DocketNumber: No. 0056044
Citation Numbers: 1997 Conn. Super. Ct. 795
Judges: FLYNN, J.
Filed Date: 2/13/1997
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
Upon the defendant's motion filed on October 17, 1996, the case was transferred from Small Claims to the regular docket pursuant to Practice Book § 572. On October 30, 1996, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. PPI also submitted copies of the pension plans at issue. On November 22, 1996, Furco filed an CT Page 796 objection to the motion to dismiss. At short calendar, Furco submitted a copy of the service agreement executed by Community Health Care Plan and the defendant. The parties do not dispute that the benefit plans at issue are Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) plans."A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court" (Emphasis in the original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gurliacci v. Mayer,
The court notes that in the CHCP — PPI contract, the defendant agrees to provide, inter alia, the following service, "[a]rrange for benefit distribution(s) upon receipt from the Client specifying the form and amount of the benefit to be paid pursuant to the Plan and the party to whom the benefit is to be paid." Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, Agency and Administrative Services Agreement, Appendix B, para. 9. Because the defendant's manner of distribution is governed by the provisions in the employee benefit plans, the dispositive issue is whether the plaintiff's breach of contract claim is preempted by ERISA.
ERISA comprehensively regulates, among other things, employee welfare benefit plans that, "through the purchase of insurance or otherwise," provide medical, surgical, or hospital care, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, or death. § 3(1),
Congress provided three provisions relating to the pre-emptive effect of the ERISA legislation: "Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section [the saving clause], the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to j any employee benefit plan. . . ." § 514(a), as set forth in
"Except as provided in subparagraph (B) [the deemer clause], nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities." § 514(b)(2)(A), as set forth in
"Neither an employee benefit plan . . . nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or investment company or to be engaged in the business of insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment companies." § 514(b)(2)(B),
To summarize the above quoted provisions, if a state law "relate[s] to . . . employee benefit plan[s], "it is pre-empted. § 514(a). The saving clause excepts from the pre-emption clause laws that "regulat[e] insurance." § 514(b)(2)(A). The deemer clause maintains that a state law that "purport[s] to regulate insurance" cannot deem an employee benefit plan to be an insurance company. § 514(b)(2)(B).
"[T]he question whether a certain state action is pre-empted by federal law is one of congressional intent. The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,
ERISA contains its own civil enforcement scheme,
In the present case, the plaintiff alleges breach of contract due to the defendant's alleged delay in the distribution of his benefits under his ERISA plans. Because ERISA preempts common law contract actions brought in state court, the court grants the defendant's motion to dismiss finding that it lacks jurisdiction to hear this claim, but does not render a decision on the merits of the plaintiff's claim.
FLYNN, J.