DocketNumber: No. CV94-0065006
Citation Numbers: 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 8093
Judges: PICKETT, J.
Filed Date: 8/11/1994
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
Pro se plaintiff.
Ruggiero, Ziogas Allaire for defendant. On April 5, 1994, the plaintiff, J. Wyatt Uhlein, commenced this tax appeal against the defendant, the Town of Litchfield. In his application, the plaintiff alleges that he is the owner of a cabin at 34 Old Hollow Road in Litchfield. The plaintiff states that he is the owner of the cabin by virtue of two deeds, one dated May 4, 1950 from G. Vondermuhl to H. Guion and another dated August 1, 1983 from H. Guion to the plaintiff. The plaintiff states that neither of these deeds were recorded. The plaintiff alleges further that the cabin is on land owned by the Marshepaug Forest Inc., and which is leased to the plaintiff. This lease is allegedly recorded in the Litchfield land records.
The plaintiff states that in January 1994 the tax assessor of Litchfield raised the assessment on the cabin from $4,910 to $18,750 on the Grand List of October 1, 1993. On February 15, 1994, the plaintiff appealed this assessment to the Board of Tax Review, but was denied relief. In a two count application, the plaintiff, acting pro se, appeals from that action. The plaintiff claims relief pursuant to General Statutes §
The defendant has now filed a motion to dismiss both counts of the plaintiff's application on the ground that the plaintiff lacks standing to appeal the assessment and therefore the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Pursuant to Practice Book § 143, each party has filed a memorandum in support of their respective claims of law. The motion to dismiss is provided for in Practice Book Sections 142-146, and is the proper manner by which to assert lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.Practice Book § 143. It is a basic principle of law that a plaintiff must have standing for the court to have jurisdiction. Unisys Corporation v. Department of Labor,
Count I
General Statutes §
. . . . [A]ny person, including any lessee of real property whose lease has been recorded as provided in section
47-19 and who is bound under the terms of the lease to pay real property taxes, claiming to be aggrieved by the action of the board of tax review . . . . may . . . . make application, in the nature of an appeal therefrom, to the superior court . . . .
(Emphasis added.) General Statutes §
Count II
General Statutes §
12-119 provides: When it is claimed . . . . that a tax laid on CT Page 8096 property was computed on an assessment which, under all the circumstances, was manifestly excessive and could not have been arrived at except by disregarding the provisions of the statutes for determining the valuation of such property, the owner thereof or any lessee thereof whose lease has been recorded as provided in section47-19 and who is bound under the terms of his lease to pay real property taxes . . . . may . . . . make application for relief to the superior court for the judicial district in which such town or city is situated.
(Emphasis added.) General Statutes §
The defendant argues that the court should dismiss count two of the plaintiff's application because the plaintiff is not the record owner of the cabin and the plaintiff no lease for the building. In opposition, the plaintiff argues that the cabin and land are leased to the applicant by a lease which was assigned to the plaintiff on August 1, 1983. The lease and its assignment are allegedly recorded in the Litchfield land records. Therefore, the plaintiff concludes that he has standing under the statute as a "lessee who has recorded."
The plaintiff, however, is challenging the tax assessment on the cabin at 34 Old Hollow Road, not on the leased land. The plaintiff has not alleged that he has a lease on the cabin. To the contrary, he has pled that he owns the cabin. Therefore, the plaintiff does not have standing as a "lessee who has recorded" pursuant to General Statutes §
The next determination for the court is whether the plaintiff is the "owner" of the cabin at 34 Old Hollow Road for purposes of bringing an action pursuant to General Statutes §
The term "owner" is not defined in the Tax Assessment portion of the General Statutes nor is the term defined in General Statutes Section
For all of the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that for purposes of bringing an appeal pursuant to §
In summary, the defendant's motion to dismiss both counts of the plaintiff's application is denied.
PICKETT, J.