DocketNumber: No. CV92 0127607
Citation Numbers: 1995 Conn. Super. Ct. 9853
Judges: LEWIS, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 8/29/1995
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
The case was referred to Attorney Barry J. Boodman, an attorney fact-finder pursuant to General Statutes §
The fact-finder recommended that judgment enter in favor of CT Page 9855 the defendants because the plaintiff did not know how much of the balance due "represents the interest it added" as contrasted with the "hourly rate" charged for its services. The fact-finder also concluded that the claimed 18% interest per year was usurious, unfair and inequitable, and that the corporate veil of the Alarm Company had not been successfully pierced.
The plaintiff filed an objection to the fact-finder's report pursuant to Practice Book § 546 et seq., on the grounds that the report found as a fact that the plaintiff had rendered accounting services to the defendants who had agreed to pay for these services, there was a balance due, and the defendants had not proved their special defenses, yet the fact-finder had recommended judgment for the defendants. The report also noted that the defendants did not offer any witnesses or evidence on their own behalf.
Practice Book § 546H provides in pertinent part that "[a] party may file objections to the acceptance of a finding of facts on the ground that conclusions of fact stated in it were not properly reached on the basis of the subordinate facts found, or that the fact-finder erred in rulings on evidence or in other rulings, or that there are other reasons why the finding of facts should not be accepted." Furthermore, "[a]fter review of the findings of facts and hearing on any objections thereto, the court may . . . (1) render judgment in accordance with the finding of facts; (2) reject the finding of facts and remand the case to the fact-finder who originally heard the matter for a rehearing on all or part of the finding of facts; (3) reject the finding of facts and remand the matter to another fact-finder for rehearing; (4) reject the finding of facts and revoke the reference; (5) remand the case to the fact-finder who originally heard the matter for a finding on an issue raised in an objection which was not addressed in the original finding of facts; or (6) take any other action the court may deem appropriate." Practice Book § 546J.
"A reviewing authority may not substitute its findings for those of the trier of the facts. This principle applies no matter whether the reviewing authority is the Supreme Court . . . or the Superior Court reviewing the findings of either administrative agencies . . . or attorney trial referees." (Citations omitted.)Wilcox Trucking, Inc. v. Mansour Builders, Inc.,
The findings of fact in a contract action such as this should be overturned "only when they are clearly erroneous," that is, a factfinder's recommendations should be accepted when "there is nothing that is unreasonable, illogical or clearly erroneous in the findings of the fact-finder and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom." Wilcox Trucking, Inc. v. MansourBuilders, Inc., supra,
Additionally, "[g]reat deference is given to the trial court's findings because the trial court is responsible for weighing the evidence and determining the credibility of witnesses." Beizer v. Goepfert,
The plaintiff points out, however, that it did provide a breakdown between the hourly rate charged to the defendants and the interest that was also charged, which is reflected in the invoices admitted as evidence at trial, where interest was referred to as a "service charge." The fact-finder's finding that the parties did not agree on an interest rate is not overturned by this court, but his recommendation that judgment enter in favor of the defendants is not accepted. Just as is the case with respect to attorney trial referees, "determinations of law in his or her report are not binding on the court . . . the trial court has the power to render whatever judgment appropriately follows, as a matter of law, from the facts found by the attorney trial referee. . . . the trial court [has] the inherent authority . . . to render whatever judgment was appropriate in light of the facts found by the attorney trial CT Page 9857 referee." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)Dills v. Enfield,
Based upon a review of the exhibits introduced at the hearing before the fact-finder, his findings are supported by the evidence presented during the proceedings.2 However, the fact-finder's conclusion that the plaintiff cannot recover from the Alarm Company is rejected because the plaintiff did offer evidence of the interest factor. Subtracting the interest claimed by the plaintiff on the theory that such interest was never agreed upon, or has other infirmities, as found by the fact-finder, a balance remains due the plaintiff of $38.40 for services rendered to the corporate defendant, and $2,375.35 for services rendered to the individual defendant, Chludzinski. As the fact-finder noted in his report: "[t]he plaintiff was entitled to payment from the defendant company for the reasonable value of the accounting services provided by the plaintiff to the defendant company and [to] the defendant individual . . . ." Accordingly, judgment may enter for the plaintiff to recover $2,413.75 from the Alarm Company, plus costs as taxed by the clerk. In all other respects, the plaintiff's objection to the fact-finder's report is overruled and judgment is entered in favor of the defendants on all counts except the first count.
So Ordered.
Dated at Stamford, Connecticut this 29 day of August, 1995.
William B. Lewis, Judge