DocketNumber: No. CV930063465
Citation Numbers: 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 12696, 13 Conn. L. Rptr. 185
Judges: PICKETT, J.
Filed Date: 12/13/1994
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
In 1984 Reid Riege represented Evans Cooling Associates ("ECA"), a Connecticut limited partnership in which John W. Evans is a general partner. Reid Riege prepared an opinion letter regarding federal income tax treatment of certain payments made in connection with a licensing agreement. Reid Riege's 1984 representation of ECA was for the limited purpose of preparing the tax opinion. Michael L. Coyle, a current Reid Riege shareholder in the tax department, was most actively involved in the 1984 opinion which was issued on February 25, 1984. Reid Riege ceased representing ECA upon completion of the opinion.
Approximately six years later, Reid Riege represented Connecticut National Bank in 1990 in the workout and collection of various notes issued to John W. Evans and Mecca Development, Inc., a corporation formed by Evans. Bob Mule was the attorney from Reid Riege most actively involved in the loan workout. Mr. Mule attended three meetings with CNB representatives and John Evans to discuss Evans' options for paying his loans. After the third meeting, Reid Riege withdrew from the case when Evans' attorney alleged that Reid Riege's representation of CNB was a conflict of interest because of the earlier representation of ECA.1
On August 26, 1993, John W. Evans filed a new lawsuit against Reid Riege. This nine count complaint, amended on March 25, 1994, alleges conflict of interest, breach of contract, violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act ("CUTPA"), breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of a duty of confidentiality, and intentional interference with a business relationship. Evans' essential claim in all nine counts is that Reid Riege's representation of ECA in preparation of the 1984 tax opinion, and Reid Riege's subsequent representation of CNB in 1991 in connection with the loan workout against John Evans, constituted a conflict of interest. The CT Page 12698 plaintiff seeks to disqualify Day, Berry Howard because of its service as local counsel to General Motors Corporation in connection with two actions brought by Evans against General Motors.
To establish a conflict of interest, plaintiff must first establish an attorney/client relationship. See Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.9 (1992); see also Prisco v. Westgate Entertainment, Inc.,
Evans seeks to disqualify Day, Berry Howard because Day, Berry Howard has access to Reid Riege's files. It is claimed that those files include information regarding Evans' patents and the federal income tax treatment of certain payments made in connection with a licensing agreement to hold patents. Such information, dating back to 1984 and largely available through public records, is simply not confidential. Indeed, the point of obtaining a patent is to protect information which you intend to make public.
Even if confidential information were involved, Evans waived any confidentiality claim when he sued Reid Riege for breach of contract. Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(d) (1992); see alsoThornton v. Syracuse Savings Bank,
Courts ruling on disqualification motions give deference to the defendant's interest in freely selecting counsel of their choice. In Re Peck,
A client whose attorney is disqualified incurs a loss of time and money in being compelled to retain new counsel who in turn have to become familiar with the prior comprehensive investigation which is the core of modern complex litigation. The client moreover may lose the benefit of its long time counsel's specialized knowledge of its operations.
Id. at 739.
Day, Berry Howard has represented Reid Riege in two lawsuits brought by Evans. The first lawsuit, commenced on October 30, 1990, was withdrawn by Evans CT Page 12700 after the issues were fully joined and no further pleadings were required. Day, Berry Howard filed an appearance in that action, interviewed witnesses, responded to discovery, and in general, defended Reid
Riege's interests. When Evans withdrew the first lawsuit, Day, Berry Howard was prepared for the second lawsuit. Day, Berry Howard again represented Reid Riege's interests, filing an appearance, attending depositions, responding to discovery and deposing the plaintiff, John Evans. Day, Berry Howard has been defending Reid
Riege against Evans' claims for almost four years now, and the law firm is intricately familiar with the legal issues and defenses involved. To disqualify Day, Berry
Howard at this point, with no evidence of a conflict of interest, would unfairly deprive Reid Riege and Robert Mule of the right to freely choose counsel. See e.g.,W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines,
The plaintiff has cited no authority in the Rules of Professional Conduct or elsewhere to support Day, Berry Howard's disqualification. Even if plaintiff could cite authority, "a violation of professional ethics does not in any event automatically result in disqualification of counsel." W.T. Grant Co., supra at 677. "Because the courts must guard against strategic or tactical use of motion to disqualify counsel . . . such motions are subject to strict scrutiny." Chapman, supra. Plaintiff has represented no evidence to support his claim and under the strict scrutiny applied, has failed to meet his burden.
Plaintiffs asks this court to adopt a standard, never before applied in disqualification actions, that "the mere possibility of past or present access of confidential and privileged information" requires disqualification. The information at issue is not confidential. Moreover, the mere "appearance of impropriety" alone is not sufficient grounds for disqualification. Bergeron,
Finally, if there were any issue of disqualification it must be raised in the U.S. District Court in the case of Evans Cooling Systems, Inc. v. General MotorsCorporation, CV No 3:94 CV35 (JAC). The plaintiff makes no claim that the original appearances in this case brought a year before the district case was improper.
For the reasons set forth, the motion to disqualify is denied.
Gab Business Services, Inc., Cross v. Syndicate 627, James ... , 809 F.2d 755 ( 1987 )
The Government of India and the Food Corporation of India v.... , 569 F.2d 737 ( 1978 )
In Re Peck , 112 B.R. 485 ( 1990 )
Grant Thornton v. Syracuse Savings Bank , 961 F.2d 1042 ( 1992 )
W. T. Grant Company v. Mark S. Haines, and John A. ... , 531 F.2d 671 ( 1976 )