DocketNumber: No. CV 94 0137023
Citation Numbers: 1995 Conn. Super. Ct. 6687, 14 Conn. L. Rptr. 496
Judges: NIGRO, J.
Filed Date: 6/2/1995
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
The complaint asserts that the defendant State Board of Education is charged with the general supervision and control of education within the State of Connecticut and that the defendant Vincent L. Ferrandino is the Commissioner of Education and chief administrator for educational functions for the State of Connecticut. It identifies the defendant Stamford Education Association and the defendant Stamford Administrative Unit as duly authorized organizations designated or elected as the exclusive collective bargaining representatives for certain employees of the Board of Education of the City of Stamford.
On December 28, 1993, an arbitration award was issued, in accordance with subsection (c)(4), concerning the collective bargaining agreement between the Stamford Board of Education and the Stamford Education Association; on December 29, 1993 an arbitration award was issued concerning the collective bargaining agreement between the Stamford Board of Education and the Stamford Administrative Unit.
The complaint alleges that on January 20, 1994, within 25 days of receipt of the notice of awards and pursuant to General Statutes §
On January 26, 1994, within 10 days of the vote and pursuant to §
The plaintiffs further claim that under §
The plaintiffs claim that the "decision" of the Commissioner was an abuse of discretion, illegal, and erroneous as a matter of law and the complaint sets for specific grounds for such claims.
The complaint then alleges that "the `decision' whereby the Commissioner declined to exercise jurisdiction constitutes a final decision for the purposes of §
The plaintiffs request by way of relief that the court reverse the decision of the Commissioner of Education on the issue of jurisdiction, and remand for further proceedings according to law.
The several defendants have each filed a motion to dismiss the administrative appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the decision appealed from was not rendered in a "contested case" within the meaning of §
General Statutes §
General Statutes §
"Contested case" means a proceeding, including but not restricted to rate-making, price fixing and licensing, in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by statute to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing or in which a hearing is in fact held, but does not include proceedings on a petition for a declaratory ruling under section
4-176 or hearings referred CT Page 6690 to in section4-168 .
It appears that the "decision" which is the subject of this appeal arose in proceedings under the Teacher Negotiation Act. Under this act, General Statutes §
Disputed issues among the Board of Education and the Stamford Education Association and Stamford Administrative Unit were submitted to arbitration. General Statutes §
General Statutes §
"Within ten days after the commissioner has been notified of the vote to reject, (A) the commissioner shall select a review panel of three arbitrators or, if the parties agree, a single arbitrator, who are residents of Connecticut and labor relations arbitrators approved by the American Arbitration Association and not members of the panel who issued the rejected award, and (B) such arbitrators or single arbitrator shall review the decision on each rejected issue. . . . Within five days after the completion of such review, the arbitrators or single arbitrator shall render a final and binding award with respect to each rejected issue. CT Page 6691 . . .
It is conceded that the Commissioner did not appoint review panels. Instead, on February 7, 1994, the Commissioner informed the plaintiffs that he would not appoint review panels with respect to the two awards because of claimed lack of jurisdiction.
The plaintiffs have not alleged that General Statutes §
The defendants emphasis that a contested case requires that it be one in which the rights of a party are required by statuteto be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing orin which a hearing is in fact held. They point out that General Statutes §
The defendants note that not all actions of an administrative agency are subject to judicial review under the UAPA. They cite to that effect Summit Hydropower v. Commissionerof Environmental Protection,
The statutory requirement that an appeal to the Superior Court may be taken only from a contested case as defined in
4-166 (2) is an obvious indicator that the legislature did not intend to authorize a right of appeal to the Superior Court from every determination of an administrative agency. See New England Dairies, Inc. v. Commissioner ofCT Page 6692 Agriculture,221 Conn. 422 ,427 ,604 A.2d 810 (1992); Connecticut Bank Trust Co. v. Commission on Human Rights Opportunities,202 Conn. 150 ,154 ,520 A.2d 186 (1987). "The UAPA grants the Superior Court jurisdiction over appeals of agency decisions only in certain limited and well delineated circumstances." New England Dairies, Inc. v. Commissioner of Agriculture, supra.
They claim and the court agrees that an administrative appeal to the superior court is available only in a "contested case" in which the agency rendering the decision was required by statute to hold a hearing. In support of this assertion, the defendants cite Lewis v. Gaming Policy Board,
. . . Judicial review of an administrative decision is governed by General Statutes
4-183 (a) of the UAPA, which provides that "[a] person who has exhausted all administrative remedies . and who is aggrieved by a final decision may appeal to the superior court . . . ." A final decision is defined in4-166 (3)(A) as "the agency determination in a contested case . . . ." (Emphasis added.)A "contested case" is defined in
4-166 (2) as "a proceeding . . in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by statute to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing or in which a hearing is in fact held . . . ." (Emphasis added). Not every matter or issue determined by an agency qualifies for contested case status. See, e.g., New England Dairies, Inc. v. Commissioner of Agriculture, supra. "[W]e have determined that even in a case where a hearing is `in fact held,' in order to constitute a contested case, a party to that hearing must have enjoyed a statutory right to have his `legal rights, duties or privileges' determined by that agency holding the hearing . . . . In the instance where no party to a hearing enjoys such a right the Superior Court is without jurisdiction over any appeal from that agency's determination." (Citations omitted.) Id.
It is clear that the General Statutes §
The defendants' motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction are granted.
NIGRO, J.