DocketNumber: No. CV-94-0705482S
Citation Numbers: 1995 Conn. Super. Ct. 656, 44 Conn. Supp. 53
Judges: WAGNER, J.
Filed Date: 1/31/1995
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 1/12/2023
The plaintiff is a patient hospitalized at Cedarcrest, a facility for the treatment of mental illness, operated by the Department of Mental Health ("DMH") since December 6, 1993. Defendants, DMH employees, have medicated the patient on at least three non-emergency occasions over his objection with long acting psychotropic medication, based upon the consent of the plaintiff's conservator of the person. The conservator was appointed by the Hartford Probate Court on July 29, 1989, pursuant to what is now General Statutes §
The plaintiff claims under the provisions of Public Act 93-369, which became effective on October 1, 1993, that he may not be forcibly medicated in non-emergency situations absent a hearing in probate court to determine his competence to give informed consent to treatment with such drugs. He argues that in issuing the 1989 order the probate court appointing his conservator did not sufficiently consider his competence to give such consent. Defendants argue that this law does not require the probate court to pass on the specific issue of plaintiff's capacity to give or withhold informed consent to such medication, and that they have conformed to the requirements of the statute.
Public Act 93-369 consists of four sections amending Sections
The amendments to Section
Subsection (a) provides that "No patient shall receive medication for the treatment of mental illness of such patient without the informed consent except in accordance with the procedures set forth in subsection (b), (d), (e) and (f) . . .".
Subsection (b) provides that no "medical or surgical procedures" may be performed without the patient's informed consent or the written consent of a conservator appointed pursuant to General Statutes Section
Subsection (d) provides for the establishment of an internal procedure by a mental health facility for the involuntary medication of inpatients in situations where CT Page 658 the "condition of the patient will rapidly deteriorate"; such medication being limited to a period not exceeding thirty days.
Subsection (e) reads as follows:
(e) If it is determined by the head of the hospital and two qualified physicians that a patient is incapable of giving informed consent to medication for the treatment of such patient's mental illness and such medication is deemed to be necessary for such patient's treatment, a facility may utilize the procedures established in subsection (d) of this section and may apply to the court of probate for appointment of a conservator of the person under section
45a-650 . The conservator shall meet with the patient and the physician, review the patient's written record and consider the risks and benefits from the medication, the likelihood and seriousness of adverse side effects, the preferences of the patient, the patient's religious views, and the prognosis with and without medication. After consideration of such information, the conservator shall either consent to the patient receiving medication for the treatment of the patient's mental illness or refuse to consent to the patient receiving such medication.
This argument must be rejected for the following reasons:
(1) Subsection (b) refers to "medical or surgical procedures only. These terms fall short and do not include CT Page 659 "medication for the treatment of a mental illness." The phrase used in both sub-sections (a) and (b) of §
(2) The exceptions listed in subsection (a) set forth in subsections (b), (d), (e) and (f) are in the conjunctive and not in the disjunctive. Subsection (a) cannot be operative with reference to subsection (b) alone, but must be interpreted together with the other subsections, particularly (d) and (e). If (e) provides for a procedure for the appointment of a conservator under Sec.
(3) If the procedure outlined in subsection (e) is mandatory on any conservator it is obvious that in the procedure of applying for a conservator by a facility, either after, or without going through the procedure of subsection (d), the patient would have an opportunity to be heard in probate court on the specific question of whether he is able to give informed consent. Indeed, in a situation where the probate court were to find that a ward was not capable of giving informed consent, the court's order appointing the conservator might sensibly include a direct reference to the power of the conservator to give such consent.
Public Act 93-359 begins with the statement: "No patient shall receive medication for the treatment of the mental illness of such patient without the informed consent of such patient . . ." Section 3 of said Public Act reads:
[n]o patient . . . shall be deprived of any personal, property or civil rights . . . unless he has been declared incompetent pursuant to sections
45a-644 to45a-662 , inclusive. [Any finding of incompetency shall specifically state which personal or civil rights the patient is incompetent to exercise.]**"
Recent United States Supreme Court cases have indicated that a strong due process safeguard surrounds the right not to have one's body invaded by unwanted administration of psychotropic medication absent a finding of overriding justification and medical appropriateness.Riggins v. Nevada,
The legislative history behind Public Act 93-369 indicates a clear intention to bring due process protection against involuntary psychotropic medication to mental patients in the light of these Supreme Court decisions.
Current law . . . provides that a person who has been involuntarily committed can be medicated against his/her will. The United States Supreme Court . . . has ruled that such statutes which unilaterally allow a state to medicate a person against his/her will are unconstitutional. . . . [H.B. 7288] brings Connecticut law into compliance with U.S. Supreme Court rulings (Washington v. Harper Riggins v. Nevada) on involuntary medication and it provides due CT Page 661 process protections for patients. . . .
Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary Part 8, 1993 Sessions, p. 3018 (testimony of Kenneth Marcus, M.D., Deputy Commissioner, Conn. Department of Mental Health).
Defendants are restrained from medicating the plaintiff until he consents or has had a duly noticed hearing in probate court finding that he is unable to give informed consent to medications for mental illness and his conservator has submitted a writing which indicates that he has followed the procedures set forth in the new subsection (e) of General Statutes §
Nothing in this restraining order should be interpreted to interfere with the right of the defendants to administer medications in emergency situations under subsection (b) or rapidly deteriorating situations under subsection (d) or in direct threat of harm situations under subsection (f).
Wagner, J.