DocketNumber: No. CV00 0179122 S
Citation Numbers: 2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 917
Judges: HICKEY, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 1/17/2002
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
The defendant filed an answer to the complaint and the following six special defenses: (1) unclean hands; (2) fraud and/or negligence and/or innocent misrepresentation, in the inducement; (3) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (4) invalid instrument; (5) forged signature; and (6) lack of consideration. In addition, the defendant Harrick filed a counterclaim of recoupment.
The plaintiff filed the present motion for summary judgment as to liability only, on the ground that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding liability and the plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The plaintiff filed a memorandum of law and documentary evidence in support of its motion. In response, the defendant filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the plaintiff's motion, accompanied by supporting documentary evidence.
"A summary judgment . . . may be rendered on the issue of liability alone, although there is a genuine issue as to damages." Practice Book §
To make out a prima facie case in this foreclosure action, the plaintiff must show that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to its ownership of the note and mortgage and the defendant's default on the CT Page 919 note. Webster Bank v. Flanagan,
As noted above, the complaint alleges that the plaintiff is the owner and holder of the note and the mortgage and furthermore, that payment under the note is in default and the debt is now due and unpaid. (Complaint, ¶¶ 1, 5, 7.) In support of its motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff submitted a certified copy of the mortgage deed3 and the mortgage note,4 each of which is dated November 9, 1994 and executed in favor of the plaintiff (Plaintiff's memorandum, Exh. B: mortgage deed and note.) The plaintiff also submitted a certified copy of a quitclaim deed indicating that on November 9, 1994, Kenneth Harrick, now deceased, conveyed the extent of his interest in the premises to the defendant. (Plaintiff's memorandum, Exh. A: quitclaim deed.) Furthermore, the plaintiff submitted an affidavit of Edward Nusbaum, an officer of the plaintiff, averring: that the plaintiff is the owner of the mortgage note and mortgage deed; that payment under the mortgage note is in default; and that the debt secured by the mortgage note is due and remains unpaid. (Nusbaum affid., ¶¶ 8, 9.) This court finds that the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is sufficient to show ownership and default, as well as satisfaction of conditions precedent to foreclosure mandated by the terms of the mortgage deed.5 For these reasons, this court concludes that the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case for foreclosure.
Where the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, the court must only determine whether the special defenses asserted by the defendant are legally sufficient6 before granting summary judgment. Beal Bank,F.S.B. v. Brown, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. 180773 (May 22, 2001, Hickey, J.) ("[w]here there is no special defense to the plaintiff's prima facie case, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the defendants' liability and the plaintiff is therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law."); see also Lasalle National Bank v. Shook, Superior Court, judicial district of CT Page 920 New London at New London, Docket No. 549266 (July 13, 2000, Martin, J.),
aff'd,
The defendant's first special defense alleges that the plaintiff is barred by the doctrine of unclean hands,7 in that the plaintiff's foreclosure action is dependent upon the plaintiff's own violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically, Rules 1.5 (regarding lawyer's fees) and 8.4 (regarding professional misconduct). Similarly, in the defendant's memorandum, she argues that her special defense of unclean hands raises genuine issues of material fact which preclude summary judgment.8 Additionally, the defendant filed an affidavit in which she attests to various facts in support of the special defense of unclean hands.
"At common law, the only defenses to an action of this character would have been payment, discharge, release or satisfaction . . . or, if there had never been a valid lien." Southbridge Associates, LLC v. Garofalo,
In Thompson v. Orcutt, supra,
"Because the doctrine of unclean hands exists to safeguard the integrity of the court. where a plaintiff's claim grows out of or depends upon or is inseparably connected with his own prior fraud, a court of equity will, in general, deny him any relief . . . The doctrine generally applies only to the particular transaction under consideration, for the court will not go outside the case for the purpose of examining the conduct of the complainant in other matters or questioning his general character for fair dealing. The wrong must . . . be in regard to the matter in litigation. . . . Though an obligation be indirectly connected with an illegal transaction, it will not thereby be barred from enforcement, if the plaintiff does not require the aid of the illegal transaction to make out his case."9 (Brackets omitted; citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 310-11.
"In addition, the conduct alleged to be unclean must have been done directly against the interests of the party seeking to invoke the doctrine, rather than the interests of a third party." Id., 311. However, the rule that the wrong must be done to the party against whom relief is sought is subject to an exception, which is that where the public interest is involved, the wrong does not have to be solely directed at the defendant. See id., 314-319. "The doctrine of unclean hands is not one of absolutes . . . It is not a judicial straightjacket." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 314. "Because the doctrine is founded on public policy, [it] may be relaxed on that ground." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 314-15, citing Cohenv. Cohen,
In this case, the defendant's first special defense alleges, among other things, that the plaintiff is barred by the doctrine of unclean hands, as follows: The alleged underlying indebtedness relied upon by the plaintiff is an alleged indebtedness of Kenneth Harrick, now deceased,10 to the plaintiff. The alleged indebtedness relates to legal services that the plaintiff purportedly performed for Kenneth Harrick in connection with a dissolution of marriage action brought by the defendant against Kenneth Harrick in 1992. During the entire course of the dissolution litigation, the plaintiff was aware, or should have been aware, that Kenneth Harrick was mentally disabled and incompetent to manage his own affairs, by reason of his addiction to heroin.11 The plaintiff took unfair, unconscionable and unethical advantage of Kenneth Harrick, by running up the time and expenses associated with its representation of him, far beyond what was reasonable and warranted under all the circumstances, and/or the plaintiff wrongfully charged Kenneth Harrick for services not performed, in violation of Rule 1.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct (regarding lawyer's fees).
Furthermore, the defendant's special defense alleges that the plaintiff's acts, in purportedly obtaining Kenneth Harrick's signature on the promissory or mortgage note and in having said note secured by the mortgaged deed, were acts of professional misconduct, as defined by Rule 8.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct,12 in one or more of the following five ways: First, the plaintiff knew or had sufficient information that it should have known that its client, Kenneth Harrick was under an acute mental disability in that he was so addicted to heroin that he could not manage his financial and business affairs. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the plaintiff knowingly acquired a security or other pecuniary interest adverse to its client, in that it acquired a promissory or mortgage note purportedly signed by Kenneth Harrick, and a security interest in a parcel of property in which Kenneth Harrick had an equitable interest.13 The transaction and terms on which the plaintiff acquired the interest were not fair and reasonable to its client, and the amount charged was unfair, improper and unethical. The terms of such transaction were not fully described and transmitted in writing by the plaintiff to Kenneth Harrick in a manner which could have been reasonably understood by him, especially under his mental disability arising from his heroin addiction.
Second, the defendant alleges that the plaintiff acquired the promissory or mortgage note and security interest without advising Kenneth CT Page 923 Harrick, in writing, that he should seek the advice of independent counsel in the transaction, and without giving him a reasonable opportunity to do so. Third, the defendant alleges that because the plaintiff knew or had reason to know that Kenneth Harrick had a severe mental disability, specifically, his acute heroin addiction, the plaintiff had a professional obligation to insure that Kenneth Harrick had a guardian ad litem or conservator appointed for him, and/or that he had competent independent counsel, before the plaintiff purportedly obtained Kenneth Harrick's signature on the promissory or mortgage note and acquired a security or pecuniary interest adverse to its client, and the plaintiff's failure to do so was an act of professional misconduct. Fourth, the defendant alleges that because of the plaintiff's legal representation of Kenneth Harrick and because of Kenneth Harrick's mental disability caused by his acute addiction to heroin, which addiction the plaintiff knew or should have known rendered Kenneth Harrick incompetent, the plaintiff had a fiduciary obligation to Kenneth Harrick which it wrongfully breached by overcharging him for legal services and obtaining a security interest adverse to his interests in the manner in which it did so.
Fifth and finally, the defendant's special defense of unclean hands alleges that at the time of the dissolution, the most significant asset owned by Kenneth Harrick or the defendant was the subject premises, a commercial property, which was in Kenneth Harrick's name alone. The plaintiff knew that Kenneth Harrick was mentally disabled and unable to properly review the plaintiff's bill or make business or legal decisions for himself, because of his acute heroin addiction and then current use of heroin. The plaintiff wrongfully and improperly threatened the defendant that unless she signed the mortgage deed in the plaintiff's favor, the plaintiff, who had control over its mentally disabled client, would not tell its client to quitclaim ownership of the premises to the defendant, and in light of these and other circumstances, the defendant signed the mortgage deed under duress.14
In light of the foregoing, this court finds that the defendant's special defense of unclean hands is legally sufficient. This court finds that the alleged acts of the plaintiff's misconduct, including the alleged violations of Rules 1.5 and 8.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, raise questions regarding, among other things: (1) the capacity or competence of Kenneth Harrick at the time that he purportedly executed the promissory or mortgage note in the plaintiff's favor;15 (2) whether the defendant executed the mortgage deed in favor of the plaintiff under circumstances constituting duress;16 and consequently, (3) whether the plaintiff's foreclosure action is directly and inseparably connected to, or dependent upon, the plaintiff's own unconscionable, unethical or other wrongful conduct. CT Page 924
This court notes that the allegations of misconduct raised by the defendant's special defense were allegedly perpetrated by the plain tiff against both Kenneth Harrick and against the defendant, at a time when the plaintiff was purportedly acting on behalf of Kenneth Harrick and engaging in the practice of law in Connecticut. To the extent that the conduct alleged to be unclean was not done directly against the interests of the defendant, this court notes that where the public interest is involved, the wrong does not have to be solely directed at the defendant to justify application of the unclean hands doctrine. See Thompson v.Orcutt, supra,
In summary, this court finds that the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case in this foreclosure action. However, this court finds that the defendant's special defense of unclean hands is legally sufficient. Consequently, this court finds that there are genuine issues of material fact which preclude this court from determining that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, this court finds that this action is inappropriate for resolution by summary adjudication. Accordingly, the plaintiff's motion for is hereby denied.
HICKEY, J.
james-dunlop-mccullen-v-local-1-s-afl-cio-clc-joseph-pascarella-margaret , 149 F.3d 85 ( 1998 )
Cohen v. Cohen , 182 Conn. 193 ( 1980 )
Precision Instrument Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive ... , 65 S. Ct. 993 ( 1945 )
Mechanics Farmers Savs. Bank v. Delco Devel. Co. , 43 Conn. Super. Ct. 408 ( 1993 )
Boretz v. Segar , 124 Conn. 320 ( 1938 )
Bird v. Plunkett , 139 Conn. 491 ( 1953 )
S&E Contractors, Inc. v. United States , 92 S. Ct. 1411 ( 1972 )