DocketNumber: No. CV99 036 27 29 S
Citation Numbers: 2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 4592
Judges: MELVILLE, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 3/10/2000
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
The complaint alleges the following relevant facts. On October 7, 1998, the Probate Court, Hall, J., appointed McMillan as the conservator of the estate and of the person for Edmond Fenyes.2 McMillan's conservatorship over Edmond Fenyes continues to the present date. Jennie Rose Fenyes currently occupies the premises known as 642 Booth Hill Road, and has done so since August 3, 1998. In October, 1998, McMillan "established a value of sixteen hundred dollars ($1,600.00) per month for use and occupancy of said premises, and gave written notice thereof to defendant Jennie Rose Fenyes." (Complaint, Count One, ¶ 11.)
In count one, the plaintiff alleges that McMillan has neither accounted for nor paid over to the plaintiff her share of the rents. The plaintiff alleges in count two that Jennie Rose Fenyes has neither accounted for nor paid over any sums due her for Fenyes' use and occupancy of the said premises. The plaintiff seeks, inter alia, an accounting pursuant to General Statutes §
Jennie Rose Fenyes filed an answer and special defense on July 1, 1999. On October 27, 1999, McMillan filed an answer in which CT Page 4593 he denies that he failed to account for the rents and that he failed to pay the plaintiff her share of said rents. McMillan filed with his answer four special defenses and a counterclaim. The plaintiff now moves to strike portions of McMillan's answer, four special defenses and counterclaim. The specific grounds are discussed more fully below.
Whenever any party wishes to contest the legal sufficiency of any answer to any complaint, counterclaim or cross complaint, or any part of that answer including any special defense contained therein, that party may do so by filing a motion to strike the contested pleading or part thereof. Bouchard v. People's Bank,
The Practice Book further provides that the request to revise must be filed before a motion to strike. See Practice Book §§
McMillan alleges in his first special defense that the Trumbull Probate Court has primary jurisdiction over the case. The second special defense incorporates the allegations of the first special defense and further alleges that the matters presented in this case already have been decided in Fenyes v. Fenyes, Superior Court (Housing Session), judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 439586 (June 4, 1999. Coco, J.). McMillan also alleges that the court, Coco, J., denied summary process on the merits without prejudice to the parties' ongoing proceedings in the Trumbull Probate Court and, therefore, res judicata precludes the plaintiff from raising the same issues in the present case.
In the third special defense, McMillan incorporates the allegations of the first and second special defenses and further alleges that the plaintiff is not entitled to a share of the gross rents. McMillan alleges that the plaintiff is merely due an accounting and any net profits from the rents as may be determined and ordered by the Trumbull Probate Court. The fourth special defense incorporates the allegations of the first, second and third special defenses. The fourth specials defense further alleges that McMillan is entitled to apply any net profits from the rents, which the Trumbull Probate Court determines are due the plaintiff, to the plaintiff's share of any joint debts of the plaintiff and Edmond Fenyes. The fourth special defense also alleges that McMillan is entitled to apply said profits to a constructive trust against the plaintiff's unpaid debts, if any, CT Page 4595 for which Edmond Fenyes may be liable.
McMillan's first, second, third and fourth special defenses substantively assert that the Trumbull Probate Court has primary jurisdiction over the present matter. (See Defendant Conservator's First, Second, Third and Fourth Special Defenses, ¶¶ 1-13) This court denied McMillan's earlier motion to dismiss, dated July 13, 1999, which asserted the same jurisdictional ground. That decision, dated October 12, 1999, stands as the law of the case. See State v. Arena,
The second special defense is stricken on the further ground that res judicata does not bar the bringing of the present action.
"[U]nder the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, a former judgment on a claim, if rendered on the merits, is an absolute bar to a subsequent action on the same claim . . . [or any claim based on the same operative facts that] might have been made. . . . [T]he appropriate inquiry with respect to [claim] preclusion is whether the party had an adequate opportunity to litigate the matter in the earlier proceeding. . . ." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Linden Condominium Assn., Inc. v. McKenna,
A summary process action is designed solely to decide the simple question of who is entitled to possession. Carnese v.Middleton,
The fourth special defense is stricken on the further ground that it fails to state a setoff claim and, therefore, is legally CT Page 4596 insufficient. The law of setoff is governed by General Statutes §
"In any action brought for the recovery of a debt, if there are mutual debts between the plaintiff . . . and the defendant . . . one debt may be set off against the other."
General Statutes §
A condition precedent to the application of §
In the fourth special defense, McMillan asserts, inter alia, that he is entitled to a setoff against any net rents which the Trumbull Probate Court may determine due the plaintiff in order to pay the plaintiff's share of the joint debts between the plaintiff and Edmond Fenyes which the Trumbull Probate Court may determine. The fourth special defense does not set forth a sum certain and, thus, fails to comply with the condition precedent to the application of §
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's motion to strike the first, second, third and fourth special defenses and the counterclaim of the defendant, Ian McMillan, is hereby GRANTED. Further, the plaintiff's motion to strike those portions of the defendant's answer which respond to the second count of the plaintiff's complaint is hereby DENIED.
MELVILLE, J.