DocketNumber: No. CV94 04 87 17S
Citation Numbers: 1995 Conn. Super. Ct. 6955
Judges: THOMPSON, J.
Filed Date: 6/13/1995
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
In the first count, the plaintiffs allege that the defendant's conduct was malicious and constituted tortious interference with the plaintiffs' contractual relationship with their potential buyer. The second count alleges breach of contract. The third count alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress; and the fourth count alleges negligent infliction of emotional distress.
The defendant has moved to strike the third and fourth counts of the complaint on the grounds that neither plaintiff has alleged that they sustained any bodily injury. The defendant has also moved to strike the plaintiffs' claims for attorney's fees, to which the plaintiffs do not object.
While a cause of action for emotional distress, either negligently or intentionally caused, does not depend upon the presence of bodily injury, the court nevertheless concludes that neither court three nor count four states a valid cause of action.
In order for the plaintiffs to prevail in a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, they must allege and prove the following:
(1) That the defendant, or its agents and servants, should have realized that their conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress; and
(2) that, from the facts known to it, the defendant should have realized that the distress, if it were caused, might result in illness or bodily harm.
CT Page 6957
See Montinieri v. Southern New England Telephone Co.,
Since the third count of the complaint does not contain these essential allegations, it is insufficient to state a cause of action for negligently inflicted emotional distress.
In order to prevail in a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiffs must allege and prove the following:
(1) That the defendant intended to inflict emotional distress on the plaintiffs, or that it knew or should have known that emotional distress was a likely result of its conduct;
(2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous;
(3) that such conduct was the cause of the plaintiff's distress; and
(4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiffs was severe.
See Petyan v. Ellis,
Therefore, the defendant's motion to strike counts three and four of the complaint, and the claim for attorney's fees is hereby granted.
Thompson, J.