DocketNumber: File 157172
Citation Numbers: 255 A.2d 640, 28 Conn. Super. Ct. 173, 28 Conn. Supp. 173, 1969 Conn. Super. LEXIS 95
Judges: Rubinow
Filed Date: 3/6/1969
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/3/2024
On February 1, 1965, the state of Connecticut entered into a contract for architectural services with Vincent G. Kling. The contract was executed for the state by Homer D. Babbidge, Jr., president of the University of Connecticut, acting under the authority of § 13 of No. 362 of the 1963 Special Acts. 31 Spec. Laws 365. That section gave the trustees of the University of Connecticut *Page 174 "full and complete responsibility for the expenditures of and accounting for funds realized from bonds issued . . . for the medical-dental school." The special act also directed that the trustees "shall select architects . . . for said medical-dental school, in such manner as they deem best to ensure (1) design of the entire project as a credit to Connecticut architecturally, and (2) economical construction and maintenance." In addition to Babbidge's signature, the contract bears the signed endorsements, "Approved as to form, Harold M. Mulvey Attorney General" and "Approved by George J. Conkling, Commissioner of Finance and Control."
An action having been instituted against the state by the contractor which is doing the construction work under Kling's plans, the state brought a third-party action against Kling. Kling then filed a motion to stay the third-party action, under General Statutes §
the crucial question is whether a governmental agency has the power to enter into an agreement to arbitrate if such power is not expressly conferred on it by statute. On this question, there are divergent lines of authority. One line, exemplified byUnited States v. Ames, 24 Fed. Cas. 784, holds that no officer of the government has the power to enter into an agreement to arbitrate unless that power is specifically conferred by the legislature. The other line, exemplified by Commonwealth v. Eastern PavingCo.,
The rationale in the Ames case has been criticized as "puzzling and inconclusive." Comment, 50 Yale L.J. 458, 462. Decided in 1845, it has an antiarbitration philosophy which was repudiated in this state twenty-one years later in Hine v. Stephens,
Although the Hine case deals with the submission of an existing controversy, as contrasted with an agreement to submit a future controversy to arbitration, that distinction has not been of significance in this state since 1929, when our Arbitration Act was passed. That act furthers a long-standing public policy of this state favoring arbitration. GaerBros., Inc. v. Mott,
There remains the question whether the authority of the trustees to enter into an agreement to arbitrate may be implied from § 13 of the special act. As noted previously, that section vests in the trustees "full and complete responsibility for the expenditures of . . . funds realized from bonds . . . for the medical-dental school." 31 Spec. Laws 365 § 13. Further, it empowers the trustees to select the architect "in such manner as they deem best." The trustees, by agreeing to article 12 of the contract, have "deemed it best" that the contract for architectural services should include a provision for arbitration. In view of the policy of our state *Page 177 favoring arbitration, and in the absence of any general or special act restraining the trustees from entering into an arbitration agreement, the court holds that the broad powers given to the trustees include the power to enter into an arbitration agreement.
The state claims that General Statutes §§
The third-party defendant's motion for a stay is granted.