DocketNumber: No. CV97 0160344 S
Citation Numbers: 1998 Conn. Super. Ct. 8007
Judges: D'ANDREA, J.
Filed Date: 7/16/1998
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
In count one, paragraph 3, of his amended complaint, dated December 18, 1998, Berrios alleges that Alves was operating the car "with the permission of defendant, Miller Ford, Inc., and was within his authority to operate said motor vehicle."
General Statutes §
"The standard of review for summary judgment is well established. Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party."Levine v. Advest, Inc.,
Miller argues that it did not authorize Alves to operate the car it rented to Delvalle. The rental agreement shows that Delvalle was the rental customer. The agreement also contained a specific section where any additional authorized drivers had to be listed. If there are no additional authorized drivers, the agreement provides that the word "none" should be printed across the section. The word "none" is printed across the appropriate section and it is signed by the customer, Delvalle. Additionally, Mark Hushak, Miller's rental manager, states in his affidavit that on February 21, 1997, Miller entered into an agreement with Delvalle authorizing only Delvalle to operate the car. Hushak also states that Alves was never authorized to operate the car.
This court finds that the Supreme Court's decision in Pedevillanov. Byron,
In the present case, Alves was not an authorized driver pursuant to the terms of the contract of rental. There are no genuine issues of material fact and summary judgment is appropriate. Therefore, Miller's motion for summary judgment CT Page 8009 is granted.
So Ordered.
D'ANDREA, J.