DocketNumber: No. CV 439033
Citation Numbers: 1992 Conn. Super. Ct. 6513
Judges: SHELDON, J.
Filed Date: 7/8/1992
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
These actions by the defendant, which the plaintiffs further claim either to have been taken with the intent to inflict extreme emotional distress upon Mr. Andrews or to have resulted from the defendant's negligence in recruiting, hiring, training, disciplining and supervising its officers and employees, are alleged to have harmed the plaintiffs in the following ways. Mr. Andrews claims to have suffered humiliation, anxiety, loss of morale, self-esteem and reputation, to have experienced nervousness, and to have been deprived of certain health care, medical, disability, vacation and other benefits to which he would have been entitled had his employment with the defendant not been terminated. Mrs. Andrews claims that as a result of her husband's injuries, she has been deprived of "many aspects of [his] love, affection, companionship, and consortium, and will be for the foreseeable future." Complaint, Count XI, p. 18.
The defendant has responded to the plaintiffs' allegations by pleading as a special defense that all eleven counts of the plaintiffs' complaint are barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act, Conn. Gen. Stat.
An employer shall not be liable to any action for damages on account of personal injury CT Page 6514 sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment or on account of death resulting from personal injury so sustained, but, an employer shall secure compensation for his employees as follows . . . All rights and claims between employer and employees, or any representatives or dependents of such employees, arising out of personal injury or death sustained in the course of employment are abolished . . .
Relying on this special defense, the defendant now moves this Court for summary judgment as to all counts of plaintiffs' complaint, claiming that each is barred by Section
A defendant is entitled to summary judgment whenever "the pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that [he, as] the moving party [,] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." C.P.B. 384. Our Supreme Court has long held that a defendant-employer is entitled to summary judgment whenever the pleadings of a plaintiff-employee in a personal injury action against him make it clear that the plaintiff's claims for relief fall within the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. Velardi v. Ryder Truck Rental Inc.,
At the time this Motion was submitted for decision, there was a split of authority in the Connecticut Superior Court as to whether actions for damages on account of personal injuries resulting from wrongful termination are barred by Section
Since this Motion was submitted for decision, however, this issue has been put to rest by the Connecticut Appellate Court, which in Fulco v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation,
In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that his emotional distress arose out of discharge, not out of the conditions of his employment. Thus, the earliest time the plaintiff's injuries could have arisen was immediately after discharge. It is impossible for the injury to have arisen during the period of his employment because his employment necessarily terminated before the alleged injury arose. It would unduly strain the language of the statute for us to conclude that termination of employment creates a job related injury.
Further the plaintiff was not reasonably fulfilling the duties of his employment or doing something incidental to it when he sustained his injury. Clearly, the process of being fired is not a duty of employment . . . By its nature, the process of being discharged normally occurs only once in an employee's tenure. It cannot be considered conduct regularly engaged in as an incident to employment.
Fulco, at 808-809. CT Page 6516
Under the authority of Fulco, this Court holds that the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act does not bar any of the eleven counts of plaintiff's complaint.2 On that basis, the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
SHELDON, J.