DocketNumber: No. CV 94 55837 S
Citation Numbers: 1995 Conn. Super. Ct. 14535, 15 Conn. L. Rptr. 515
Judges: KLACZAK, J.
Filed Date: 12/21/1995
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
Factual History
On February 3, 1994, the plaintiffs filed a subdivision application (Application #94-104) with the Commission to subdivide their property located in the RU-40 zone at Woodbridge Road in the Town of Coventry, Connecticut into five building lots. (Return of Record [ROR], Items 21-24).
The Commission held a public hearing on April 11, 1994. (ROR, Item 17). Commission members Shelton Stewart, Darby Pollansky, and Al Quintiliano participated in the discussions and subsequent vote. (ROR, Items 18, 23 and 30).
On April 25, 1994, the Commission denied the plaintiffs' application for approval of a subdivision because the proposed subdivision lacked the required road frontage.1 (ROR, Items 21-24). The Commission reconfirmed that decision on May 9, 1994. (ROR, Items
The plaintiffs have challenged the Commissions' decision, arguing that the Commission acted illegally, arbitrarily, and in abuse of its discretion by: (1) concluding that the plaintiffs' proposed lots did not have frontage; (2) deciding that it could not impose a condition on the plaintiffs that Woodbridge Road be relocated; (3) accepting information from the Town Planner after the hearings had closed; and (4) allowing an individual to participate in the hearings and render a vote despite that individual not being legally qualified to be a member of the Commission because she was not a resident of the Town of Coventry.
Aggrievement
Aggrievement is a jurisdictional matter and a prerequisite for maintaining an appeal. Winchester Woods Associates v.Planning Zoning Commission,
The plaintiffs allege that they are the owners of the property which is the subject of this appeal. (ROR, Item 1).
Lyndon Wilmot testified before this Court that he and Roberta Wilmot are the owners of the property. Accordingly, the Court finds the plaintiffs are aggrieved and have standing to bring this appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court may grant relief in an appeal from a decision of an administrative authority only where the authority has acted unreasonably, illegally, arbitrarily or has abused its discretion. Smith v. Zoning Board of Appeals,
"The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the board acted improperly." Spero v. Zoning Board of Appeals,
In reviewing a subdivision application, the Commission acts in an administrative capacity and not as a legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial agency. Reed v. Planning Zoning Commission,
Issues
The plaintiffs contend that when the State of Connecticut relocates Woodbridge Road, the plaintiffs' land will have the required frontage to support the proposed subdivision. They assert that, because the State has assumed the obligation of relocating or building the road, the Commission erred by denying the subdivision application because the proposed subdivision lacked frontage.
The Court finds that the Commission did not act unreasonably, illegally, arbitrarily, or in; abuse of its discretion by denying the plaintiffs' subdivision application because the parcel lacked the proper frontage.
Sections 3.3 and 10.2 of the Coventry Zoning Regulations provide in pertinent part: "Each lot shall meet the minimum lot frontage on at least one street. . . ." Section 10.5 of the Coventry Zoning Regulations requires lots in the RU-40 zone to have a minimum 150 feet of frontage.
The Commission is authorized to consider applicable town zoning regulations in reviewing a subdivision application.Krawski v. Planning Zoning Commission,
Whether the State relocates Route 6 in the future should not CT Page 14539 have been considered in the proposed application. The plaintiffs provide no evidence that such relocation will take place in the near future, if at all. The fact is that the plaintiffs' subdivision application, as submitted, does not meet the frontage requirements necessary for approval. "Once a zoning violation has been found on the face of a submitted plan, a commission may not approve the plan." Reed v. Planning Zoning Commission,
The Court finds, therefore, that the Commission did not act unreasonably, illegally, arbitrarily, or in abuse of its discretion by denying the plaintiffs' subdivision application due to the absence of the requisite frontage.
The plaintiffs posit that the State will relocate Woodbridge Road and when it does the parcels will then have the required frontage, and they argue that the Commission erroneously decided that it could not conditionally approve the application — the condition being that the State build the relocated road within five years otherwise the conditional approval would be void.
The Commission cannot make a subdivision subject to a condition not authorized by statute or where the condition is not within the control of either the Commission or the applicant.Carpenter v. Planning Zoning Commission,
The relocation of Woodbridge Road is not within the control of either the Commission or the applicant. Consequently, the Commission correctly declined to grant a conditional approval of the plaintiffs' application.
The plaintiffs, however, attempt to distinguish the above cases by asserting that in the present case, the applicants have requested the condition, as opposed to the Commission imposing the condition on the applicant. This distinction fails to change CT Page 14540 the proposition set forth in Carpenter.
Further, even if the commission could grant the subdivision subject to a condition not conferred by statute or not within the control of the Commission or the applicant, the failure to do so does not constitute an unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal, or abusive decision.
"Nothing in . . . [General Statutes] §
The Court can only reverse the Commission's decision if the Commission acted unreasonably, illegally, arbitrarily, or in abuse of its discretion. Smith v. Zoning Board of Appeals,
The plaintiffs contend that this information should invalidate the Commission's decision because the information was untrue, prejudicial, and poisoned the Commission.
Although the Town Planner's remarks appear to be inaccurate, the plaintiffs have not demonstrated that such remarks prejudiced the Commission or induced the Commission to deny the subdivision application.
Indeed, a further reading of the April 24 transcript reveals CT Page 14541 that the Town Planner's remarks did not influence the Commission members' reasoning. After the Town Planner's remarks, the Commission members discuss that the plaintiffs have no road frontage "unless someone else builds the road that may or may not be done." (ROR, Item 22 p. 9). Furthermore, the Commission members discuss the possibility of conditioning their approval on the construction of the relocated road. (ROR, Item 22 p. 9-13). These discussions would not have occurred if the Town Planner's remarks had induced the commission members into thinking that the road would never be relocated.
Further, even if the Town Planner's statements were improper, at most, the statements constituted a harmless error because the actions of the Commission are adequately supported by reasons not based on the Town Planner's statements. First Hartford RealtyCorp. v. Planning Zoning Commission,
Furthermore, "[n]ot all procedural irregularities require a reviewing court to set aside an administrative decision; material prejudice to the complaining party must be shown." (Citations omitted.) Murach v. Planning Zoning Commission,
The plaintiffs contend that because the Commission was not legally constituted with resident electors at the time this matter was heard, the Court should reverse the decision. The plaintiffs rely on Hackett v. City of New Haven,
Although Pollansky was not a resident of the Town of Coventry pursuant to Hackett, the remedy proscribed in Hackett does not mandate that this Court reverse the Commission's ruling. The plaintiff in Hackett brought an injunction action to restrain the defendant from acting as a member of the board of finance. CT Page 14542Hackett v. City of New Haven,
This Court does find that Pollansky was not a resident elector of the town of Coventry at the time she served as a Commission member hearing this application. From January 1992 until the end of the summer of 1994 she lived with her husband and children in Storrs, at the home of her husband's parents. While she maintained ties to Coventry, including staying on the voting rolls, having her mail sent to her father's home in Coventry, and intended to eventually move to Coventry when she and her husband had sufficient money saved to buy a house there (which in fact was done in 1994 subsequent however to the hearing in this case), the family ate and slept in Storrs for longer than two years. While she may have intended to return to Coventry and kept Coventry as her legal domicile, her residence was the town in which she and her family lived, and that was Storrs.
However, although the Court concludes that Pollansky was an improper member of the Commission, Hackett does not require the Court to overrule the Commission's decision. The plaintiffs would have had to bring a separate action to remove Pollansky from the Commission prior to the Commission's decision, rather than challenge the decision on the grounds of Pollansky's impropriety after Pollansky had participated in the decision.
In Lurie v. Planning Zoning Commission,
The Court, however, never reached the merits of the plaintiffs' claim, concluding that "it [was], however, unnecessary to decide that point in this case since the plaintiffs raised no objection at the hearing to [the commission CT Page 14543 members'] appearance. Lurie v. Planning Zoning Commission,
supra,
Pollansky testified that her place of residence was an issue when her appointment to the Commission was being considered and there was public awareness that there was a question as to her residence, but the town council was satisfied that she was a resident elector and made the appointment.
"Except as otherwise provided by statute, quo warranto is the exclusive method of trying the title to an office." Scully v.Town of Westport,
Lastly, even if the Court could declare that Darby Pollansky improperly participated in the Commission hearing, the plaintiffs have not demonstrated how Pollansky's presence in any way affected the Commission's final decision. The plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of showing any prejudice resulting from Pollansky's participation in the Commission proceedings. SeeMurach v. Planning Zoning Commission,
Accordingly, the Court finds that the Commission did not act unreasonably, illegally, arbitrarily, or in abuse of its discretion by denying the plaintiffs' subdivision application despite Pollansky's participation in the proceedings.
For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed.
Klaczak, J.
Lurie v. Planning & Zoning Commission , 160 Conn. 295 ( 1971 )
Scully v. Town of Westport , 145 Conn. 648 ( 1958 )
Stiles v. Town Council , 159 Conn. 212 ( 1970 )
Carpenter v. Planning & Zoning Commission , 176 Conn. 581 ( 1979 )
Hackett v. New Haven , 103 Conn. 157 ( 1925 )
Fletcher v. Planning & Zoning Commission , 158 Conn. 497 ( 1969 )
Forest Construction Co. v. Planning & Zoning Commission , 155 Conn. 669 ( 1967 )