DocketNumber: No. CV96-0252959-S
Citation Numbers: 2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 11267
Judges: BOOTH, JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
Filed Date: 8/14/2001
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
The jury returned a verdict for $285,000.00 in economic damages and $1,350,000.00 in non-economic damages. The defendants filed post-verdict motions arguing that the verdict should be set aside and that they should be granted a new trial on a number of legal grounds. Before these motions could be addressed Judge Dorsey died. The defendants then moved for a mistrial and, under General Statutes §§
This following motions are presently pending before the court:
1. Motion for a mistrial (#172);
2. Motion to set aside the verdict and order a new trial (#166)1;
3. Motion to set aside the verdict and for entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict (#168)2; and
4. Motion for remittitur (#164).3
The collateral source issue raised by the defendants (#163) has been resolved by agreement of the parties. The parties have agreed that the collateral source amount is $1,121.76. It is noted that the defendants filed an objection (#170) to the plaintiff's bill of costs (#169). The plaintiff has since filed an amended bill of costs (date stamped February 28, 2001). The court will hold a separate hearing if the bill of costs remains an issue.
This successor judge heard argument on the pending motions on May 7, 2001.
General Statutes §
Based on the steps outlined in Stevens v. Hartford Accident IndemnityCo.,
The defendants' motion for a mistrial is denied. The court has, in line with General Statutes §
II MOTIONS TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT AND ORDER A NEW TRIAL AND FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDTNG THE VERDICT
A. Judge Dorsey did not abuse his discretion in admitting the testimony of the plaintiff's accident reconstructionist, Robert Mantho.
"It is well settled that [t]he trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence is entitled to great deference. . . . [T]he trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility . . . of evidence. . . . [Its] ruling on evidentiary matters will be overturned only upon a showing of a clear abuse of the court's discretion. . . . We will make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial court's ruling, and only upset it for a manifest abuse of discretion. . . . Moreover, evidentiary rulings will be overturned on appeal only where there was an abuse of discretion and a showing by the defendant of substantial prejudice or injustice. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gaudio v. Griffin Health ServicesCorp.,
At issue is the testimony of the plaintiff's accident reconstructionist. Robert Mantho, concerning the location of the car operated by the defendant, Thomas Groonell, specifically, when it became a threat to the plaintiff. The defendants argue that Mantho's testimony CT Page 11270 should have been excluded under State v. Porter,
1. Applicability of State v. Porter
The standard for the admissibility of scientific evidence, as set forth in Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
A review of the transcript reveals that Mantho testified that, to formulate his opinion as to how the accident occurred he "considered all the information that was available and essentially came up with three different scenarios of how this collision could have taken place. And the scenarios are based on what people are saying, what the deposition testimony is of the witnesses, as well as, the evidence with respect to the skid marks and scratches on the roadway that were reported to be on the pavement." (Tr., 10/22/99, p. 52.) At the point plaintiff's counsel offered an illustration depicting the movement of the Groonell vehicle in the three scenarios presented by Mantho, defendants' counsel objected and requested voir dire on it. (Tr., 10/22/99, p. 74.) The following colloquy then took place between defendants' counsel and Mantho:
"Q: [W]hat is the science behind your determination that the point at which you draw this car is the point at which Mr. Groonell becomes a hazard? CT Page 11271
"A: Well, again, based on my own experience and training in this field for many, many years —
"Q: No testing?
"A: Excuse me?
"Q: No scientific testing?
"A: This perception reaction doesn't require scientific testing.
"Q: I'm not asking about perception reaction, I'm asking about the concept of a vehicle at some point and time becoming a perceived threat, what is the science underlying your decision to put the Groonell car wherever it is you put it on this diagram? It's not science, is it, it's your judgment call?
"A: That is a judgment, absolutely."
(Tr., 10/22/99, pp. 76-77.)
The defendants argued that under Porter, Mantho's testimony is impermissible because it is not based on science, rather, it is based on a judgment call made by Mantho. Judge Dorsey overruled the objection and allowed plaintiff's counsel to continue with direct examination. Defendants' counsel was then given the opportunity to cross-examine Mantho. At the completion of Mantho's testimony, defendants' counsel asked Judge Dorsey for his decision on whether Mantho's testimony metPorter, or whether Judge Dorsey decided that Porter did not apply. Judge Dorsey responded: "I don't think it applies. I think the testimony that I've heard is usual and customary in this type of cases and it's based upon timelines and distances, skid marks, slide marks and they're frequently used in this court to estimate speeds and estimate times to overcome those speeds." (Tr., 10/22/99, p. 162.)
Judge Dorsey did not abuse his discretion in admitting the testimony of Mantho as to the location of Groonell's vehicle when it became a threat to the plaintiff. The testimony of Mantho is not the type of evidence that is subject to a Porter analysis. Mantho's testimony did not involve scientific evidence, rather, Mantho based his opinions on the materials submitted to him and on his expertise as an accident reconstructionist. The defendants argue that the court should extend Porter by adopting the CT Page 11272Kumho Tire standard. This court need not reach this question in regard to Mantho's testimony. The testimony objected to by the defendants is usual and customary in a case involving the testimony of an accident reconstruction expert and requires analysis under neither Porter or KumhoTire.
2. Foundation for all of Mantho's testimony
"The fact that an expert opinion is drawn from sources not in themselves admissible does not render the opinion inadmissible, provided the sources are fairly reliable and the witness has sufficient experience to evaluate the information. . . . An expert may base his opinion on facts or data not in evidence, provided they are of a type reasonably relied on by experts in the particular field. . . . This is so because of the sanction given by the witness's experience and expertise. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) George v. Ericson,
Mantho testified that accident reconstruction experts customarily rely on physical evidence, such as skid marks, marks on the roadway, measurements associated with positioning of the vehicles at impact and at points of rest, characteristics of the vehicles involved in the accident, the type of damage to the vehicles, the tires of the vehicles involved in the collision, and documentation, to reconstruct an accident and formulate an opinion as to how the accident happened. (Tr., 10/22/99, p. 38.) Mantho also testified that he reviewed and analyzed the deposition transcripts of witnesses, the police officer and other officials that were involved in the investigation, the police report, statements from witnesses, Groonell's recorded statement, photographs that were taken after the collision, the Department of Motor Vehicle photo log, measurements taken at the scene of the accident, and diagrams of the area where the collision occurred to reconstruct the accident and formulate an opinion as to how the accident occurred. (Tr., 10/22/99, pp. 38-40.)
Judge Dorsey did not abuse his discretion in admitting Mantho's testimony because the testimony had a proper factual foundation. The defendants rely on Going v. Pagani,
Mantho based his opinion on evidence which is typically relied upon by accident reconstruction experts, therefore, the defendants' argument that Mantho's testimony was improperly admitted because he was the first witness to testify and he relied on deposition testimony, is without merit. "An expert may base his opinion on facts or data not in evidence, provided they are of a type reasonably relied on by experts in the particular field." George v. Ericson, supra,
B. Judge Dorsey did not abuse his discretion in precluding the defendants from presenting the testimony of Mantho and the defendants' expert, Michael Cei, that the accident would not have occurred if the plaintiff had been traveling at or near the posted speed limit.
The trial court's decision to exclude expert testimony is subject to abuse of discretion review. Gaudio v. Griffin Health Services Corp., supra,
At issue are the rulings by Judge Dorsey precluding Mantho and the defendants' accident reconstructionist, Michael Cei, from testifying that, had the plaintiff been traveling at or near the posted speed limit of thirty miles an hour, the collision would not have occurred. (Tr., 10/22/99, pp. 2, 153-56; 11/1/99, pp. 705-07, 786-88.) The defendants argue that Judge Dorsey abused his discretion in excluding such testimony and had he not excluded the testimony, the plaintiff's negligence should have been determined to be the proximate cause of the his damages as a matter of law.
In Hines v. Davis, supra,
1. Preclusion of Mantho's testimony as to the plaintiff's speed
Defendants' counsel made the following request of the court: "Your Honor, at this point I'd like to make an offer of proof with respect to whether or not Mr. Mantho thinks this collision would have occurred had [the plaintiff] been traveling at or near the speed limit." (Tr., 10/22/99, p. 153.) The following colloquy then took place between defendants' counsel and Mantho:
"Q: If we assume under any of your scenarios that [the plaintiff] would have applied his brakes in the same manner at the same point that he did in your opinion, but we change his speed from forty nine to fifty one, we take it down to thirty five, in your opinion would there have been a collision there?
"A: I believe I opined to that in my deposition and it most probably would have been a miss.
(Tr., 10/22/99, pp. 154-55.)
Because "speed alone . . . does not suffice to establish proximate cause in a negligence action," the testimony of Mantho is too speculative to constitute proximate cause. Hines v. Davis, supra,
2. Preclusion of Cei's testimony as to the plaintiff's speed
Counsel for the defendants made the following offer of proof relating to Cei's testimony about the plaintiff's speed:
"Q: Mr. Cei, if, in fact, [the plaintiff] had been traveling thirty miles per hour rather than fifty five or higher and if you assumed that he perceived and reacted at the same spot in the road and applied his brakes in the same manner, do you have an opinion with a reasonable degree of engineering probability as to whether or not he would have struck the Groonell vehicle?
"A: Yes.
"Q: And what is that opinion?
"A: That he would not have.
"Q: In fact, do you have an opinion based upon a reasonable degree of engineering probability what would have occurred under the same situation had there been any meaningful reduction in [the plaintiff's] speed below fifty five miles an hour?
"A: Yes.
"Q: And what is that opinion?
"A: There would not have been a collision."
(Tr., 11/1/99, p. 787.)
The opinion offered by Cei is essentially similar to the opinion offered by Mantho. Judge Dorsey did not abuse his discretion in precluding Cei's testimony.6
3. Proximate cause
Because the court did not abuse its discretion in precluding the testimony of Mantho and Cei concerning the plaintiff's speed, the defendants' argument that the plaintiff's negligence should be determined to be the proximate cause of his damages, as a matter of law, must fail. CT Page 11276
C. Judge Dorsey did not abuse his discretion in excluding evidence of the plaintiff's felony convictions which were nineteen, twenty and thirty years old.
The standard of review is abuse of discretion. State v. Abdalaziz,
The use of earlier convictions to impeach credibility is dealt with in § 6.7 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence. The purpose of adopting the Connecticut Code of Evidence was to codify existing evidentiary rules and not to adopt new rules for Connecticut trials. Section 6.7 is consistent with the arguments of each side on the propriety of the trial judge excluding the convictions. Section 6.7 provides, in pertinent part: "In determining whether to admit evidence of a conviction, the court shall consider: (1) The extent of the prejudice likely to arise, (2) the significance of the particular crime in indicating truthfulness, and (3) the remoteness in time of the conviction."
Our Supreme Court has established no absolute time limit that would bar the admissibility of certain convictions, although it has suggested a ten year limit on admissibility measured from the later of the date of conviction or the date of the witness's release from the confinement imposed by the conviction. State v. Carter,
This court is convinced that Judge Dorsey did not abuse his discretion in refusing to admit the felonies in question.
D. If plaintiff's counsel is deemed to have delivered a "golden rule" argument, that argument did not contain sufficient prejudice to warrant a new trial.
There were several changes made to page 822 of the trial transcript which contains the plaintiff's claimed golden rule argument. A copy of page 822 was presented to the court at the time of argument on the post-trial motions. The court is using the copy which all parties have agreed accurately reflects what in fact was said in closing arguments. CT Page 11277
The argument objected to concerns a hypothetical "wanted to buy" ad. In the hypothetical presented by plaintiff's counsel, a medical lab wants to buy a lower right leg with the incidental consequences of amputation without anesthesia, screaming pain and suffering, emotional upset and psychological damages. At times in the argument, plaintiff's counsel referred to the leg generically as "a leg" or "human leg," however, on at least three occasions in the argument, plaintiff's counsel referred to the leg as "your leg." Following the conclusion of the plaintiff's closing argument, a colloquy was held between Judge Dorsey and the lawyers, at which time Attorney Laney objected, claiming that a "golden rule" argument had been made. At the conclusion of that colloquy the following exchange is found:
"The Court: He did ask them, `Who would answer the ad and what they would pay for it'. But, he didn't directly relate that to the jury themselves, so, under those circumstances I don't think it's Golden Rule.
"Mr. Laney: Very well, your Honor.
"Mr. McNamara: I took pains not to do that, your Honor.
"The Court: All right. . . ."
(Tr., 11/1/99, p. 825.)
The court is of the opinion that a reference to the leg without the specific personal pronoun "your" would be preferable to avoid any claim of a golden rule argument. Nevertheless, in context, it is the court's holding that the argument did not reach prohibited golden rule proportions and, in any event, was not so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial.
E. Judge Dorsey's refusal to grant a challenge for cause to remove venireperson DeLaurentis does not constitute grounds for a new trial.
"If the judicial authority before whom such examination is held is of the opinion from such examination that any juror would be unable to render a fair and impartial verdict, such juror shall be excused by the judicial authority from any further service upon the panel, or in such action, as the judicial authority determines." Practice Book §
The court has reviewed the transcript of the voir dire examination of venireperson Carol DeLaurentis, dated October 19, 1999. During that voir CT Page 11278 dire, DeLaurentis disclosed that her husband had been involved in a serious accident which might eventually result in an amputation. When asked whether her husband's situation would affect her ability to be fair, she stated, "Well I would try to but it is very painful for me because I know that it is something that I may be faced with in the future with my husband." (Tr., 10/19/99, p. 2.) When asked if she would follow the judge's instructions, she answered, "Yes I would. I will try to do the best that I could." (Tr., 10/19/99, p. 4.)
Judge Dorsey ruled as follows: "Considering all her educational background and her responses to the questions and her response particularly to the question as to whether she would follow the Judge's instructions which were (sic) clearly indicate that she has to decide this case on the facts of this case and only the facts of this case I am not going to grant a request to challenge for cause." (Tr., 10/19/99, pp. 5-6.)
After reviewing the transcript, the court is not prepared to find that Judge Dorsey abused his discretion in refusing to grant the challenge for cause. Equally important, while the court recognizes that it is in the unique position of substituting for the trial judge, and is not a one-man appellate court, nevertheless, our law generally provides that "[a] trial court's refusal to remove a juror for cause is reversible error only if the party has exhausted all of his or her peremptory challenges and `an additional challenge is sought and denied.'" Eisenbach v. Downey,
While the court need not decide whether Esposito is binding on a trial judge sitting as a successor judge pursuant to General Statutes §
F. The economic damages awarded by the jury were excessive. TheCT Page 11279 non-economic damages awarded by the jury were not excessive.
The jury awarded a total verdict of $1,635,000. (Tr., 11/2/99, p. 942.) This was composed of $285,000 for economic damages and $1,350,000 for non-economic damages. (Tr., 11/2/99, p. 941.) The question for the court in examining the excessiveness of damages is whether the size of the verdict so shocks the sense of justice as to compel the conclusion that the jury was influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake or corruption."Wichers v. Hatch,
While not finding the economic damages shocking in amount, the court agrees with the defendants that a portion of the economic damages are completely unsupported by any evidence presented at trial so that the figure is the result of mistake. The plaintiff presented evidence of total medical cost of $75,654.36. In closing argument, plaintiff's counsel, relying on the testimony of prosthetist, Nicholas Guarino, calculated future medical costs to be $151,200. (Tr., 10/29/99, pp. 612-616; 11/1/99, pp. 819-820.) This leads to total economic damages of $226,854.36. The jury awarded $285,000.00. (Tr., 11/2/99, p. 941.) The court finds no reasonable evidentiary basis for the excess of $58,145.64, which the jury awarded as economic damages. The court recognizes that it can consider the testimony and evidence about the plaintiff's active life style and life expectancy, and that the court is not absolutely required to limit economic damages to those estimated by Guarino. The court finds, however, that the economic damages exceed the damages proven at trial, and, accordingly, orders a remittitur of the economic damages in the amount of $58,145.64.
As to the non-economic damages, the jury heard evidence of a traumatic, painful and life-altering injury. They viewed photographs of the plaintiff's mangled leg in the emergency room and of the cross-section of the plaintiff's leg that was left open to drain for more than five days. They heard about his screaming during the painful dressing changes. The jury also heard the testimony of Vincent Manjoney, M.D., with regard to the pain suffered by the plaintiff and the resulting disability from the amputation. They heard that the plaintiff's leg was almost z-shaped in the emergency room. They heard testimony concerning the leg which was left open for five to six days while it was "somewhere between half to twice its normal thickness and size." The plaintiff testified extensively about the pain he experienced and the attempt to control it by using intravenous morphine. There was testimony that the dressing changes were so painful that the doctors considered using the operating room, with the plaintiff under anesthesia, for the dressing changes. The dressing changes were intolerable even after five days. Two anesthesiologist were involved in pain control. There was medical testimony that the plaintiff's lower right extremity was 70 percent CT Page 11280 permanently disabled, which translated into a 28 percent disability of a whole person. Considering all of the facts which were before the jury, the court finds that the non-economic damages were fair, just and reasonable and that no remittitur is appropriate with regard to the non-economic damages.
G. This court and Judge Dorsey are bound to follow Connecticut Supreme Court precedent and affirm the instruction on income taxation on damages awards.
Judge Dorsey failed to instruct the jury that any award for personal injuries is not subject to federal income tax. Judge Dorsey's actions in this regard were required by the Connecticut Supreme Court decision inGorham v. Farmington Motor Inn, Inc.,
By the Court,
Kevin E. Booth Judge of the Superior Court
Gorham v. Farmington Motor Inn, Inc. , 159 Conn. 576 ( 1970 )
Going v. Pagani , 172 Conn. 29 ( 1976 )
Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Liepelt , 100 S. Ct. 755 ( 1980 )
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. , 113 S. Ct. 2786 ( 1993 )