DocketNumber: No. 52 81 37
Citation Numbers: 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 6052, 9 Conn. Super. Ct. 683
Judges: HURLEY, J.
Filed Date: 6/2/1994
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
Whether the defendants' motion to strike count two of the plaintiffs' second amended complaint should be granted.
Facts
By a three count second amended complaint filed December 2, 1993, the plaintiffs, Karen Spakowski and Paul Spakowski, commenced this negligence action against the defendants, Charter Oak Walk-In Medical Center, P.C. ("Charter Oak"), Richard C. Albrecht, M.D. ("Albrecht"), and Charles L. Carr, D.O. ("Carr"). The plaintiffs allege the following facts.
Charter Oak operates a walk-in style medical clinic and holds itself out to the public as being fully able to care for a wide range of illnesses, emergency conditions, diseases, and injuries. Defendant Albrecht is a licensed physician in the state of Connecticut who holds himself out to the public as a general practitioner. Defendant Carr is a licensed doctor of osteopathy in the state of Connecticut who holds himself out to the public as having a family practice.
On or about May 27, 1991, Karen Spakowski first came under the care and treatment of the defendants. While under the care and treatment of the defendants, Karen Spakowski suffered a perforated, ruptured appendix with a resulting abscess which required emergency surgery. The perforation and rupture of Karen Spakowski's appendix and resulting abscess were caused by the failure of the defendants to exercise reasonable care under all of the circumstances then and there present. CT Page 6053
In count two of the plaintiffs' amended complaint, the plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that the defendant Charter Oak has violated CUTPA, General Statutes §
On December 30, 1993, the defendants filed a motion to strike count two of the plaintiffs' second amended complaint and an accompanying memorandum of law.
The defendants argue that count two of the plaintiffs' second amended complaint is legally insufficient for the following reasons: (1) a claim of negligence does establish a violation of CUTPA; (2) an allegation of a single unfair or deceptive act cannot establish a violation of CUTPA; and (3) plaintiffs have failed to allege the necessary elements of a claim under CUTPA.
The plaintiffs argue that count two of the plaintiffs' second amended complaint is legally sufficient because a single act or transaction is sufficient to state a claim under CUTPA and the facts as alleged state a legally sufficient cause of action under CUTPA.
On January 25, 1994, the plaintiffs filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the defendants' motion to strike count two of the plaintiffs' second amended complaint.
Discussion
Pursuant to Practice Book § 152, a motion to strike maybe brought to test the legal sufficiency of a pleading. Pratt v.Town of Old Saybrook,
General Statutes §
Courts have held that an allegation of a single transaction is insufficient to bring a claim under CUTPA. See, e.g., Dalton v. Knell,
Other courts hold that an allegation of a single transaction is sufficient to bring a claim under CUTPA. See, e.g., Levesque v. Kris Enterprises,
This court is persuaded by the those cases holding that a single instance of alleged misconduct is insufficient to bring a claim under CUTPA. See, e.g., Laks v. Metropolitanproperty and Casualty Insurance Company, supra, citing Mead v.Burns,
The court also finds that a mere negligent act does not support a CUTPA claim. Furthermore, the plaintiffs have failed to allege the necessary elements of a claim under CUTPA: that the defendants' acts (1) offend public policy, (2) were immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous, and (3) caused substantial injury to consumers.
For all the foregoing reasons the motion to strike is granted.