DocketNumber: No. CV93 0132773
Citation Numbers: 1996 Conn. Super. Ct. 1319-R, 16 Conn. L. Rptr. 111
Judges: LEWIS, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 2/5/1996
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
The defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment (#141) as to counts two and three of the plaintiff's complaint on the CT Page 1319-S ground that negligence is not sufficient to support a cause of action in CUTPA, and that the plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to support a cause of action in fraudulent concealment.
"Practice Book § 384 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Barrettv. Danbury Hospital,
The defendant contends that the plaintiff has essentially alleged a cause of action in negligence, which is insufficient to support an action in CUTPA, and that the plaintiff has not alleged a general business practice or consumer injury. The plaintiff maintains that the defendant "withheld information from her regarding the risk of the procedure, the defendant's lack of skill in performing the procedure and the extent of damage she suffered as a result of his negligence," and that these allegations are sufficient to establish a claim in CUTPA.
In his motion for summary judgment the defendant is testing the legal sufficiency of counts two and three of the plaintiff's complaint. "The office of a motion for summary judgment is not to test the legal sufficiency of a complaint, but is to test for the presence of contested factual issues." Burke v. Avitable,
"General Statutes §
The first issue is whether CUTPA can apply to dentists and their providing of dental services to a patient. Whatever doubt existed as to this issue was put to rest rather forcefully in a footnote in Larson Chelsey Realty Co. v. Lansen, supra,
In the present case, the plaintiff repeats the allegations of the first six paragraphs of the professional negligence count, including that the defendant "failed to inform" the plaintiff that he had caused or aggravated her dental problem due to failure to properly treat her. In the CUTPA count, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant misrepresented her dental condition and concealed from her his lack of skill in his performance of dental work. Thus, the plaintiff has in effect repeated in the CUTPA count her claim that the defendant failed to advise her of his negligence. Thus, both the first count and the CUTPA count are premised on negligence and the CUTPA count does not set forth a separate, cognizable cause of action. Accordingly, the defendant's motion for summary judgment as to count two is granted.
The defendant also contends that the plaintiff has not alleged sufficient acts to establish a cause of action in fraudulent misrepresentation. The plaintiff argues that the allegations of negligence and those of fraud are related but distinct.
"The essential elements of an action in common law fraud, as we have repeatedly held, are that: (1) a false representation was made as a statement of fact; (2) it was untrue and known to be untrue by the party making it; (3) it was made to induce the other party to act upon it; and (4) the other party did so act upon that false representation to his injury." Barbara Weisman, Trustee v.Kaspar,
The plaintiff alleges that the defendant concealed the following facts from her: his negligent acts, that her condition was not healthy, that he performed procedures unskillfully, and the risks and consequences of the procedures he did and did not perform. The plaintiff further alleges that she relied on these misrepresentations in that she did obtain care to rectify the defendant's negligence, and that she has suffered injury as a result. These allegations are sufficient to state a cause of action in fraudulent misrepresentation. The defendant contends, however, that these allegations cannot be proven by the plaintiff. The defendant argues that he testified that he told the plaintiff immediately upon becoming aware of perforations, but the defendant also states in his memorandum that the plaintiff testified that the defendant did not tell her that "he was incompetent to do root canal therapy; that he was careless; and . . . that he might have perforated her canals long before the date on which he told her of the perforations." This presents CT Page 1319-V a genuine issue of material fact, and accordingly, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied as to count three.
So Ordered.
Dated at Stamford, Connecticut, this 5th day of February, 1996.
WILLIAM BURKE LEWIS, JUDGE.