DocketNumber: No. CV 02-0820462 S
Citation Numbers: 2003 Conn. Super. Ct. 2829
Judges: SHELDON, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 2/24/2003
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
In this case, plaintiff Dolores R. Swetzes seeks to recover money damages from defendants Tyson J. Burk ("Tyson Burk"), Joan Muldoon Burk ("Joan Burk") and Joseph Muldoon Burk ("Joseph Burk") in connection with an automobile accident that took place in Simsbury, Connecticut on October 25, 2000. According to the plaintiff's six-count Complaint dated October 15, 2002, the accident resulted from the tortious conduct of defendant Tyson Burk in the operation of a 1990 Volvo station wagon which he was then driving with the permission of its owners, defendants Joan and Joseph Burk. The Complaint does not specify the relationship, if any, between Tyson Burk and either of his co-defendants.
In Count One of the Complaint, the plaintiff claims that defendant Tyson Burk was negligent in the operation of his co-defendants' vehicle in eleven specific ways, and that, by such negligence, he proximately caused her to suffer certain serious injuries, resulting financial losses, and limitations upon her life's activities. On the basis of these allegations, the plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory damages from Tyson Burk.
In Counts Two and Three of the Complaint, which are directed to defendants Joan and Joseph Burk, respectively, the plaintiff repleads all the allegations of her first count, then claims, without more, that
8. Pursuant to C.G.S. §
Complaint, Count II, ¶ 8 (as to defendant Joan Burk); Count III, ¶ 8 (as to defendant Joseph Burk). By so pleading, the plaintiff expressly seeks to recover compensatory damages from Joan and Joseph Burk by establishing their vicarious liability for Tyson Burk's alleged negligence under General Statutes §
In Count Four of the Complaint, the plaintiff seeks to recover double or treble damages from defendant Tyson Burk under General Statutes §
4 . . . were caused by the defendant, Tyson J. Burk who deliberately or with reckless disregard operated his motor vehicle in one or more of the following ways, which were a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries and losses, in that
a) he operated his vehicle at a greater speed than was reasonable, having regard to the width, traffic and use of the road, in violation of C.G.S. §
b) he operated his vehicle recklessly, having regard to the width, traffic and use of the road, in violation of C.G.S. §
Complaint, Count IV, ¶ 4.
Finally, in Counts Five and Six of the Complaint, the plaintiff seeks to recover double or treble damages from defendants Joan and Joseph Burk, respectively, by establishing their vicarious liability for defendant Tyson Burk's alleged violation of General Statutes §
8. Pursuant to C.G.S. §
Complaint, Count V, ¶ 8 (as to defendant Joan Burk); Count VI, ¶ 8 (as to defendant Joseph Burk). By so pleading, the plaintiff attempts, here as in Counts Two and Three, to base her claims of vicarious liability against these defendants on the Family Car Statute.
The defendants have moved this Court, under Practice Book §
Assessed by that standard, the challenged Counts are legally sufficient to state valid claims for relief under Section
The plaintiff bases her opposition to this aspect of the defendants' Motion to Strike on the holding of our Supreme Court in Gionfriddo v.Avis Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc.,
Any person renting or leasing to another any motor vehicle owned by him shall be liable for any damage to any person or property caused by the operation of such motor vehicle while so rented or leased, to the same extent as the operator would have been liable if he had also been the owner. CT Page 2833
Reading that language in light of the statute's long-established purpose — which is to make the owner-lessors of motor vehicles liable for the acts of those to whom they entrust their vehicles — the Gionfriddo Court explained its finding of vicarious liability in the following terms:
Although this court has not previously had the occasion to determine specifically whether
In light of our consistent construction of
Gionfriddo, supra,
Against the background of the foregoing analysis, the plaintiff's claimed reliance upon the Supreme Court's decision in Gionfriddo is curious at best. Far from supporting the plaintiff's claim that the Family Car Statute should be read to impose vicarious liability for statutory multiple damages upon the non-operator-owner of a family car, the Gionfriddo decision undermines that decision in two important ways. CT Page 2834
First, the decision relies expressly upon statutory language not appearing in the Family Car Statute which equates the liability of an owner or lessor of a leased or rented vehicle to that of the operator of that vehicle. Though the Family Car Statute creates a rebuttable presumption that a vehicle operated by the owner's spouse or child is being driven as a family car, within the scope of a general authority from the owner to put it to that use, the Statute does not address the scope of the owner's civil liability, if any, for such authorized operation, much less equate the owner's liability to that of the authorized operator. Since the statutory language which established such parallel or alter ego liability was critical to the Gionfriddo Court's analysis of Section
Second, the Gionfriddo decision expressly notes that the extent of liability imposed upon owners and lessors of leased and rented vehicles under Section
In fact, the common-law roots of the family car doctrine in Connecticut were well established long before the Supreme Court issued its decision in Gionfriddo. The doctrine was first adopted in the case of Wolf v.Sulik,
If the owner . . . of any vehicle, shall entrust such . . . vehicle to his agent, bailee, servant or employee, to be . . . driven or operated by such agent, bailee, servant or employee upon the public highways . . . and such agent, bailee, servant or employee, while in the performance of such owner's business within the scope of his authority, . . ., shall, by neglecting to conform to any provision of sections 1568 or 1569, cause any injury to the person or property of another, such owner shall pay to the party injured his actual damages and costs.
Id. at 433 (quoting General Statutes § 1572). (Emphasis added). Drawing upon common-law precedents from other jurisdictions, the Wolf Court agreed that under that statute, the owner of a family car should be CT Page 2835 held responsible for the negligence of a close family member who operates the vehicle as a family car, under a general grant of authority from the owner to do so. Its rationale for this ruling was explained as follows:
This question of the responsibility of owners of pleasure cars maintained for the use and convenience of members of the owner's family, has been the subject of considerable litigation in recent years. The cases on the subject are collected and reviewed in the note to Birch v.Abercrombie, 50 L.R.A. (N.S.) 59 (
We think this case falls within the reason as well as the letter of the statute. The difficulty of formulating any satisfactory explanation for all of the recognized applications of the rule respondeat superior is well understood, but it is generally accepted as a necessary rule of public policy and social justice. Under an older and simpler economic system, the rule was restricted in its application to the relation of master and servant, and in its origin that relation rested on the right of one man to control the conduct of another. But theoretically as well as practically, the master's responsibility for the negligence of his servant extends far beyond his actual or possible control over the conduct of the servant. It rests on the broader ground that every man who prefers to manage his affairs through others, remains bound to so manage them that third persons are not injured by any breach of legal duty on the part of such others while they are engaged upon his business and within the scope of their authority. CT Page 2836
Wolf v. Sulik, supra,
Four years later, following the repeal of the statute it had interpreted in Wolf, the Supreme Court made the family car doctrine a part of Connecticut common law in Stickney v. Epstein,
We . . . said [in Wolf], in effect, that at common law, while there is a conflict of authority, the weight of authority seems to be that when a motor-car is maintained by the paterfamilias for the general use and convenience of his family, he is liable for the negligence of a member of the family having general authority to drive it, while the car is being used as a family car, and that the inherent justice of the rule thus stated is apparent. The rule rests on the broad ground that every man who prefers to manage his affairs through others, remains bound to so manage them that third persons are not injured by any breach of legal duty on the part of such others while they are engaged upon his affairs and within the scope of their authority. In that opinion we intended to sanction the claim that at common law when a paterfamilias maintains an automobile for the pleasure, use and convenience of his family and in pursuance of such purpose authorizes members of his family to use it for such purpose, he by so doing makes such pleasure uses his affair, and constitutes members of the family so operating the car his agents engaged in the prosecution of his affairs. We are satisfied that the same rules of public policy and social justice which entailed former extended applications of the rule respondeat superior to new situations at common law, still apply, and entail its application to the situation presented in this case.
Stickney, supra,
Finally, in 1931, the legislature expressly reincorporated the common-law family car doctrine into Connecticut statutory law by passing the predecessor to our current Family Car Statute, now codified at General Statutes §
is in effect a restatement of a common law rule established by the courts to the effect that where an automobile is maintained for the CT Page 2837 general use of the family, the owner of the vehicle is vicariously liable for injuries or property damage caused by a member of the family operating the car. In order for the doctrine to operate, the operator of the car must have "general authority" to operate the vehicle; and if the operator only had special permission to drive the car, the doctrine has been held not to apply.
Id. at 122-23.
On the basis of the foregoing authorities, this Court concludes that the Family Car Statute does not impose vicarious liability for statutory double and treble damages under General Statutes §
IT IS SO ORDERED this 24th day of February 2003.
Michael R. Sheldon, J.
Birch v. Abercrombie , 74 Wash. 486 ( 1913 )
Fisher v. Hodge , 162 Conn. 363 ( 1972 )
O'Keefe v. Fitzgerald , 106 Conn. 294 ( 1927 )
Connelly v. Deconinck , 113 Conn. 237 ( 1931 )
Wolf v. Sulik , 93 Conn. 431 ( 1919 )
Marshall v. Fenton , 107 Conn. 728 ( 1928 )
Graham v. Wilkins , 145 Conn. 34 ( 1958 )
Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., Inc. , 108 Conn. 333 ( 1928 )