DocketNumber: No. CV93 0131151
Citation Numbers: 1995 Conn. Super. Ct. 434, 13 Conn. L. Rptr. 388
Judges: LEWIS, J.
Filed Date: 1/26/1995
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
The Town contends that the court did not consider the second ground of its motion for summary judgment, which claimed that the plaintiffs' allegation of joint liability against the Town and the Greenwich Housing Authority, Inc. (Housing Authority) does not satisfy the requirement of proving sole proximate cause against the Town as required by General Statutes §
Specifically, the court noted that "[t]he sole proximate cause doctrine . . . has never been extended to the cause of the defect, but only as to whether the defect in the public highway was the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries." See Memorandum of Decision dated January 20, 1994 (Lewis, J.). The court held CT Page 435 that in order to prevail on a defective highway claim, the plaintiff must prove "that the defect must have been the sole proximate cause of the injuries and damages claimed, which means that the plaintiff must prove freedom from contributory negligence." See Memorandum of Decision dated January 20, 1994 (Lewis, J.), quoting Szachon v. Windsor,
Accordingly, based upon the previous decision of the court, and the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defect was the sole proximate cause of the injuries and damages claimed by the plaintiff, the motion to reargue is denied. Practice Book § 204B.