DocketNumber: FILE No. 1184
Citation Numbers: 460 A.2d 1306, 38 Conn. Super. Ct. 695, 38 Conn. Supp. 695, 1983 Conn. Super. LEXIS 245
Judges: Hennessy
Filed Date: 2/4/1983
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/3/2024
After a trial, a jury found the defendant guilty of making a false statement to a public officer in violation of General Statutes
The relevant facts are as follows: Property at 848 Congress Avenue in New Haven, owned by the defendant, was the site of an alleged arson. The police suspected that Judson Brown, a live-in companion of Ophelia Holmes and a business associate of the defendant, set fire to the property. In the course of the police investigation into the arson, the defendant was asked *Page 697
if he had any business dealings with Ophelia Holmes involving 848 Congress Avenue. The defendant stated that he did not and signed, under oath, a transcript of his recorded statement to that effect. Examination of the land records, however, showed that the defendant had transferred a half interest in 848 Congress Avenue to Ophelia Holmes in 1978 and that she had later transferred the property back to the defendant. The defendant's sworn statement is the basis of his conviction for violating
Evidence was presented to the jury to establish that the defendant swore that he did not have business dealings with Ophelia Holmes involving the property at 848 Congress Avenue when in fact he did; that the defendant was an acquaintance of and had business dealings with Ophelia Holmes and Judson Brown, both of whom were under arrest in connection with the arson burning of other properties, a fact which was known to the defendant; and that the defendant's sworn statement was made to a peace officer who was conducting an investigation into the alleged arson at the defendant's property at 848 Congress Avenue. The jury also had before it the testimony of the defendant that his statement denying business dealings with Ophelia Holmes concerning the Congress Avenue property was made as a result of his faulty memory and confusion.
The jury rejected the claim of the defendant and believed the proposition of the state that the defendant knowingly and intentionally swore to a false statement *Page 698
made to a public servant in the performance of his official duty. The facts presented to the jury could reasonably lead it to conclude that which it did. We as an appellate court cannot retry the facts or pass upon the credibility of the witnesses. State v. Penland,
The specific acts of misconduct claimed are encompassed in the general allegation that "the prosecution's presentation was designed to prejudice the defendant and to induce and encourage speculation." The defendant alleges that the many references by the prosecution to the fire at Congress Avenue as being an arson were prejudicial. There are in the transcript many references by the assistant state's attorney that the Congress Avenue fire was caused by arson. The police had listed the fire as an arson and were investigating it as such. The offense alleged to have been committed by the defendant took place during an arson investigation. The circumstances under which the defendant's statement was given were relevant and evidence presenting these circumstances was properly admitted. A review of the record does not reveal that the references to the fire at Congress Avenue as an act of arson were so prejudicial that the defendant was deprived of his right to a fair trial because of prosecutorial misconduct.2 State v. Kinsey,
The purpose of a charge is to call to the attention of the members of a jury, unfamiliar with legal distinctions, whatever is necessary and proper to guide them to a right decision in a particular case. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Brenckman,
The example given, read in the context of the entire charge, was not such as to mislead the jury. The instructions are adequate if they give the jury a clear understanding of the issues and proper guidance in determining those issues. State v. Mason,
"Circumstantial evidence involves the offering of evidence of facts from which the trier is asked to infer the existence of, and, so, to find proven, another fact or facts." Hennessey v. Hennessey,
The alleged offense in this matter involves a false statement by the defendant in an arson investigation. The false statement concerns the defendant's business dealings with the live-in companion of the suspect in the arson of the defendant's property. Testimony showing that Judson Brown was a suspect in the burning of the Congress Avenue property and his relationship with Ophelia Holmes and the defendant could enlighten the jury as to the intent of the defendant and is therefore relevant.
We do not agree with the defendant's argument that the court erred in allowing evidence to be introduced to show a pattern between repairs to property and fires subsequently set in the repaired property. The prosecutor asked the investigating officer a question directed to that point.5The defendant objected to the question. Although the court overruled the objection, the prosecutor did not repeat the question. We are not convinced that that testimony, since it was not pursued, resulted in any significant prejudice to the defendant which would result in depriving him of a fair trial. State v. Hafner,
The defendant further claims that it was error to allow testimony of the fact that Judson Brown and Ophelia Holmes had been arrested in the past for arson. *Page 702
A review of the transcript reveals that the defendant introduced into evidence the investigating officer's affidavit in connection with the arrest warrant he prepared in this case. Information in that affidavit stated that Judson Brown and Ophelia Holmes had been arrested for an arson fire other than the one under investigation. Later, upon questioning by the prosecutor, that information was read by the investigating officer to the jury without objection by the defendant. The defendant cannot rely upon the admission of evidence which he himself introduced as a basis for a reversal of his conviction. State v. Kinsey,
The defendant's additional argument that he was prejudiced by a statement of a fact not in evidence, made by the prosecutor in her summation to the jury, is not persuasive. The prosecutor stated that the defendant's insurance claim had not been paid although that fact was not in evidence. The court specifically corrected that misstatement by the prosecution and clearly informed the jury not to consider it. Comments to the jury will not constitute error unless they are prejudicial and deprive the defendant of a fair trial. State v. Kinsey, *Page 703 supra, 348. In view of the court's corrective instruction to the jury, the prosecutor's statement was not sufficient to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.
There is no error.
In this opinion DALY and COVELLO, Js., concurred.
State v. Alterio , 154 Conn. 23 ( 1966 )
State v. Evans , 165 Conn. 61 ( 1973 )
Novella v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. , 163 Conn. 552 ( 1972 )
State v. Briggs , 179 Conn. 328 ( 1979 )
Hennessey v. Hennessey , 145 Conn. 211 ( 1958 )
State v. Penland , 174 Conn. 153 ( 1978 )
Briggs v. Connecticut , 100 S. Ct. 3000 ( 1980 )
State v. Cordova , 38 Conn. Super. Ct. 377 ( 1982 )
State v. Hafner , 168 Conn. 230 ( 1975 )
State v. Avila , 166 Conn. 569 ( 1974 )
State v. Kinsey , 173 Conn. 344 ( 1977 )
Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance v. Brenckman , 148 Conn. 391 ( 1961 )