DocketNumber: No. CV970575312-S
Citation Numbers: 1998 Conn. Super. Ct. 7506
Judges: RITTENBAND, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 6/30/1998
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
In paragraphs one through thirteen of count one, which are incorporated into counts three, six, nine, twelve, fifteen and eighteen, the plaintiff alleges the following facts. He and was a police detective employed by the Town of West Hartford ("Town"). (Count one, ¶ 1.) Members of the police force included the Chief of Police James Strillacci ("Strillacci"), Assistant Chief CT Page 7507 of Police Stephen Lovett ("Lovett"), Lieutenant Carl Rosensweig ("Rosensweig"), Sergeant Brian Royce ("Royce") and Officer Anthony Miele ("Miele"). (Count one, ¶¶ 3-7.) A special operations force within the department was named the Tactical Response Team ("TRT"). (Count one, ¶ 6.) "At all times relevant, the members of the TRT were as follows: Detective Lieutenant Rosensweig, Team Commander, Sergeant Royce, Team Leader . . . Detective Miele and Detective Melanson." (Count one, ¶ 8.) On October 25, 1995, the TRT executed a search warrant in West Hartford. (Count one, ¶ 11.) While executing the warrant, defendant Miele discharged his weapon. (Count one, ¶ 12.) The bullet from Miele's weapon struck the plaintiff injuring him severely and leaving him permanently disabled. (Count one, ¶ 13.)
In paragraph fifteen of each count, alleging intentional conduct, the plaintiff alleges that each defendant "intended to injure [him] or created a condition that made [his] injuries substantially certain to occur."1
"A wilful and malicious injury is one inflicted intentionally without just cause or excuse. It does not necessarily involve the ill will or malevolence shown in express malice; nor is it sufficient to constitute such an injury that the act resulting in the injury was intentional in the sense that it was the voluntary action of the person involved. Not only the action producing the injury but the resulting injury must be intentional. A wilful or malicious injury is one caused by design. Wilfulness and malice alike import intent. . . . [Its] characteristic element is the design to injure either actually entertained or to be implied from the conduct and circumstances. . . . The intentional injury aspect may be satisfied if the resultant bodily harm was the direct and natural consequence of the intended act." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Nolan v. Borkowski,
Even if the alleged conduct goes beyond aggravated negligence, and includes such elements as knowingly permitting a hazardous work condition to exist, knowingly ordering claimant to perform an extremely dangerous job, wilfully failing to furnish a safe place to work, or even wilfully and unlawfully violating a safety statute. . . this still falls short of the kind of actual intention to injure that robs the injury of accidental character." 6 A. Larson L. Larson, Workmen's Compensation (1997) § 68.13, pp. 13-55 through pp. 13-70.
In the present case, construing the facts in the complaint most favorably to the plaintiff, no allegations support the proposition that any of the five defendant members of the police force wilfully or maliciously inflicted an injury upon the plaintiff. The allegations against defendant Miele merely state that he failed to take various precautions to prevent or preclude the discharge of his weapon. Likewise, the allegations against defendants Strillacci, Lovett, Rosensweig and Royce merely state that they failed to provide adequate supervision, planning and training, and to formulate and promulgate procedures that would prevent or preclude the discharge of an officer's weapon. Bare CT Page 7509 conclusory allegation of intent to injure is not enough. 6 A. Larson L. Larson, Workmen's Compensation (1997) § 68.14. Moreover, "[a] plaintiff cannot transform a negligence count into a count of wilful and wanton misconduct merely by appending a string of adjectives to allegations that clearly sound in negligence." Brown v. Branford,
The plaintiff's allegations in counts one through three and seven through eighteen, therefore, fail to state a claim sufficient to overcome the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. The motion to strike #1 should be and is granted.
In Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp. ,
In the present case, construing the facts in the complaint most favorably to the plaintiff, no allegations even remotely support the proposition that the Town intended either that Officer Miele discharge his weapon under the circumstances that prevailed at the time or that the plaintiff be shot as a result of Officer Miele's conduct. The allegations against the Town merely state that it railed to provide adequate supervision, planning and training, and to formulate and promulgate procedures that would preclude the discharge of an officer's weapon. Bare conclusory allegation of intent to injure is not enough. 6 A. Larson L. Larson, Workmen's Compensation (1997) § 68.14. The Town could not possibly have known that these types of omissions were substantially certain to result in the plaintiff being shot by another officer. Moreover, the allegations fail to support a rational inference that the Town specifically intended for the plaintiff to be injured. The allegations, therefore, do not reflect a conscious and deliberate intent directed to the purpose of inflicting an injury. Suarez II, supra,
In Jett v. Dunlap,
Because no allegations in the complaint support the proposition that any of the five defendant members of the police force wilfully or maliciously inflicted an injury upon the plaintiff or had the intent to injure the plaintiff, see supra CT Page 7511 pp. 4-6, there does not appear to be a reason to address whether any of those defendants were of such a rank as to be deemed the alter ego of the Town.
The plaintiff's allegations in counts four, five and six, therefore, fail to state a claim sufficient to overcome the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act, since the common-law liability of the employer cannot be stretched to include accidental injuries caused by the gross, wanton, wilful, deliberate, intentional, reckless, culpable, or malicious negligence, breach of statute, or other conduct of the employer short of genuine intentional injury. The motion to strike #2 is, therefore granted.5
Rittenband, J.