DocketNumber: No. CV 32 54 28
Citation Numbers: 1995 Conn. Super. Ct. 13545
Judges: BALLEN, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 12/5/1995
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
In the first count of her complaint the plaintiff asserts a negligence claim against the defendant. In the second count the plaintiff asserts a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In the third count the plaintiff asserts a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
On September 11, 1995 the defendant filed a motion to strike all three counts of the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that each count is barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA), General Statutes §
The purpose of a motion to strike is to test the legal sufficiency of the allegations of a complaint to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Ferryman v. Groton,
"We consistently have interpreted the exclusivity provision of the [Workers' Compensation Act], General Statutes §
An employer shall not be liable to any action for damages on account of personal injury sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment or on account of death resulting from personal injury so sustained. . . . All rights and claims between employer and employees . . . arising out of CT Page 13547 personal injury or death sustained in the course of employment are abolished other than rights and claims given by this chapter. . . .
Public Act 93-228, section 1, which amends §
In the present case the plaintiff specifically alleges that "[d]uring the course of her employment at the defendant medical center, [she] was exposed to . . . patients infected with tuberculosis." (Complaint, ¶ 3.) In paragraphs five, six, seven and fifteen of the complaint the plaintiff also alleges that her injuries were work-related and occurred during the course of her employment. These paragraphs are incorporated into all three counts of the complaint. Therefore, the plaintiff's negligence (first count) and negligent infliction of emotional distress (third count) claims are clearly barred by the exclusivity provision of the WCA because based on the allegations in the complaint the plaintiff's injuries arose out of and in the course of, her employment with the defendant.
With respect to the second count in which the plaintiff asserts a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a narrow exception to the exclusivity provision of the WCA exists where it is alleged that the employer committed an intentional tort or where the employer has engaged in wilful or serious misconduct. Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., supra,
In the present case the plaintiff incorporates the negligence allegations pleaded in the first count into the second count. Thus, the plaintiff bases her intentional tort CT Page 13548 claim solely upon allegations of the defendant's negligent acts and omissions. Then, at paragraph sixteen of the second count, the plaintiff adds the conclusory allegation that "[t]he defendant in committing the above-mentioned acts, intentionally and without justification inflicted severe emotional distress on the plaintiff."
In terms of intentional tort . . . the use of the word `intent' in allegations `is not a talisman that can change the allegations into colorable claims of true intentional torts.'" (Citation omitted.) Id., 101. Thus, the plaintiff's inclusion of paragraph sixteen in the second count, in which she appends the word "intentionally" to her negligence allegations, does not transform her negligence allegations into an intentional tort claim which falls into the exception to the exclusivity provision of the WCA. Therefore, as with the first and third counts, the plaintiff's second count is also barred by the exclusivity provision of the WCA. Accordingly, the court grants the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's complaint in its entirety.
BALLEN, JUDGE