has filed a motion to dismiss the intervention request. The crux of the motion to dismiss is that, under the Connecticut case of Castagno v. Wholean,
"A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court."Gurliacci v. Mayer,
General Statutes §
The plaintiff and defendant rely on Castagno v. Wholeon,
Having sought the jurisdiction of this court for their marriage dissolution, the parties cannot seriously claim that custody and visitation are not before this court. Indeed, in his April 19, 2001, complaint, the plaintiff father seeks "[t]emporary and permanent joint legal custody of the minor children." Given the active nature of a preexisting divorce proceeding instituted by the father of the children and the absence of an intact family unit as defined by case law, the court has subject matter jurisdiction with the power to hear and decide the grandmother's motion to intervene. Therefore the Motion to Dismiss is denied.
That does not end this court's inquiry. In Troxel v. Granville, the United States Supreme Court suggested that before a state court can authorize third party intervention, there should be a specific pleading of parental unfitness or imminent harm to the child. The burden of proof rested with the attempted intervenor. The Supreme Court cautioned that a CT Page 15986 family court should presume that the parents' decision is in the child's best interest, unless there is a probable cause to believe otherwise. See also Carbo v. Kalosky, 29 C.L.R. 2547 (February 16, 2001, Gordon, J.) In the present case, the maternal grandmother has failed to indicate any facts that indicate parental unfitness.
Accordingly, this court will treat the Motion to Dismiss as a Motion to Strike, which is granted.
It so ordered.
JULIA DiCOCCO DEWEY, JUDGE