DocketNumber: File No. CV99-0494415S.
Citation Numbers: 47 Conn. Super. Ct. 113, 47 Conn. Supp. 113
Judges: HON. ROBERT SATTER, JUDGE TRIAL REFEREE.
Filed Date: 3/27/2000
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/12/2023
The facts as found by the commission's hearing officer and supported by substantial evidence are as follows. The plaintiff was created as a nonprofit § 501 (c) corporation in 1983. See
On the recommendation of the study group, the MCAA's board of directors directed its staff to form the plaintiff organization. All members of the plaintiff's board of directors initially were appointed by the MCAA's board of directors. The articles of incorporation of the plaintiff organization provide that four of its seven directors were to be appointed by the MCAA and *Page 115 that decisions were to be made by the plaintiff by a majority vote of those members present, provided at least two MCAA designees were present. The plaintiff's articles of incorporation stated its purposes as follows: "[E]ncouraging the process of community-based economic development in minority, poor or disadvantaged communities . . . expand opportunities for low-income minority and disadvantaged individuals to enter into, own, manage, operate or be employed in business enterprise . . . and to promote and enhance the vitality and health of existing neighborhoods. . . ." The articles further provide: "The focus of the corporation will be on energy conservation, construction and housing rehabilitation, training and the creation of employment."
The plaintiff experienced four distinct phases of activity during the course of its existence: (1) 1983-1985, when the plaintiff operated actively; (2) 1986-1993, when the plaintiff was relatively inactive; (3) 1993-1996, when the plaintiff substantially engaged in a lead abatement program financed by a $380,000 grant by the Department of Health and Human Services and in an insulation program of Wrap-Up/Seal-Up under contract with Northeast Utilities; and (4) the present, when the plaintiff again is virtually inactive. During its active periods, the plaintiff also was the successful bidder for a number of other contracts involving removal of lead in public schools, rehabilitating houses for low income people and job training for the Department of Labor.
The executive director of the MCAA serves without compensation as the executive officer and fiduciary agent of the plaintiff. The plaintiff's financial records are maintained by the staff of the MCAA and kept on file in the MCAA's office. The plaintiff has its own project manager, who actually directs the work of lead removal, weatherizing and rehabilitation activities of the organization. *Page 116
Throughout its existence, the plaintiff received income from the public and private contracts it performed and public grants from various sources for the programs it undertook. Only in 1994 did the plaintiff's state and federal grants exceed 30 percent of all of its revenues.
The hearing officer correctly identified the legal principles to be applied in this case. He cited Board of Trustees v. Freedom of InformationCommission,
The hearing officer further recognized that in Connecticut HumaneSociety v. Freedom of Information Commission,
Applying those factors in the manner indicated, the hearing officer determined that the level of government funding criterion had not been met, but that all the other factors had been met and, accordingly, concluded that the plaintiff is the functional equivalent of a public agency within the meaning of §
Because the commission's decision requires the plaintiff to provide copies of all the requested documents, the court finds that the plaintiff is aggrieved within the meaning of General Statutes §
The court reviews the issues raised by the plaintiff in accordance with the limited scope of judicial review afforded by the UAPA. Dolgner v.Alander,
In this case, the interpretation of §
In this case, the hearing officer has properly identified the factor to be considered in determining whether an organization is the functional equivalent of a government agency within the meaning of §
The commission found that the level of government funding criterion of the functional equivalence test had not been met. This court finds that there is substantial evidence to sustain that finding and, moreover, that neither party to this proceeding contests it. Consequently, it may be adopted by this court.
As to the factor of whether the plaintiff performs a governmental function, the hearing officer alluded to the purposes of the plaintiff's articles of incorporation, as previously discussed, and stated: "More specifically, it is found that the primary activities of the [plaintiff] have been to upgrade energy conservation and lead *Page 119 abatement programs, both of which activities implemented public policy initiatives of the U.S. Congress and the Connecticut General Assembly." The decision of the hearing officer went on to state: "While such social welfare programs are not universally supported as appropriate activities for government, it is beyond question as a matter of history and it is found that in the period from the 1960s to the 1990s, social welfare programs such as those operated by the [plaintiff] have been governmental functions. . . . The [plaintiff] therefore performed a governmental function."
General Statutes §
Lead abatement and energy conservation may be governmental functions pursuant to those statutes. When such programs are conducted by an organization as a contractor rather than as a governmental entity, however, the organization is not performing a governmental function within the meaning of §
The plaintiff in this case has no power to govern, to regulate or to make decisions affecting government. It operates only through contracts with the government and private concerns. Thus, this court determines that the commission incorrectly applied the factor of performing a governmental function to the facts of this case, and that factor has not been met.
As to the factor of whether the plaintiff was created by government, the hearing officer found that the MCAA's board of directors directed its staff to form the plaintiff. The MCAA's board of directors initially appointed the plaintiff's board of directors, and the MCAA provided the original seed money for the plaintiff's start-up. The hearing officer concluded that the plaintiff was created directly by the MCAA, itself a public agency of government. Although the plaintiff contends that the initial idea for the creation of the plaintiff came from a study group of citizens and citizen organizations, substantial evidence in the record sustains the commission's finding that the plaintiff was created by the MCAA. *Page 121
As to the final factor of the extent of government involvement or regulation, the commission based its conclusion that this factor had been met on evidence that the MCAA appoints a majority of the plaintiff's board (four out of seven directors), the plaintiff's board cannot act unless two MCAA appointed directors are present, the executive director of the MCAA serves as the chief executive officer of the plaintiff and its fiduciary agent, and all of the plaintiff's financial records are maintained by the staff of the MCAA and are on file at the MCAA's offices. Moreover, the record reveals that if, at an MCAA executive committee meeting, there were sufficient members of the plaintiff's board members present for a quorum, the plaintiff simultaneously conducted its own board meeting. While the actual activity of the plaintiff in performing lead abatement, weatherization and rehabilitation contracts was supervised by the plaintiff's project manager in the field, the MCAA, by appointing the majority of the plaintiff's board of directors and by having its executive director as the chief executive officer of the plaintiff, has not only considerable involvement with the plaintiff, but actual domination and control of the plaintiff.
Thus, the court concludes that two factors of the functional equivalence test support the commission's conclusion that the plaintiff is a public agency (the plaintiff was created by government, and there is considerable government involvement and control), and that two factors have not been established (level of governmental funding and performance of a governmental function). The court must consider the factors "`cumulatively'"; Connecticut Humane Society v. Freedom of InformationCommission, supra,
The court gives dominant weight to the factor of the MCAA's having dominant control of the plaintiff by virtue of the MCAA's director constituting a majority of the plaintiff's board and the plaintiff effectively not being able to act without the concurrence of the MCAA's board members, the MCAA's executive director being the chief executive officer of the plaintiff and being paid by the MCAA, and all of the plaintiff's financial records being maintained and filed with MCAA. The plaintiff, thus, is virtually an alter ego of the MCAA. If the organizations were private corporations, under either the instrumentality or identity tests of Zaist v. Olson,
The MCAA was formed by an ordinance of the Meriden city council to conduct community action programs pursuant to federal and state statutes. It was found by the commission to be a public agency. By the plaintiff's being the MCAA's alter ego, the court concludes that the plaintiff also is a public agency within the meaning of §
The appeal is dismissed.
Peter H. Forsham v. Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Secretary of ... , 587 F.2d 1128 ( 1978 )
DiBenedetto v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles , 168 Conn. 587 ( 1975 )
Hart Twin Volvo Corporation v. Commissioner of Motor ... , 165 Conn. 42 ( 1973 )
Zaist v. Olson , 154 Conn. 563 ( 1967 )
Saphir v. Neustadt , 177 Conn. 191 ( 1979 )
Wilson v. Freedom of Information Commission , 181 Conn. 324 ( 1980 )