DocketNumber: No. CV01 0183761 S
Citation Numbers: 2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 11937
Judges: HICKEY, JUDGE TRIAL REFEREE.
Filed Date: 8/24/2001
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
"Whenever any party wishes to contest (1) the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . that party may do so by filing a CT Page 11938 motion to strike." Practice Book §
The defendants argue that the plaintiff merely has realleged the negligence counts in her recklessness claims and therefore, has not supported the recklessness counts with sufficient factual allegations so as to assert a valid cause of action for recklessness. The plaintiff contends that it is not improper to use the same facts from a negligence count to assert a recklessness claim. "Recklessness is a state of consciousness with reference to the consequences of one's acts . . . It is more than negligence, more than gross negligence. . . . The state of mind amounting to recklessness may be inferred from conduct. But, in order to infer it. there must be something more than a failure to exercise a reasonable degree of watchfulness to avoid danger to others or to take reasonable precautions to avoid injury to them." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dubay v. Irish,
"The fact that the recklessness count relies upon the same factual allegations as the negligence claim does not, in and of itself, provide [the defendant] with the basis for a motion to strike." Ouellette v.Hartford Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain at New Britain, Docket No. 496991 (April 12, 2000, Kocay, J.); Bendowski v.Quinnipiac College, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at Meriden, Docket No. 248346 (April 9, 1996, Silbert, J.) (
The issue before this court, therefore, is whether the plaintiff has alleged a distinct separate claim sounding in recklessness and if so, has she alleged sufficient facts to rise to the level of recklessness. "In order for a person's conduct to give rise to the level of recklessness, that person must realize that his conduct involved a risk so substantial that his conduct goes beyond negligence." Chatterton v. Infinity Ins.Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia/Milford at Milford, Docket No. 064615 (October 1, 1999, Arnold, J.). "In order to rise to the level of recklessness, [the] action producing the injury must be intentional and characterized by highly unreasonable conduct which amounts to an extreme departure from ordinary care. . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Stamford Hospital, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. 160804 (April 8, 1998, D'Andrea, J.).
In counts two, four and six, the plaintiff realleges and incorporates counts one, three and five sounding in negligence, and then alleges that the defendants were reckless or acted with deliberate indifference in that they: allowed the parking lot to be and remain in a defective, dangerous and unsafe condition; allowed the parking lot to be and to remain in a state of disrepair; failed to remedy or repair the parking lot; failed to supply a safe parking lot for the plaintiff and others to walk on; failed to warn the plaintiff of the existence of the pothole; failed to make proper and reasonable inspections to discover the presence of the pothole; failed to implement a maintenance or inspection system so that unsafe and defective conditions could be quickly ascertained; and failed to have sufficient and reasonably trained personnel on duty to inspect, maintain and repair the premises. Viewing the allegations most favorably to the plaintiff, the court finds that the plaintiff's claims for recklessness are separate and distinct from the negligence counts and that the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to rise to the level of a recklessness claim. See Lynch v. Brookside Obstretrics and GynecologyAssociates, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. 175019 (December 13, 2000, D'Andrea, J.). Accordingly, the defendants' motion to strike counts two, four and six is hereby denied.
HICKEY, JUDGE TRAIL (TRIAL) REFEREE. CT Page 11940