DocketNumber: File No. SP-H-7903-745-HD
Citation Numbers: 408 A.2d 22, 35 Conn. Super. Ct. 274, 35 Conn. Supp. 274
Judges: SPADA, J.
Filed Date: 5/14/1979
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/12/2023
The plaintiff landlord seeks possession of an apartment dwelling unit by way of a summary process complaint which alleges a termination of lease and the commission of a nuisance. The defendant's status is that of a tenant on an oral month-to-month lease. A motion to dismiss was filed contending that the complaint failed to meet the requirements of §
The issue raised by the present motion is one of first impression within Connecticut. No published decisions related to this issue have been found. Essentially, the tenant seeks a "second bite of the apple." She argues that by enacting §
The original complaint, a preprinted form, seeks possession for nonpayment of rent. The notice to quit charged nuisance as the grounds for the eviction. In compliance with a request to revise, the plaintiff submitted a revised complaint alleging breach of the rental agreement in that "the defendant underlet a portion of said premises." Additionally, the revised complaint alleged a termination of the lease and the commission of a "nuisance in that she used excessive hot water and maintained the apartment in an unclean manner." Nowhere does the revised complaint allude to the remedial thirty-day notice period prescribed by §
Prior to reaching the principal issue, the court will address several points raised in oral argument. The plaintiff contended that the present motion was untimely in that it was filed more than fifteen days after the defendant's appearance. Practice Book, 1978, § 142. The fifteen-day period is, however, tolled where, as here, the claim is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. "Any claim of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived; and whenever it is found . . . that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action." Practice Book, 1978, § 145.
The plaintiff further argues that the allegation of termination of the lease preempted the application of §
The Connecticut Supreme Court, in Vogel v.Bacus,
Section
The language of the statute is clear and unequivocal. It creates a thirty-day reconciliation period, allowing errant tenants to remedy their first miscue within twenty-one days of the termination notice. The legislative purpose of the statute is manifest on its face. It is to discourage and foreclose evictions against "first offenders." This is yet another example of permissible legislative modification of the common law. The statute legislates social policy by suspending the machinery of the summary process. This purpose is underscored by the removal of this "suspension" upon the reoccurrence of the violation within a six-month period.2
Upon remedy of the breach by the tenant within the statutory time framework, the rental agreement remains in effect. The statutory right to this remedy is available to tenants under both written and oral leases. The condition precedent to a remedy of the breach by the tenant is the receipt of a "written notice . . . specifying the acts or omissions." The failure of the plaintiff to allege the delivery of a written notice is fatal to its complaint.
Longstanding principles of statutory construction mandate that effect must be given to the intention of the legislature, that intent is ascertained by the wording used in the statute, and that if the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, its meaning cannot be subject to modification by construction.Colli v. Real Estate Commission,
The statute in issue refers to three separate statutes,3
all relating to landlord-tenant relations. When read together they form a consistent mosaic, each dependent upon the other to form a comprehensible order of statutory law on the subject of landlord-tenant relations. Under settled rules of statutory construction, statutes on the same subject matter should be construed in a manner that harmonizes the law so as to make one consistent body of law. Cicala v. Administrator,
The plaintiff contends that the use of the word "may" instead of "shall" in the statute in effect renders the requirement of notice directory rather than mandatory. The court does not agree. The word "may" is to be construed as "shall" when necessary to effect manifest legislative intent.Miller v. Phoenix State Bank Trust Co.,
Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein, the motion to dismiss is granted.
Colli v. Real Estate Commission , 169 Conn. 445 ( 1975 )
Miller v. Phoenix State Bank & Trust Co. , 138 Conn. 12 ( 1951 )
Hurlbut v. Lemelin , 155 Conn. 68 ( 1967 )
Cicala v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act , 161 Conn. 362 ( 1971 )
Vogel v. Bacus , 133 Conn. 95 ( 1946 )
Webb v. Ambler , 125 Conn. 543 ( 1939 )
St. Paul's Flax Hill Co-Operative v. Johnson , 124 Conn. App. 728 ( 2010 )
Housing Authority v. Stevens ( 2022 )
Housing Authority of New Haven v. Martin , 95 Conn. App. 802 ( 2006 )
HOUSING AUTH. OF CITY OF NEW HAVEN v. DeRoche , 112 Conn. App. 355 ( 2009 )
Oxford House at Yale v. Gilligan , 125 Conn. App. 464 ( 2010 )
Suburban Greater Hartford Realty Management Corp. v. Edwards , 123 Conn. App. 295 ( 2010 )
Windsor Housing Authority v. Fonsworth, No. Hdsp 107882 (... , 2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 6284 ( 2001 )
Housing Authority v. Rodriguez, No. Sp 97-8305 (Nov. 6, ... , 20 Conn. L. Rptr. 554 ( 1997 )
Rac Family v. Wallace, No. Cv9-12569 (Dec. 14, 2001) , 2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 17151 ( 2001 )
Almagro v. Jackson, No. Sph 9003-54901 (Oct. 3, 1990) , 1990 Conn. Super. Ct. 2923 ( 1990 )
Barkan Management Co., Inc. v. Artis, No. Spnh 9511 45269 (... , 16 Conn. L. Rptr. 357 ( 1996 )
Centrix Management Co. v. Burleson, No. Sp 89480 (Jan. 7, ... , 19 Conn. L. Rptr. 405 ( 1997 )
Housing Authority v. Rodriguez , 178 Conn. App. 120 ( 2017 )
Josephine Towers, L.P. v. Kelly ( 2020 )
Moisiadis v. Failla, No. 9012-58640 (Mar. 4, 1991) , 1991 Conn. Super. Ct. 2802 ( 1991 )
East Side Village Condo. v. Shumpert, No. Spn 961225494nb (... , 19 Conn. L. Rptr. 451 ( 1997 )
Thomas v. Lenhart , 38 Conn. Super. Ct. 1 ( 1982 )
East Hartford Housing Authority v. Lundy, No. Sph 87718 (... , 1996 Conn. Super. Ct. 6388 ( 1996 )